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INTRODUCTION
The pervasive influence of the federal government in modern
American life is attributable in significant part to Congress's ma-
nipulation of federal funds. The social issues occasioning spending
programs, the diminution of choice and diversity many spending
conditions entail, and the deficit consequences that have resulted
from spending at accustomed levels all have engendered much
discussion. However, the constitutional question of Congress's
"9power" to spend (including its ability to oblige compliance with
its wishes as a "condition" of federal financial assistance) has re-
ceived relatively little attention from legal scholars.'
As a consequence, the conceptual premises of this extremely
important federal activity are almost universally misunderstood.
The problems that result from this misunderstanding are not mere-
ly problems of theory, for in this realm, legal theory has immedi-
ate economic consequences and practical effects. Confused premis-
es tend to subvert rational planning and produce anomalous sur-
prises. Later in this Article the reader will confront several recent
U.S. Supreme Court cases incompatible with spending power pre-
mises to which the Court still claims to adhere. Some have gone
virtually unnoticed, while others have provoked controversy or
alarmed surprise. In each category, some have comported with
sound constitutional analysis while others have not. As to the
latter cases, however, spending power reasoning has been flawed
so subtly and for so long that no one among the disaffected has
been able to explain what went wrong.
For more than half a century it has been common ground
among constitutional scholars and lawyers that "[t]he conception
of the spending power advanced by Hamilton ... has prevailed
over that of Madison ....",2 Every law student is exposed, at
1. The worthwhile articles on this topic can almost be counted on the fingers of
one hand, and none of these has undertaken to do what is attempted here.
2. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937). The Court first explicitly endorsed
the Hamiltonian view a year earlier, in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936);
Helvering reaffirmed that endorsement, citing Butler. The Court again reaffirmed the en-
dorsement explicitly, again citing Butler, in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207
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least in meager fashion, to the classic contrast between those
Founders on this point. It therefore should seem rather important
to understand Hamilton's view. However, the majority Justices in
United States v. Butler,3 the 1936 case that first explicitly endorsed
Hamilton's view, manifestly did not: they declared that Hamilton
had it right but so misunderstood him that they actually decided
the case according to the contrary, restrictive Madisonian view.4
The famous Social Security Act cases of the next year-Stew-
ard Machine Co. v. Davis' and Helvering v. Davis6-- typically are
viewed as having corrected Butler's error, affirming its endorse-
ment of Hamilton but applying his view correctly.7 Most editors
of constitutional law teaching materials have opted to give stu-
dents chopped versions of one or both of the 1937 opinions and
then change the subject. No casebook, nor either of the major
constitutional law treatises,8 attempts any critique of Helvering or
Steward.
A rigorous critique is warranted, however. While the bare
results in Steward and Helvering (unlike those in Butler) are con-
sistent with Hamilton's view, the opinions certainly are not. Rath-
er, they display essentially the same conceptual error, the same
profound misunderstanding of Hamilton, as the opinion in Butler;
the error simply manifests itself in a converse way.
In 1937 the Justices were in the midst of difficult intellectual
struggles, not only against one another but each within himself.
Several were beginning to break free of "dual federalism,"9 a
twisted view of the Constitution that had risen to dominance after
the first third of the nineteenth century, long after Hamilton was
dead. The errors of dual federalism were subtle, tenacious, and
pervasive, and purging them after a hundred years was not an
afternoon's task. The Justices' recovery of classic constitutional
principles beginning late in the New Deal era was no simple turn-
(1987); id. at 212-13 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
3. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
4. The Butler opinion is examined infra Part 11(B).
5. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
6. 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
7. Both opinions are examined infra Part 11(B).
8. 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5.7, at
349-56 (1986); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-10, at
321-23 (2d ed. 1988).
9. Some features of dual federalism are identified infra notes 21-34 and accompany-
ing text.
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around-no "switch in time to save nine"-but rather a complex,
difficult, and slow intellectual process. Each Justice willing to re-
consider dual federalism at all had to first sense intellectual fault
in dual federalism reasoning and then unthink and rethink concep-
tions that had trammelled good minds for generations. When the
Social Security Act cases were decided in 1937, that process had
not yet been completed in any of the Justices' minds.'"
Because the immediate impact of the holdings in Steward and
Helvering was politically popular, and because the opinions seemed
not only eloquent but sufficiently cogent, the conceptual error that
prevented the Justices from accurately understanding Hamilton
went unnoticed. Not until a few years later had most of the Justic-
es pursued the intellectual ascent from dual federalism far enough
that Hamiltonian results in a spending power case could be
reached without the misfortune of a seriously confused and mis-
leading rationale.
Part I of this Article systematically examines Hamilton's view
of the power to spend. Part II examines Butler, Steward and
Helvering, each of which expressly endorses Hamilton's view but
none of which reflects any real understanding of it. Part III exam-
ines the subsequent cases (including the most recent ones), consid-
ering to what extent they are consistent with the Hamiltonian view
they nominally endorse and how differently others like them must
be decided if true conformity to Hamiltonian principle is to be
maintained.
10. Indeed, relapse into dual federalism errors still is a constant risk. See, e.g., Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the Court in New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992),
discussed infra notes 228-30, 245-55 and accompanying text.
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I. THE CONCEPTS
A. Hamilton's View of the Spending Power
1. The Principle of Enumerated Powers. No one today can-
didly denies that Hamilton's view of the spending power was cor-
rect. However, most of those who purport to endorse him serious-
ly misconceive what he said. In order to grasp accurately Hamil-
ton's spending power view, one must understand the generic constitu-
tional principles of which it was simply an application.
The prime political postulate of the early Americans was that
sovereignty inheres in the people. They therefore maintained that
governments "deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the
governed."'" This principle meant that the only powers govern-
ments legitimately could exercise were those delegated to them by
the people. When people from the several American states sought
a greater degree of national integration than existed under their
Articles of Confederation, yet desired that most matters still be
governed by their respective states, the "delegated power" concept
remained applicable, but the people faced the additional problem
of allocating the delegated power of governance between different
hands.
It was easily agreed that the nation should handle national
matters and govern what the states separately could not, while
states should continue to govern what they could. Thus, the dele-
gates to the 1787 Constitutional Convention easily approved the
Eighth Randolph Resolution, which provided that the national
legislature should be competent "in all Cases for the general Inter-
ests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which the States are
separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the United
States may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legisla-
tion."12
The delegates also realized, however, that so general a propo-
sition would entail considerable difficulties of application, because
it left vast room for disagreement over which characterization
should apply to each governable matter conceived. To ameliorate
11. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
12. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 131-32 (Max
Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter CONVENTION RECORDS].
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this problem, those who framed the Constitution particularized the
generalization by enumerating the powers delegated to the nation.
Enumeration at first had been eschewed, because the miserly
allocation of central authority under the Articles of Confederation
had proved crippling. Madison himself had "a strong bias in favor
of an enemeration [sic]" but also had "doubts concerning its prac-
ticability., 13 The critical step toward enumeration was taken in
the Committee of Detail, a committee of five delegates chosen on
July 24 "To report a Constitution conformable to the Resolutions
passed by the Convention.' 14 The lead in translating the sub-
stance of Randolph's Sixth Resolution into the format of "enu-
merated powers" was taken by Committee member James Wilson,
who had begun thinking about the enumeration technique five
weeks earlier while comparing the Randolph Resolutions with the
alternate plan William Paterson of New Jersey had proposed.
Under Randolph's generalization, Wilson noted, "the Natl. Legisla-
ture is to make laws in all cases to which the separate States are
incompetent," whereas under Paterson's Congress "[is] to have
additional power [beyond that of the Confederation Congress] in a
few cases only."' 5 By the time the Detail Committee set to work,
Wilson had decided that enumeration would be a useful technique
even though the national government should have power less
restricted than Paterson had urged. The powers enumerated could
be few or many, miserly or grand, but in either event the limits
would be subject to less disagreement than under such general
language as was used in the Randolph plan.
As Wilson later explained at his own state's ratification con-
vention,
It was easy to discover a proper and satisfactory principle on the
subject. Whatever object of government is confined in its opera-
tion and effects within the bounds of a particular state, should be
considered as belonging to the government of that state; whatev-
er object of government extends in its operation or effects be-
yond the bounds of a particular state, should be considered as
belonging to the government of the United States. But though
this principle be sound and satisfactory, its application to particu-
lar cases would be accompanied with much difficulty; because, in
13. 1 id. at 53 (James Madison).
14. 2 id. at 106 (James Madison).
15. 1 id. at 252 (James Wilson).
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its application, room must be allowed for great discretionary
latitude of construction of the principle. In order to lessen or
remove the difficulty arising from discretionary construction on
this subject, an enumeration of particular instances, in which the
application of the principle ought to take place, has been at-
tempted with much industry and care. 6
Enumeration certainly did not obviate all disagreement over
the extent of federal power. Room for difference still remained in
construing each particular grant,17 and as to some, the latitude
left was substantial. Wilson was rather too sanguine in claiming
that "the enumeration will be found to be safe and unexception-
able; and accurate, too ....",18 The sufficiency of the enumerated
particulars to exhaust all that was comprehended by the agreed
generality, as James Madison would note in The Federalist, was
inevitably affected by the human frailties of perception, concep-
tion, and expression.19 It still is, of course; now, after two centu-
ries, it also is affected by the changed conditions of later times.
Nonetheless, the principle of enumerated powers still is the
fundament of American federalism law. Unfortunately, this princi-
ple is commonly misrepresented and misunderstood. Some seem to
16. James Wilson, Speech Delivered on 26th November, 1787, in the Convention of
Pennsylvania, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 759, 764 (Robert G. McCloskey ed.,
1967).
17. As Chief Justice Marshall recognized, "This government is acknowledged by all
to be one of enumerated powers .... But the question respecting the extent of the
powers actually granted, is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, as
long as our system shall exist." M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405
(1819).
18. Wilson's complete statement sounds a bit less like Pollyanna.
It is only in mathematical science, that a line can be described with mathemati-
cal precision. But I flatter myself that, upon the strictest investigation, the enu-
meration will be found to be safe and unexceptionable; and accurate too, in as
great a degree as accuracy can be expected in a subject of this nature.
Wilson, supra note 16, at 764.
19.
[H]owever accurately objects may be discriminated in themselves, and however
accurately the discrimination may be considered, the definition of them may be
rendered inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the terms in which it is delivered.
And this unavoidable inaccuracy must be greater or less, according to the com-
plexity and novelty of the objects defined . . . .Here then are three sources of
vague and incorrect definitions; indistinctness of the object, imperfection of the
organ of conception, inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas. Any one of these
must produce a certain degree of obscurity. The Convention, in delineating the
boundary between the Federal and State jurisdictions, must have experienced
the full effect of them all.
THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 236-37 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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think it a blockade against federal action on various matters. Oth-
ers seem to think it a quaint relic of simpler times, worthy of lip
service at most. In fact, like any mental construct designed to
moderate action (such as a responsible budget), the principle of
enumerated powers can work only if and when it is considered
worth adhering to. It is far more likely to be esteemed, and thus
followed, if it is considered in terms of its purpose and overall de-
sign, rather than as a merely formal rule.
There is too little space here for an extensive review of the
social and political advantages of federalism or the policy merits of
legal differentiation between state and federal roles.2" The ulti-
mate reason for allocating power between the nation and the
states was and is to accommodate the advantages of unity and
scale on matters of common interest and the responsibility or
accountability essential to popularly representative government.
The purpose is not to debilitate governance, but to enhance popu-
lar influence on public policy choices and to improve answerability
for their consequences. In the practical world, where bare power
and lofty motives alike tend to undervalue competing interests,
fragmenting and decentralizing authority can increase access and
accountability at a price in efficiency that is generally thought to
be tolerable to pay.
When interests collide, altercations over allocations of authori-
ty are likely. It usually is preferable that such altercations take the
form of rational argument rather than defiant, perhaps violent acts.
Rational argument employs words, the relations among them, and
the ideas that the words and their relations denote or connote.
Rational argumentation with words is capable of persuading at
least some whose interests otherwise predispose them, because in
most humans much of the time the rational function is capable of
constraining even the will.
These circumstances give great practical significance to the
principle of enumerated powers. Allocating roles or functions by
relatively particularized words and phrases rather than a more
highly generalized proposition, and doing so in a written text that
20. For some valuable insights, see Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sover-
eignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 847, 853-57 (1979); Michael W. McConnell,
Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1484, 1493-1507 (1987);
Deborah J. Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third
Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1988); Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamen-
tal Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 SUP. CT. REv. 81, 99-100.
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is widely acknowledged to have solemn force, enhances the oppor-
tunity for rhetoric and polemics: it multiplies the verbal and gram-
matical possibilities for argument toward correlating governing
power with political responsibility (or, in simpler terms, toward
dispersing and limiting governing power).
Unfortunately, the idiom of enumerated "powers" permits im-
agining governing competence as "territory" or "turf" marked off
into segments, or a pie sliced and distributed. That misconception
is the essence of "dual federalism," which posits discrete "sover-
eignties" separately relating to the same people, each with para-
mount or exclusive competence for certain, different purposes, and
each foreclosed from interference with the other.21
While the idiom of enumerated powers is susceptible to that
misconception, however, that is not its import. A "power" is not a
"thing," occupying physical space and displacing others. It is mere-
ly an abstraction. That noun is verbal shorthand for other nouns,
21. The dual federalism error is seductive enough that even Chief Justice John Mar-
shall gave it some countenance in an ill-considered dictum. Counsel had argued in Gib-
bons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824), that Congress's power to regulate inter-
state commerce imports "full power over the thing to be regulated" and "excludes, neces-
sarily, the action of all others that would perform the same operation on the same
thing." Marshall responded for the Court, "There is great force in this argument, and the
Court is not satisfied that it has been refuted." Id. Because the Court found federal and
state laws in collision, however, this proffered point was immaterial, and Marshall's hospi-
table comment a mere dictum. The application of sound principle would have induced
either silence or a contrary dictum on the point, and Marshall's statement was in fact
taken as encouragement by advocates of the dual federalism view.
James Madison had moved to the dual federalism view early, and he continued to
espouse it as a senior statesman. Late in 1830 he wrote,
The two vital characteristics of the political system of the United States
are, first, that the Government holds its powers by a charter granted to it by
the people; second, that the powers of Government are formed into two grand
divisions-one vested in a Government over the whole community, the other in
a number of independent Governments over its component parts . ...
.. . Here the established system aspires to such a division and organiza-
tion of power as will provide at once for its harmonious exercise on the true
principles of liberty over the parts and over the whole, notwithstanding the
great extent of the whole . ...
As the most arduous and delicate task in this great work lay in the un-
tried demarkation of the line which divides the general and the particular Gov-
ernments by an enumeration and definition of the powers of the former, more
especially the legislative powers; and as the success of this new scheme of poli-
ty essentially depends on the faithful observance of this partition of powers, the
friends of the scheme, or rather the friends of liberty and of man, cannot be
too often earnestly exhorted to be watchful in marking and controlling en-
croachments by either of the Governments on the domain of the other.
Supplement to the letter of Nov. 27, 1830, from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, in
9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 411, 430-31 n.1 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
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adjectives, verbs, and adverbs describing relations of action and
consequence rather too tedious to describe elaborately." In law's
manner of speaking, to "have a power" means to be acknowledged
as competent to produce legal consequences by taking action con-
cerning some object.
A "power of appointment," for example, might enable one to
designate who will fulfill some role with respect to a gift or be-
quest; a "power of attorney" might enable one to execute some
document on another's behalf with the same legal effects as if exe-
cuted by that other herself. The enumeration of "powers" in the
Constitution allocates legal competence to govern.
Thus, describing the principle of enumerated powers, James
Wilson spoke in terms of "objects of government."23 It is ex-
tremely important to notice the equivocal denotation of the word
"object": it can mean a tangible thing, a behavioral act (or acts),
an abstraction generalizing a great variety of behavioral acts, or an
end or aim. For example, the phrase "objects of government"
comprehends automobiles, licensure, driving, and safety. License
suspension for drunk driving pertains to several of these differently
described "objects"-and others as well, such as alcoholic beverag-
es. Examples like this can be multiplied infinitely, and they illus-
trate that any particular measure might be associated with any of
several different "objects of government." Particular acts or events
might be susceptible to governance by exertions of differently de-
scribed "powers"-much as, in geometry, a single point might be
reached on many lines.
This has great significance for the allocation of governing
power on a federal model. Of course, some objects of government
might deliberately be vested in both levels of government concur-
rently.24 Even as to those allocated severally, however, different
objects of government might intersect on some particular act or
event, resulting in concurrent competence pro tanto as to the par-
ticular act or event on which the separate powers converge. In-
deed, even as to objects foreclosed to one level by exclusive vest-
ment in the other,' such convergence of different powers on the
22. As Hamilton himself put it, "What is a power, but the ability or faculty of doing
a thing?" THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
23. See supra text accompanying note 16.
24. E.g., the raising of revenue by taxation.
25. The U.S. Constitution is generally understood as vesting exclusively in the federal
[Vol. 44:1
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same particular remains possible, each level of government having
some relevant competence albeit each is addressing a different
object of government and thus can be said to be exercising a
different power. Some provision might be made for preeminence
of one level in any or all such circumstances-as it is in our Con-
stitution by the Supremacy Clause 26-- but the essential point re-
mains that merely assigning some object of government to one
level rather than the other does not prevent any particular within
that object from being simultaneously within a different object of
government assigned to the other level of government instead. 7
This is the point that slipped out of grasp in the middle of
the nineteenth century when Justices began their slide into dual
federalism, trying to determine, for example, whether particular
measures were exercises of a "commerce power" or of a "police
power" instead.28 Hamilton, however, lived and died a generation
before such confusion became widespread. In his time the dual
federalism idea, which would grow more tenacious and pervasive
as it became amalgamated with sectional and partisan interests,
still was readily identifiable as simply an intellectual mistake.
Manifesting that he suffered no contamination by the dual
federalism error, Hamilton declared that "the national and state
systems are to be regarded as ONE WHOLE" 29 and even antici-
pated that state magistrates routinely would function as the princi-
pal instruments for enforcement of federal laws.3" Dual federalism
government the governance of the national capital district, for example, and the gover-
nance of bankruptcy. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 4, 17. It does not identify any
object as exclusively for the states; it merely employs the principle of enumerated pow-
ers-which has very different consequences, as will be elaborated in the ensuing text.
26. Id., art. VI, cl. 2.
27. I.e., there may be concurring, or convergent, "power" (using the word to mean
the "abstraction of all legally acknowledged competence") even if either level's "power"
(using the word to mean "competence concerning some particular object") is deemed
"exclusive."
28. See, e.g., The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (regulation of alco-
hol sales); The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847) (taxes on alien passengers);
Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837) (reporting requirements for
foreign ships).
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 556 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
30. Id. To the same effect, at greater length, see also THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at
174-75 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). This Hamiltonian thesis-albeit
without citation to him-was endorsed again unanimously by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990).
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conceives of "separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately
and independently of each other, within their respective
spheres,"31 but in Hamilton's contrary view, the existence of state
power never precludes federal power even as to the very same
matter, and the existence of federal power precludes state power
only32
in three cases; where the Constitution in express terms granted
an exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in one
instance an authority to the Union and in another prohibited the
States from exercising the like authority; and where it granted an
authority to the Union, to which a similar authority in the States
would be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant.33
The first step toward understanding Hamilton's view of the
spending power, therefore, is to recognize that the Constitution's
principle of enumerated powers does not countenance-but in fact
repels-dual federalism's mistaken conclusion that some matters,
some activities or events, are shut off from the federal
government's attention and addressable only by the states. 4
The second step is to recognize, as Hamilton did, that while
the Constitution enumerates for Congress only a few of the pow-
ers a government might conceivably have, each of the enumerated
powers is "plenary." As Chief Justice John Marshall put it three
decades later, it "has always been understood" that the governing
31. Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 406 (1872).
32. Hamilton's statement applies to the power itself, when unexercised or "dormant,"
When federal power is exercised, the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, might
preclude various applications of state power that otherwise would not be precluded.
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961). Contradiction or repugnancy to federal policy on a matter within federal authority
might invoke the Supremacy Clause, but that is not what Hamilton was discussing here:
he specified contradiction or repugnancy not to any "policy of" the federal government,
but "in point of constitutional authority." Id. Then he continued that "[tihe necessity of a
concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases results from the division of the sovereign power;
and the rule that all authorities of which the States are not explicitly divested in favour
of the Union remain with them in full vigour, is . . . a theoretical consequence of that
division . . ." as well as being admitted by "the whole tenor of' the Constitution. Id. at
203.
34. Hamilton wrote, "It can therefore never be good reasoning to say-this or that
act is unconstitutional, because it alters this or that law of a State. It must be shewn,
that the act which makes the alteration is unconstitutional on other accounts, not because
it makes the alteration." Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the Con-
stitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 THE PAPERS OF AL-
EXANDER HAMILTON 97, 109-10 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965).
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power of the nation "though limited to specified objects is plenary
as to those objects. 35 "Plenary" governing competence means the
federal government has a free hand in fashioning policy for any
"object of government"36 within the scope of an enumerated pow-
er-(subject, of course, to constitutional restrictions such as those
contained in the Bill of Rights). The Supremacy Clause, of course,
gives federal policy for such matters priority over any contrary
state law.
As to matters not within the Constitution's enumeration, Con-
gress has no such plenary power. However, as explained in the
next several pages, it would be a great mistake to conclude that
where the Congress has no plenary power it is powerless to act at
all.
2. The Principle of Extraneous Means. Hamilton's prefer-
ence initially had been for greater consolidation of power at the
center, and he remained too hospitable toward arguments of "im-
plication." Nonetheless, he understood and accepted the principle
of enumerated powers. 7 Thus, while he argued that implication
should have assured it anyway, he based Congress's competence to
incorporate a national bank (for example) squarely on an enumer-
ated power: the power conferred by the Necessary and Proper
Clause. 8
It is unfortunate that inexact usage has associated this clause
with so-called implied powers, for (except in the international
realm") the principle of enumerated powers actually precludes
the notion of "implied" federal powers. The power granted by the
35. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
36. Remember the equivocal denotation of the word "object." See supra notes 23-27
and accompanying text.
37. Hamilton maintained not that the national government under the Constitution "is
sovereign in all respects, but that it is sovereign to a certain extent: that is, to the extent
of the objects of its specified powers." Hamilton, supra note 34, at 107. Again, he main-
tained only that it was "sovereign with regard to its proper objects." Id. at 98. The short-
comings of the idiom attributing "sovereignty" to governments, rather than to "the Peo-
ple," need not be elaborated for present purposes.
38. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see Hamilton, supra note 34, at 101-06.
39. The principle of enumerated powers does not operate with regard to international
affairs. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1936); see
also DAVID E. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM 204 (2d ed. 1987) ("[O]ur na-
tional government's legal competence on the international plane is determined by inter-
national rather than domestic law."). The principle therefore does not preclude "implied
powers" arguments in that realm.
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Necessary and Proper Clause is enumerated, not implied. That
power is wholly contingent on a relationship of means to end, but
it is quite inaccurate to characterize such a telic4" relationship as
a relationship of "implication. '41 Equally obfuscatory are refer-
ences to "incidental," "auxiliary," or "accessory" powers.42
The Necessary and Proper Clause enables Congress to take
primary action regarding matters extraneous to its otherwise enu-
40. "Tending toward an end." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
2351 (3d ed. 1986); see also THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1846-47 (3d ed. 1992) ("Directing or tending toward a goal or purpose; pur-
poseful."). The word is derived from the Greek telos, meaning "end." Id. at 1847.
41. The word "imply" is a very imprecise term. It derives from the Latin implicare,
to enfold, entangle, involve. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra
note 40, at 1135. We use the word to characterize reasoning processes along with another
word, "infer" (derived from the Latin inferre, to bring on, to conclude, id. at 1158): we
"infer" conclusions that premises "imply."
But the mind employs many different avenues of inference, and "imply" therefore
is used to refer to several different reasoning patterns. Consequently, the statement that
something is "implied" can carry any of several very different meanings. To use this
imprecise word in connection with the Necessary and Proper Clause, therefore, is to
conceal which of the many possible reasoning patterns actually is involved.
The language of the Necessary and Proper Clause itself makes unmistakable that it
has no connection whatsoever with any kind of "inference" or "implication" except a
telic one-if, indeed, such a connection should be called an "inference" or "implication"
at all. The clause has to do only with relations of means and ends. Most arguments of
"implication" lack any "means to end" aspect and thus can find no support whatsoever
in this Clause.
The classic exposition of this, of course, is in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 411-23 (1819). For elaboration of the requisites of the Necessary and Prop-
er Clause, see ENGDAHL, supra note 39, at 33-48.
42. Each of these words inevitably causes confusion, because telic relations constitute
only a small fraction of what they can comprehend. The words are frequently used with
reference to relations of mere concomitance. While they might occasionally be used
where the relationship is telic, they apply regardless which is the means and which the
end. Therefore, because the Necessary and Proper Clause is applicable only where the
end, as distinguished from the means, in the telic relationship is within an enumerated
power, the use of these words constantly and inevitably induces misapplications of the
Clause.
Another unfortunate phrase, inducing absurd corruptions of the extraneous means
principle in the specific context of the commerce power, is the "affecting commerce"
idiom. Everything "affects interstate commerce" somehow or other, and more or less. but
when the modern use of the "affecting commerce" idiom began late in the New Deal,
the Court's rationale was explicitly telic, with express reference to the Necessary and
Proper Clause being made. After two generations of sloppy usage, most lawyers today
mistakenly assume that the "affecting commerce" idiom warrants ridiculous enlargement
of the concept of interstate commerce itself. The fact that this idiom really is an unfortu-
nate and imprecise allusion to the Necessary and Proper Clause has now begun to be
recognized at last. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,
583-85 (1985) (O'Connor, Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
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merated powers, but only in a telic manner-i.e., as a means to
promote objects within the enumeration.43 This crucial telic requi-
site of the Necessary and Proper Clause, plain on its face, makes
it very much less than a "sweeping clause"'  bringing all objects
of government into Congress's domain. Hamilton's mature45 un-
derstanding of this clause (which is the classic 6 and modem
view) does bring all matters potentially within Congress's reach
but permits Congress to reach them only insofar as it does so to
effectuate one or another of the other enumerated federal powers.
The Necessary and Proper Clause, in other words, imports
what I call the "principle of extraneous means." The earliest elab-
oration of this principle was Hamilton's own,4 7 which Chief Jus-
43. As Hamilton put it, the Necessary and Proper Clause leaves
a criterion of what is constitutional, and of what is not so. This criterion is the
end to which the measure relates as a mean. If the end be clearly comprehend-
ed within any of the specified powers, & if the measure have an obvious rela-
tion to that end . . .it may safely be deemed to come within the compass of
the national authority.
Hamilton, supra note 34, at 107 (third and fourth emphases added).
To the same effect, Chief Justice Marshall wrote, "Let the end be legitimate, let it
be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, ... are constitutional." M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 421.
44. Alexander Contee Hanson of Maryland, for example, wrote in opposition to rat-
ification of a proposed plan for a federal government by his state, "It is apprehended,
that this sweeping clause will afford pretext, for freeing congress from all constitutional
restraints." ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON, REMARKS ON THE PROPOSED PLAN OF A
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNIT-
ED STATES 217, 233 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1888).
This inapt, derogatory appellation remained popular among critics like Thomas
Jefferson. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Apr. 30, 1800),
in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 163, 165 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907).
The sufficient answer to it remains the one given by James Wilson during the ratification
debates in Pennsylvania:
[W]hen it is said that Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper, those words are limited and defined by the following,
"for carrying into execution the foregoing powers." It is saying no more than
that the powers we have already particularly given, shall be effectually carried
into execution.
2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 468 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836).
45. Hamilton's first explication of the Necessary and Proper Clause, deprecating it as
"chargeable with tautology or redundancy ...[but] at least perfectly harmless," was ab-
surdly fallacious. THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 22, at 205. Hamilton never used it
again.
46. See M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 421; United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358,
395 (1804).
47. See Hamilton, supra note 34, at 98-99.
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tice Marshall simply paraphrased in his classic M'Culloch v. Mary-
land41 opinion.
Federal measures regarding otherwise extraneous matters
constitute exercises of an enumerated power insofar as they satisfy
the telic requisite of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Such mea-
sures, therefore, also invoke the Supremacy Clause: no state may
frustrate or interfere with the means Congress has chosen for
promoting ends that are within some enumerated power.
3. The Principle of Extraneous Ends and Its Corollaries. A
third principle, equally irreconcilable with dual federalism, also was
a part of Hamilton's view. This may be called the "principle of ex-
traneous ends," and it was nicely articulated generations later in
Justice Holmes's famous Hammer v. Dagenhart dissent: "It seems
to me entirely constitutional for Congress to enforce its under-
standing [of good policy about anything] by all the means at its
command."4 9 We are accustomed now to hundreds of federal laws
and regulations fitting this pattern. Some govern interstate com-
merce to promote consumer interests or to combat local crime;
others create tax incentives or disincentives to induce behavior
Congress could not require; others restrict use of the mails to
inhibit extortion, debt collection abuses, or child pornography.
None of these ends are within any enumerated power, but the
means-control of interstate commerce, manipulation of tax rates
and breaks, control of the mails-certainly are. 0
The principle of extraneous ends is simply a corollary to the
proposition that Congress's enumerated powers are plenary: if
Congress has a free hand in fashioning policy for those "objects of
government" entrusted to it, it may manipulate them even to pro-
mote objects of government (in the sense of aims or ends) that
are not constitutionally enumerated for it, unless some Bill of
Rights type of constitutional restriction forbids. None does-not
even the Tenth Amendment."
48. See M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 421.
49. Hammer v. Dagenhart,.247 U.S. 251, 281 (1918) (Holmes, Brandeis, McKenna,
and Clarke, JJ., dissenting).
50. See U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8.
51. Refracted by dual federalist lenses, the Tenth Amendment might seem to be
such a restriction, but when its words are seen clearly, unbent by that distorting precon-
ception, it is not. The Amendment reserves those powers not delegated to the United
States, but it does not pretend to define, delimit, or in any way restrict the use of any
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Hamilton's view of Congress's spending power is nothing
other than this general principle of extraneous ends applied to the
particular function of spending. Hamilton utilized this general
principle (and urged Congress to utilize it) from the outset of the
Washington administration, and it has been instanced throughout
American history. Its use has been almost constant, notwithstand-
ing the misguided (or misconstrued) dictum of Chief Justice Mar-
shall in M'Culoch v. Maryland about laws passed "under the
pretext of' an enumerated power but "for the accomplishment of
objects not entrusted to the government. 52
Even Justices confounded by dual federalism's errors upheld
several federal laws aimed at extraneous ends, but they did so
only when they so scrambled this issue with the distinct issue of
extraneous means that they thought they were applying the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause.53 Whenever they recognized that the
principle of extraneous ends was actually operating instead, they
vigorously denounced it, treating M'Culloch's "pretext" dictum as
a cardinal precept.54 Flourishing that dictum, the majority in the
powers that are so delegated. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. As to avoiding misconceptions
when using the idiom of "powers," see supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
52. 17 U.S. at 423. In the midst of elucidating the classic and sound (and Hamilto-
nian) construction of the Necessary and Proper Clause, Marshall attempted to highlight
his point with a rhetorical contrast, saying, "[S]hould Congress, under the pretext of exe-
cuting its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the [fed-
eral] government[,] it would become the painful duty of this tribunal" to hold them un-
constitutional, should some case requiring consideration of them arise. Id.
If Marshall was contemplating something like, for example, a measure that could
not fairly be said to tax, or one that could not fairly be said to regulate interstate com-
merce, his statement was unobjectionable. But dual federalists took his statement to
mean, for example, that interstate commerce may be regulated only for commercial ends,
or that taxes may be imposed only to raise revenue. So taken, this "pretext" dictum is
utterly unsound. Nothing in the Constitution precludes Congress from taxing or governing
trade, for example, with an eye toward public safety or whatever other end it might
choose, regardless whether such end is within an enumerated power.
Dual federalists bandied this pretext dictum for more than a century, misappropriat-
ing Chief Justice Marshall as an authority for their error. See, e.g., Linder v. United
States, 268 U.S. 5, 17 (1925) ("[A]ny provision of an act of Congress ostensibly enacted
under power granted by the Constitution, not naturally and reasonably adapted to the
effective exercise of such power ... is invalid and cannot be enforced."). It was relied
upon heavily in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68-70 (1936) ("[R]esort to the taxing
power to effectuate an end which is not legitimate, not within the scope of the Constitu-
tion, is obviously inadmissible.").
53. See, e.g., The Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321, 355 (1903) (ratio-
nalizing shipment prohibition to prevent local gambling as "appropriate mode for the
regulation of that particular kind of commerce"-i.e., shipment of lottery tickets).
54. See, e.g., Linder, 268 U.S. at 17; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275 (1918).
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1936 spending power case of United States v. Butler made adamant
denial of the extraneous ends principle integral to its rationale."
Today, the principle of extraneous ends is so familiar and
obvious that we easily forget that it never received clear-sighted
and unequivocal affirmation by a Supreme Court majority until
1941. That was the year Justice Stone broke free at last from long-
standing misconceptions and separately applied the extraneous
means principle 6 (employing the Necessary and Proper Clause)
and the extraneous ends principle 7 (overruling Hammer v.
Dagenhart8) to sustain different provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act in different parts of the unanimous opinion in Unit-
ed States v. Darby.9 It is significant that this first clear judicial
recognition of the principle of extraneous ends occurred four years
after the landmark spending power cases involving the Social Secu-
rity Act: when they decided Steward and Helvering, the' Justices
did not yet have their minds so clear. The fact that those two
landmark cases, claiming to follow Hamilton, were decided before
the Justices accurately perceived the principle that Hamilton actu-
ally employed has occasioned great confusion.
The principle of extraneous ends has very important corollar-
ies. First, while Congress thus may pursue policy objects regarding
extraneous matters, those policies remain extraneous to the enu-
merated powers; therefore, those policies cannot invoke the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, which avails only for effectuating ends
within the enumerated powers.
Simple examples should illustrate this first corollary of the
principle of extraneous ends. Congress was not made competent to
outlaw lotteries when it prohibited the interstate shipment of lot-
tery tickets,60 even though the reason it prohibited those ship-
ments was that it wanted lotteries to cease. And Congress did not
gain the power to punish the retailing of butter-colored oleomarga-
55. See Butler, 297 U.S. at 68-70 (1936), discussed infra text accompanying notes
127-42.
56. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 117-25 (1941).
57. See id. at 112-17.
58. 247 U.S. at 251.
59. Steps of intellectual transition toward Darby's clear grasp of the extraneous ends
principle had been taken in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S.
377, 426 (1940), and United States v. City & County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16,
29-30 (1940).
60. See The Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321, 357 (1903).
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rine when it placed a high tax on that product,61 even though it
hoped that a tax would drive the product off the retail market.62
As applied to federal spending, this is one point James Madi-
son failed to grasp. Discussing spending with reference to the
"general Welfare" phrase of the first clause in Article I, Section 8
of the Constitution,63 Madison insisted that one must choose be-
tween two contrasting propositions: either that clause is "a mere
61. See McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 63-64 (1904).
62. The corollary holds even for more complex situations. A good example is United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 117-25 (1941). Having adopted as its policy for interstate
commerce the rule prohibiting shipment of goods produced under certain wage or hour
conditions, Congress forbade the production of goods under such conditions. Id. at 110.
The Necessary and Proper Clause rationale for the production prohibition was that if
fewer goods were produced under the specified conditions, fewer produced under those
conditions would be available for interstate shipment, and as a consequence, Congress's
interstate commerce policy prohibiting shipment of goods produced under those conditions
would be better effected. Thus, the production prohibition was reasonably adapted to
attainment of the non-shipment policy, even though production per se was not within
Congress's enumerated powers. As the Court said, "Congress, having . . . adopted the
policy of excluding from interstate commerce [certain goods,] . . . may choose the means
reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted end, even though they involve
control of intrastate activities." Id. at 121.
It was obvious in Darby that the production prohibition also was aimed at improv-
ing the lot of workers-a matter which, itself, is extraneous to Congress's enumerated
powers; that the extraneous end really was the primary objective of the production prohi-
bition; and that the same extraneous objective was the whole reason for the commerce
power manipulation (prohibition of interstate shipment) itself. Thus, Darby illustrates that
it is constitutionally inoffensive (indeed, immaterial) that a regulation of some extraneous
matter, regulation of which serves some enumerated end, also promotes an extraneous
one-or even that the extraneous end is manifestly the motivating one. But the telic link
to Congress's policy for an enumerated matter was indispensable: the extraneous regula-
tion must be, to quote from Darby, "reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permit-
ted end," id.-"permitted" by virtue of some enumerated power.
In other words, if a measure helps effectuate Congress's policy for some enumerat-
ed matter, the fact that it simultaneously helps effectuate Congress's policy for some
extraneous policy is constitutionally unobjectionable; a measure is not made constitutional
merely because it helps effectuate Congress's policy for some extraneous matter, however,
even if that same extraneous policy is simultaneously being promoted by manipulation of
an enumerated power.
To uphold an extraneous regulation serving only an extraneous end simply because
that extraneous end is simultaneously served by manipulation of some enumerated power
would be to commit what I have elsewhere characterized as the "bootstrap" error and
discussed at greater length than is possible or necessary here. See, e.g., ENGDAHL, supra
note 39, at 65-73.
63. The clause provides: "The Congress shall have the Power To lay and collect Tax-
es . . .. to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of
the United States. ... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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introduction to the enumerated powers, and restricted to them,"'64
as Madison himself maintained, or else
the power to provide for the common defence and general wel-
fare stands as a distinct substantive power, the first on the list of
legislative powers ... coming within the purview of the clause
concluding the list, which expressly declares that Congress may
make all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution theforegoing powers vested in Congress.
... [T]he alleged power to appropriate money to the
"common defence and general welfare" is either a dead letter, or
swells into an unlimited power to provide for unlimited purposes,by all the means necessary and proper for those purposes.65
As Hamilton perfectly well understood, however, neither of the
propositions between which Madison thought one must choose is
sound. The Necessary and Proper Clause cannot be invoked on
the ground that the measure in question serves some extraneous
end, even if that end is one toward which Congress, in its plenary
discretion, has elected also to aim some application of an enumer-
ated power.
A second corollary of the principle of extraneous ends is that
extraneous objectives being promoted by taxing, by spending, or
by manipulating any other enumerated power may freely be frus-
trated or countermanded by states. Congress's prerogative to gov-
ern, to have its way-and hence, the force of the Supremacy
Clause---cannot extend beyond its enumerated powers. Whatever
practical and even very powerful influence it might exert over mat-
ters beyond its enumerated powers is not by virtue of any power
to govern those extraneous matters; it is accomplished, rather, by
the governance of other matters, themselves within some enumer-
ated power. The frustration of Congress's extraneous objectives,
therefore, is no affront to the Constitution's allocation of govern-
ing power.
Even while the Lottery Act was in force, for example, the
states remained free to authorize or operate lotteries (although the
tickets would have had to be printed in-state).67 A state may en-
64. Supplement to the letter of Nov. 27, 1830, from James Madison to Andrew
Stevenson, supra note 21, at 428.
65. Id. at 424 n.1, 428-29.
66. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
67. The Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321, 357 (1903).
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courage, or even require, activities Congress simultaneously is
discouraging by means of a federal tax (although the tax nonethe-
less must be paid). For the same reason, a state may frustrate any
extraneous objective of federal spending by resisting the financial
temptation offered to it, or as to private grantees within the state's
jurisdiction, by forbidding what the subsidy is designed to induce
(even though no state may alter the terms on which Congress
offers federal funds).
With respect to spending, these two corollaries seem even
more compelling when one reflects on what it means to "spend."
When I cash my paycheck, I have power to spend the money (or
some disappointing fraction of it) however I might choose, but
that does not mean I can make people take the money, or escape
punishment by pleading that I tendered ample payment if I take
what they refuse to sell. Every transaction (even of donation)
involves at least two parties, and neither can complete the transac-
tion alone.
The point can be illustrated by this reverse example: the Unit-
ed States may accept gifts, and no state may prevent it from doing
so, but a state law outlawing testamentary gifts to the United
States
acts upon the power of its domiciliary to give and not on the
United States' power to receive. As a legal concept a transfer of
property may be looked upon as a single transaction or it may
be separated into a series of steps. The approach chosen may
determine legal consequences. Where powers flow so distinctly
from different sources as do the power to will and the power to
receive, we think the validity of each step is to be treated sepa-
rately.
... [W]e find nothing in the Supremacy Clause which pro-
hibits the state from preventing its domiciliary from willing prop-
erty to the Federal Government.(8
By a parity of reasoning, Congress's spending power constitutes
competence to offer, but not to oblige acceptance; competence to
tender,69 but not to compel receipt. The spending power by itself
68. United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87, 91, 93 (1950) (citations omitted).
69. Thus, for example, federal assistance in the form of deposit insurance or loan
guarantees constitutes exercise of the spending power, even if no default ever occurs and
money therefore never changes hands.
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is not sufficient even to accomplish a transfer from the Treasury:
the debit there must find a credit elsewhere or it fails.
Still less, then, can the spending power override opposition to
any extraneous end at which federal spending programs or their
conditions are aimed. If the end is extraneous,70 refusal by the
intended recipients, or their failure to qualify, does not contravene
Congress's spending power even if it utterly frustrates Congress's
desire. It can make no difference whether the refusal or failure is
by the will of the intended recipient, or under compulsion of some
state having jurisdiction.
Hamilton not only understood but emphasized these corol-
laries to the principle of extraneous ends. As to the first, for ex-
ample, Hamilton wrote in his 1791 Report on Manufactures that
there is "no room for a doubt that whatever concerns the general
Interests of learning of Agriculture of Manufactures and of Com-
merce are within the sphere of the national Councils as far as
regards an application of Money.",7' To further emphasize that
spending toward such extraneous ends would not bring the ends
generally within the scope of federal power, Hamilton continued,
No objection ought to arise to this construction from a supposi-
tion that it would imply a power to do whatever else should
appear to Congress conducive to the General Welfare. A power
70. The result obviously is different when more than the spending power itself is in-
volved: spending frequently is used as a means to effectuate enumerated ends, and in
such instances not only the spending power, but also the Necessary and Proper Clause is
involved. Whenever the latter is used, the Supremacy Clause certainly does apply.
For example, an unwilling merchant may be obliged, when the necessity is "ur-
gent," to exchange goods or services to the Army for money. See United States v. Rus-
sell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623, 628 (1871) (services); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 115, 134-35 (1851) (goods). Likewise, an unwilling owner may be obliged to ex-
change, for compensation in money, realty sought for a post office building. See, e.g.,
Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1875). It makes no difference whether the
recalcitrant owner is a private person or a state or state subdivision. See United States v.
Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 255 (1946) (land held by city in trust for private individual);
Wayne County v. United States, 53 Ct. Cl. 417, 424 (1918) (county highway), affd, 252
U.S. 574 (1920).
The critical distinction as to whether the end is an enumerated or an extraneous
one was well understood when last the constitutionality of federal acquisitions by "emi-
nent domain" was competently litigated; succeeding decades of inattention, however, have
obscured it. See David E. Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18
ARIZ. L. REV. 283, 338 n.238 (1976).
71. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, FINAL VERSION OF THE REPORT ON THE SUBJECT OF
MANUFACTURES (1791), reprinted in 10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 230,
303 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1966).
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to appropriate money with this latitude which is granted too in
express terms would not carry a power to do any other thing, not
authorised in the constitution ....
The second corollary is reflected in Hamilton's advice con-
cerning canals. Spending itself-the mere application of money-in
Hamilton's view was just as permissible for canals as for education,
manufacturing, improvement of agriculture, or any other purpose;
yet when he composed his political agenda on the eve of the Sixth
Congress in 1799, Hamilton wrote, "An article ought to be pro-
posed to be added to the constitution for empowering Congress to
open canals . . .,73
He was not being inconsistent.74 To "open" canals involves
much more than spending money: it involves acquiring rights of
way and constructing and operating the improvements. The per-
sons or companies doing so, whatever their source of funds, would
be subject to the governmental jurisdiction of any states through
which the respective canals might run. On routes crossing state
lines, differences of state law would entail cumulative and some-
times conflicting requirements that easily could make a project
difficult or even impossible,75 even if it were federally funded,
72. Id. at 303-04.
73. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Jonathan Dayton (Oct.-Nov. 1799), in 23
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 599, 603 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1976).
74. James Madison id later years repeatedly accused Hamilton of self-contradiction.
For example, writing to Edward Livingston in 1824, Madison said,
It is remarkable that Mr. Hamilton himself, the strenuous patron of an expan-
sive meaning in the text of the Constitution, with the views of the Convention
fresh in his memory, and in a Report contending for the most liberal rules of
interpretation, was obliged by his candour to admit that they could not embrace
the case of canals ....
Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (Apr. 17, 1824), in 3 CONVENTION RE-
CORDS, supra note 12, at 463. In another letter, Madison said, "It may be remarked that
Mr. Hamilton, in his Report on the Bank, when enlarging the range of construction to
the utmost of his ingenuity, admitted that Canals were beyond the sphere of Federal
Legislation." Letter from James Madison to Reynolds Chapman (Jan. 6, 1831), in 9 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 21, at 435, 435; see also Supplement to the
letter of Nov. 27, 1830, from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 21 at 424
n.1.
Madison misrepresented what Hamilton actually had said, however. In the relevant
passage of his bank opinion Hamilton had said only that opinions differed as to whether
the reason for not adopting the canal provision was that it was inexpedient, that it em-
braced too much besides canals, or that it was superfluous (and impolitic) because power
ample for the purpose was already otherwise conferred. See Hamilton, supra note 34, at
97, 110-11.
75. In Madison's own words, interstate canals would "be of hopeless attainment if
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unless Congress had more power in the matter than merely the
power to spend.
It was this insufficiency of the spending power to override
state law obstacles to achieving the targeted end that made Hamil-
ton conclude that a constitutional amendment for canals was nec-
essary. Hamilton's complete sentence makes it plain that the possi-
bility of incompatible or adverse state policies, and the inability of
federal funding alone to override them, is what led him to recom-
mend an amendment-not any fear that spending for canals would
otherwise be impermissible.76 In the very same document, Hamil-
ton urged appropriation to a loan fund for "improvement of the
roads"77 and also called for "funds to encourage Agriculture and
the arts, 78 "to be employed in premiums for new inventions dis-
coveries and improvements in Agriculture and in the Arts., 79 As
to these ends he perceived no risk of frustration by conflicting
state policies, and consequently for them-with no need to over-
ride state policy-the spending power itself was ample.
B. A Metaphor
Metaphors enhance expression and can facilitate the develop-
ment as well as the communication of ideas. To the extent that
they are inapt, however, they also can reinforce and perpetuate
misconceptions.
At some uncertain early date, it became common to discuss
the governing competence of the state and federal governments in
terms of "fields." Unfortunately, this geographical metaphor helped
perpetuate the dual federalism misconception, which posited the
respective jurisdictions of the federal government and of the states,
for the most part, as mutually bounded and exclusive, like physical
domains. Extension of the metaphor by the military imagery of
"occupation" made it usable even where jurisdiction was deemed
left to the limited faculties and joint exertions of the States possessing the authority."
Letter from James Madison to Reynolds Chapman, supra note 74, at 436.
76. Hamilton said,
An article ought to be proposed to be added to the constitution for em-
powering Congress to open canals in all cases in which it may be necessary to
conduct them through the territory of two or more states or through the terri-
tory of a State and that of the UStates.
Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Jonathan Dayton, supra note 73, at 603.
77. Id. at 601-02.
78. Id. at 602.
79. Id. at 601.
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concurrent until federal power was exercised. So powerful is this
geographical metaphor that its continued use even now-though
the error of dual federalism is rather widely and well under-
stood-tends to induce a misconception of mutual exclusivity.
Sometimes a metaphor is not only apt, but striking enough
that it can embarrass and thus help dislodge misconceptions, which
are most powerful when solemnity discourages critical examination.
This characterization hopefully will prove true of my likening dual
federalism to distributed pieces of pie, with the Tenth Amendment
misconceived as forbidding the federal government to nibble at the
states' plate.
A very different metaphor is needed to communicate the
fundamental principles of American federalism accurately. Hamil-
ton never used this metaphor, but his insistence that "the national
and state systems are to be regarded as ONE WHOLE"8 invites
it. It is the metaphor of ecology.
The Constitution places only a few "species" under the na-
tional government's management and control; species interact with
one another, however, and consequently, exercising control over
one typically impacts others as well. The Constitution could not
have precluded Congress'from thus impacting other species, except
by radically circumscribing its discretion over the few. So far from
being thus circumscribed, except for the few Bill of Rights type of
limitations, Congress's power over the species enumerated for its
management and control is "plenary., 81
The Supremacy Clause82 gives priority to whatever Congress
might wish regarding its species, and the Necessary and Proper
Clause 3 enables Congress to conscript even other species in ser-
vice to its own (although it is only insofar as it is so used that any
of those other species is amenable to Congress's control).
As to the species designated for it, however, because its pow-
er over them is plenary, Congress may utilize them however it
will. Nothing forbids Congress from electing to manipulate its
species specifically to impact some others that are not designated
for management by it, and to the extent such manipulation of its
80. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, supra note 29, at 556; see supra notes 29-30 and ac-
companying text.
81. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
82. U.S. CONST art. VI, cl. 2.
83. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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own is sufficient to work Congress's will for any such other, it is
done. Those others, however, have different masters-the states-
who cannot be prevented from resisting or trying to deflect
Congress's attempted impacts on theirs. The states are free to
frustrate Congress's will for those species not enumerated for its
control. All that the Constitution forbids to the states, as masters
of those species not enumerated, is to countermand Congress's
management of the enumerated species or to impair Congress's
right to conscript any of the others insofar as it is employed to
service Congress's own.
II. THE PRACTICE
A. Spending Power Theory and Practice Before the New Deal
Hamilton's view of the spending power clearly predominated
during the earliest years under the Constitution. Joseph Story
afterwards observed, "There is no doubt that President Washing-
ton fully concurred in [Hamilton's spending power] opinion, as his
repeated recommendations to Congress of objects of this sort, es-
pecially of the encouragement of manufactures, of learning, of a
university, of new inventions, of agriculture,... abundantly
prove."'
Addressing the four-decade period including not only the
Federalist administrations of Washington and Adams, but also the
Republican hegemony from the turn of the century to the time of
his own writing in the 1830s, Story said, "Appropriations have
never been limited by Congress to cases falling within the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution, whether those powers be
construed in their broad or their narrow sense."85 As examples,
he included
appropriations ... to aid internal improvements of various sorts,
in our roads, our navigation, our streams, . . . appropriations to
aid destitute foreigners and cities laboring under severe calami-
ties; as in the relief of the St. Domingo refugees, in 1794, and
84. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 718 n.1 (5th ed. 1891). I omit from this passage Story's reference to Washing-
ton's recommendation of spending for encouragement "of commerce and navigation" and
for "a military academy," id., because those might more readily be conceived as means
to enumerated ends.
85. 1 id. at 727.
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the citizens of Venezuela, who suffered from an earthquake in
1812[;] . .. the bounty given in the cod-fisheries .... 86
James Madison had asserted as early as 1791 his contrary view
that Congress's fiscal powers under the first clause in Article I,
Section 8 are "limited and explained by the particular enumeration
subjoined."' Nonetheless, misgivings about the constitutionality of
spending toward extraneous ends seem not to have become promi-
nent until Jefferson's administration. Recommending in his annual
message to Congress, on December 2, 1806, that a federal revenue
surplus be used to fund internal improvements and education,
Jefferson supposed that a constitutional amendment would be nec-
essary "because the objects now recommended [public education,
roads, rivers, canals, and other objects of public improvement] are
not among those enumerated in the Constitution, and to which it
permits the public moneys to be applied.""8 But the predominant
opinion in Congress still (as from the beginning) was that spending
toward extraneous ends already was permitted. Therefore, without
troubling to propose an amendment, Congress passed an appro-
priation to pay for constructing a few miles of the "Cumberland
Road," an improvement projected to extend from Cumberland,
Maryland westward to the Ohio River. 9 Jefferson signed the bill.
The issue then became unimportant for several years, because
trade policy and war eliminated surplus federal revenues. When
next it arose, Congress acted on the same premise as before, but
President James Madison adhered to his contrary view. Madison
repeated that the phrases "common Defence" and "general Wel-
fare"9 in the clause commonly regarded as the source of power
to spend operate "merely as general terms, explained & limited by
the subjoined specifications."'" On this view, the whole effect of
86. 1 id. at 727-28.
87. James Madison, Speech in the First Congress-Third Session (Feb. 2, 1791), in 6
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 19, 28 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
88. 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 11, 15 (1806).
89. Act of Mar. 29, 1806, ch. 19, § 1, 2 Stat. 357, 358.
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
91. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson (Nov. 27, 1830), in 9 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 21, at 411, 418-19. He used virtually the
same language in a supplement to that letter to Andrew Stevenson: "general terms, limit-
ed and explained by the particular clauses subjoined to the clause containing them."
Supplement to the letter of Nov. 27, 1830, from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson,
supra note 21, at 428 n.6.
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those phrases (although limited to fiscal matters) is redundant to
the Necessary and Proper Clause. Madison therefore vetoed the
1817 "Bonus Bill,"'  saying he found "insuperable difficulty" in
"reconciling [it] with the Constitution":
The legislative powers vested in Congress are specified and enu-
merated . . and it does not appear that the power proposed to
be exercised by the bill is among the enumerated powers; or that
it falls, by any just interpretation, within the power to make laws
necessary and proper for carrying into execution those or other
powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the
United States.93
Madison claimed the prevailing "Hamiltonian" view (which he
grossly misconceived) "would have the effect of giving to Congress
a general power of legislation instead of the defined and limited
one hitherto understood to belong to them, the terms 'common
defense and general welfare' embracing every object and act with-
in the purview of a legislative trust."'94
Others, even if they rejected Hamilton's spending power view,
might have defended the Bonus Bill as "necessary and proper" to
commerce and defense ends: the Bill did recite that the contem-
plated internal improvements were to be made "in order to facili-
tate, promote, and give security to internal commerce among the
several States, and to render more easy and less expensive the
92. The Act incorporating the Second Bank of the United States (which Madison
signed in 1816) required the Bank to pay a "bonus" of $1,500,000 to the United States.
An Act to Incorporate the Subscribers to the Bank of the United States, ch. 44, § 20, 3
Stat. 266, 276 (1816). Early in 1817, Congress passed the "Bonus Bill" providing for that
sum, plus periodic dividends the Bank paid the United States, to be a permanent fund
for financing internal improvements. See ALFRED KELLY & WINFRED A. HARBISON, THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 243-44 (5th ed. 1976). As
his last official act, President Madison vetoed the "Bonus Bill" on March 3, 1817.
93. JAMES MADISON, VETO MESSAGE (1817), reprinted in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 584, 584 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896)
[hereinafter 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS].
94. Id. at 585. Senator James Barbour from Jefferson and Madison's (and the new
President Monroe's) Virginia introduced a resolution to propose a constitutional amend-
ment authorizing Congress "to pass laws appropriating money for constructing roads and
canals, and improving the navigation of water-courses," and adding certain restrictions.
KELLY & HARBISON, supra note 92, at 245. This amendment not only would have con-
ferred no new power (since, as most senators understood, Congress already had power
merely to spend for such purposes), but would have diminished political discretion by the
restrictions it imposed. The Senate killed the Barbour proposal. Id.
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means and provisions necessary for their common defence."'95
Madison, however, could not accept it on this ground, for he also
rejected the orthodox view of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
He adhered instead to the miserly view Jefferson had articulated
in opposing incorporation of the Bank of the United States, name-
ly that it required "a necessity invincible by any other means" 96
and authorized only "those means without which the grant of the
power would be nugatory."97 In other words, Madison not only
restricted the spending power to the reach of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, but compounded the restriction with a Jeffersonian
view of the latter.
James Monroe, who succeeded Madison as President in 1817,
at first shared Madison's restrictive view of the spending power.
He said of Madison's view, "To this construction I was inclined in
the more early stage of our Government; but on further reflection
and observation my mind has undergone a change . . . ."9 Mon-
roe was converted to Hamilton's spending power view, and conse-
quently, before revenue shortfalls temporarily mooted the point
again, Monroe signed appropriations for additional work on the
Cumberland Road.99
Monroe also grasped the crucial point in Hamilton's analysis
that Madison had completely missed. Monroe clearly understood
the difference between spending toward extraneous ends and oth-
erwise acting toward or achieving them. Monroe made this distinc-
tion the basis for his veto of the more ambitious Cumberland
Road Bill presented in 1822.1" The 1822 bill was not just an ap-
propriation measure: it also provided for maintenance and pro-
tection of the Road and the collection of tolls and even asserted
95. 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 186 (1817).
96. See Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establish-
ing a National Bank, in 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 275, 279 (Julian P.
Boyd ed., 1974).
97. Id. at 278.
98. JAMES MONROE, VIEWS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE
SUBJECT OF INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS (1822), reprinted in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 144, 165 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897)
[hereinafter 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS].
99. Act of Apr. 14, 1818, ch. LX, 3 Stat. 426; see also Act of Feb. 28, 1823, ch.
XVII, 3 Stat. 728 (appropriating further funding for repair and improvement of
Cumberland Road).
100. JAMES MONROE, VETO MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1822).
in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 98, at 142-43.
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governmental jurisdiction over the Road within the states through
which it would pass.' Explaining his veto, Monroe wrote,
The right of appropriation is nothing more than a right to
apply the public money to this or that purpose. It has no inci-
dental'02 power, nor does it draw after it any consequences of
that kind. All that Congress could do under it in the case of
internal improvements would be to appropriate the money neces-
sary to make them. For every act requiring legislative sanction or
support the State authority must be relied on. The condemnation
of the land, if the proprietors should refuse to sell it, the estab-
lishment of turnpikes and tolls, and the protection of the work
when finished must be done by the State. To these purposes the
powers of the General Government are believed to be utterly
incompetent.
[T]he power "to pay the debts and provide for the
common defense and general welfare[]" . . . conveys nothing
more than a right to appropriate the public money[;] . . . al-
though the right to appropriate the public money to such im-
provements affords a resource indispensably necessary to such a
scheme, it is nevertheless deficient as a power in the great char-
acteristics on which its execution depends.0 3
Were he not already two decades dead at that time, Hamilton
(unlike Monroe) surely would have approved even the nonspend-
ing features of the 1822 Cumberland Road Bill. He would have
approved them, however, not by virtue of the spending power, but
rather as "necessary and proper" to carry into execution Con-
gress's policy for the mails, for interstate commerce, and for the
101. Id. at 142.
102. This was a denial (an accurate denial) that the Necessary and Proper Clause
could support nonspending means to the extraneous ends sought by spending.
103. MONROE, supra note 98, at 1168, 173. The House of Representatives a few years
earlier had observed the same distinction emphasized by Monroe, passing a resolution
that asserted Congress's power to spend for roads and canals while defeating one assert-
ing that Congress had power to construct such improvements. See KELLY & HARBISON,
supra note 92, at 245.
Writing in 1830, Madison himself took note of this distinction, saying, "It is not to
be forgotten, that a distinction has been introduced between a power merely to appropri-
ate money to the common defence & general welfare, and a power to employ all the
means of giving full effect to objects embraced by the terms." Supplement to the letter
of Nov. 27, 1830, from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 21, at 424 n.l.
Madison's discussion of the distinction in that 1830 letter, however, displays his utter
failure to comprehend the principle of extraneous ends.
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movement of troops and defense materiel. Monroe was unable to
approve them on that ground because even though he shared
Hamilton's view of the spending power, like Madison he adhered
to Jefferson's crabbed view of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
With respect to new states created from the public domain,
Congress had followed the practice of earmarking a percentage of
the net proceeds from federal land sales to be spent for internal
improvements there." 4 This practice began with the admission of
Ohio under Jefferson, 5 and continued through Madison's ad-
ministration as well as Monroe's. The improvements at first were
federally selected, and later were left for the states to choose; but
in neither case was any federal role contemplated other than pay-
ing the bill. In this respect, however, Congress's next attempt to
sponsor a specific internal improvement-the Maysville Road Bill
of 1830-resembled the Cumberland Road Bill of 1822, and Presi-
dent Jackson vetoed it on reasoning reminiscent of President
Monroe's: "Assuming the right to appropriate money to aid in the
construction of national works to be warranted by the contempora-
neous and continued exposition of the Constitution, its insufficien-
cy for the successful prosecution of them must be admitted by all
candid minds."10 6 Without "[t]he right to exercise as much ju-
risdiction as is necessary to preserve the works and to raise funds
by the collection of tolls to keep them in repair," Jackson insisted,
"nothing extensively useful can be effected."10 7 Jackson, however,
did not interfere with the practice of making grants to public do-
main states, and there is no constitutional basis for granting states
federal money to use as they wish that is not equally sufficient to
uphold federal spending toward extraneous ends specified by Con-
gress itself.
It was not only money that Congress disposed of. Congress
repeatedly authorized grants of land for the recipients to sell (or
use as security) to finance various activities.0 8 It is important to
104. See PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 4-6
(1968).
105. Act of Apr. 30, 1802, ch. XL, § 7, Third, 2 Stat. 173, 175 (amended 1803).
106. ANDREW JACKSON, VETO OF THE MAYSVILLE ROAD BILL (1830), reprinted in 2
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 98, at 483, 490-91.
107. Id. at 492. Jackson also argued that the Maysville Road, running wholly within
Kentucky from the banks of the Ohio River to a town 60 miles inland, would be of
merely local benefit rather than for the "general" welfare as he considered required of
federal spending. Id. at 487.
108. The classic example is the numerous grants for railroads, but there are many
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notice this land grant practice because, as discussed in Section C
of this Part, the granting of money and the granting of land are
both really applications of the same constitutional power."
Land grants to locate seats of state government, to locate and
support universities, and to support public schools accompanied
the admission of every public domain state beginning with Ohio in
1803.11' The policy of earmarking one or two sections in each
township to support public schools actually antedated the Constitu-
tion,"' and ultimately "[a]lmost 78 million acres were granted to
the states for the support of the common schools.""' Of course,
advancement of education is not an end within any enumerated
power. In addition, a statute enacted in 1841 (and still on the
books) provided for granting every new state thereafter admitted
up to half a million acres of public land "for purposes of internal
improvement. 1 13
Nevertheless, when Congress acted in 1854 to authorize grant-
ing ten million acres to states to support maintenance of the indi-
gent insane, President Pierce vetoed the bill." 4 In the terms on
which it would have authorized making these grants (including at-
tendant limitations and conditions to be accepted by state legisla-
tures as prerequisites), this 1854 bill anticipated the style of mod-
ern federal funding programs. President Pierce did not attribute his
veto to these features, however. Instead, he invoked the view of
Madison and Jefferson regarding spending-that Congress's permis-
sible objectives are limited to matters within the scope of the
enumerated powers. "I have been unable to discover any distinc-
tion on constitutional grounds," Pierce said, "between an appro-
others. See GATES, supra note 104, at 341-86.
109. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
110. Proposals to spread this largesse more broadly, so as to include the older states,
emerged periodically for decades but failed to pass. The best synopsis of these proposals
as well as the practice of grants on admission is GATES, supra note 104, at 3-28.
111. This policy was initiated by the same Land Ordinance of 1785 that established
the rectangular system of surveys for the Northwest Territory. Id. at 65.
112. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 243
(1970).
113. Act of Sept. 4, 1841, ch. 16, § 8, 5 Stat. 453, 455 (current version at 43 U.S.C. §
857 (1988)). Subsequent admission acts dispensed with this Act's provisions, however,
making different grants instead. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 857 historical note (1988).
114. FRANKLIN PIERCE, VETO MESSAGE (1854), reprinted in 5 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 247 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
Justice McReynolds set out this veto message at length in his dissenting opinion in Stew-
ard Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 600-09 (1937) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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priation of $10,000,000 directly from the money in the Treasury for
the object contemplated and the appropriation of lands presented
for my sanction ...."'15 He reasoned that the federal govern-
ment was formed "for certain specified objects and purposes, and
for those only,"116 and said,
I can not find any authority in the Constitution for making the
Federal Government the great almoner of public charity through-
out the United States. To do so would, in my judgment, be con-
trary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution and subversive of
the whole theory upon which the Union of these States is found-
ed.117
President Pierce did not so much as mention the contravening
tradition, almost seventy years old at that time, of land grants to
finance schools: education certainly is not one of the federal gov-
ernment's "specified objects and purposes." His argument was a
triumph of dual federalism, which was in full flower by 1854 and
obscured with its false precepts the sound Hamiltonian principles
of constitutional analysis reflected in the decades of consistent
prior practice regarding land grants.
The modem era of federal spending began shortly after ratifi-
cation of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments in 1913.
Hamilton had observed that duties, excises, and other taxes on
articles of consumption
prescribe their own limit .... If duties are too high they lessen
the consumption-the collection is eluded; and the -product to the
treasury is not so great as when they are confined within proper
and moderate bounds."
Taxes on incomes, in contrast, do not similarly "prescribe
their own limit," and not long after the Sixteenth Amendment was
adopted it became apparent that with this efficient revenue device
the federal government could collect vastly more than was needed
for executing the enumerated powers. The excess revenues posi-
tioned Congress as potential benefactor and patron, and the Ham-
iltonian view of the spending power afforded Congress great dis-
115. PIERCE, supra note 114, at 253.
116. Id. at 250.
117. Id. at 249.
118. THE FEDERALIST No. 21, at 134 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
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cretion in selecting the objects of its largesse.' 9 At the same
time, the Seventeenth Amendment's alteration of the Senate's
political constituency, providing for election of senators directly by
voters rather than by state legislatures, decreased the institutional
fitness and disposition of that body to serve as a political safe-
guard against increasing federal influence.
In modern practice, federal money typically is offered subject
to numerous prerequisites and other "conditions," whether the re-
cipients are states, state subdivisions, or private persons or entities,
and whether the spending is for procurement or otherwise toward
some enumerated end or instead promotes extraneous ends. A
great many of these conditions have the evident purpose and prob-
able effect of inducing or deterring acts or practices that no enu-
merated power authorizes Congress to prohibit or compel. 20 It is
convenient to denominate all of the latter "extraneous" conditions,
for whether or not they are integral to the particular grant or its
particular policy aims, they are extraneous to any constitutionally
enumerated federal power."' Extraneous conditions raise the
119. Once the habit of copious spending toward extraneous ends was established, it
was indulged far beyond the point of exhausting surplus, contributing to an enormous
accumulation of debt.
120. Others, of course, aim at matters that are within some enumerated power (e.g.,
policy for interstate commerce, or enforcement of Fourteenth Amendment restrictions on
state action), but that Congress in the particular instance elected to influence only
through conditional spending rather than by exercise of the relevant enumerated power.
121. Professor Albert Rosenthal discusses "extraneous" conditions, but he uses "extra-
neous" to mean something very different from what is contemplated here. Rosenthal
contrasts "provisions that would regulate extraneous conduct" with "expressions of the
purpose of the expenditure itself." See Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending
and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1115 (1987). I use the word, however, not
to indicate a lack of germaneness to the purposes of particular expenditures, but to indi-
cate matters beyond the scope of Congress's enumerated powers.
Rosenthal exaggerates the degree to which powers "delegated . . . to the national
government" have "expanded enormously over time"; he therefore regards "the threshold
inquiry ... whether the action is warranted under the presumptive powers of Congress"
as "easily answered in the affirmative." Id. at 1125. Because he so casually expands the
enumerated powers, however, Rosenthal mistakenly asserts that "it is still not certain
whether furtherance of a mere 'policy' of the federal government will sustain conditional
spending unless that policy may be carried out pursuant to one of the powers granted to
Congress." Id. at 1131. He thus fails to realize that Steward, Helvering, and Oklahoma,
for example, resolve precisely the uncertainty he says persists, since the objectives target-
ed by the conditions there upheld were beyond the enumerated powers.
Likewise, because he exaggerates the scope of enumerated powers, Rosenthal
opines that the threshold "issue of presumptive power" is "comparatively unimportant."
Id. On the contrary, however, that issue is the whole point of the classic contrast be-
tween Madison and Hamilton.
THE SPENDING POWER
same constitutional issue raised by the bare act of spending toward
extraneous ends. Because they are so pervasively used, however,
extraneous conditions bring this issue even into the context of
spending grants and contracts aimed at effectuating enumerated
powers.
One early spending program with extraneous conditions was
the Maternity Act of 1921,122 which authorized federal matching
funds for states submitting plans satisfactory to the Children's Bu-
reau of the Department of Labor for promoting maternal and
infant hygiene and welfare. When the Maternity Act was chal-
lenged on its face in the 1923 Mellon cases,"z the Court de-
scribed the attack as having been made in stark dual federalist
terms, writing "that the statute constitutes an attempt to legislate
outside the powers granted to Congress by the Constitution and
within the field of local powers exclusively reserved to the
States."124 Instead of being decided in the Mellon cases,"a  how-
ever, the issue thus framed was postponed thirteen years, until
United States v. Butler in 1936.126
B. Butler, Steward, and Helvering
Butler involved the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933,127
which authorized federal payments to individual farmers in ex-
change for agreements to reduce acreage under production. Six
Justices held the Act unconstitutional.128
After declaring that Hamilton's view of Congress's spending
power "is the correct one ... [, i.e.,] the power of Congress to
Professor Rosenthal also proposes a different distinction, between "classifying" and
"coercive" conditions. Id. at 1114. He does not regard that distinction as having constitu-
tional significance, however, see id. at 1115; certainly on the Hamiltonian view it is im-
material.
122. Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224, repealed by. Act of Jan. 22, 1927, ch.
53, 44 Stat. 1024.
123. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 459-70 (1923).
124. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 482.
125. The Court held unanimously that neither the state nor the individual litigant had
standing to challenge the statute on its face, as they had tried to do. Id. at 480.
126. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
127. Pub. L. No. 10, § 25, 48 Stat. 31 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-624 (Supp.
III 1991)).
128. Butler, 297 U.S. at 68. Five Justices present for the Mellon cases were still on
the Court for Butler. Four of these (including Sutherland, who wrote the Mellon opinion)
were among the Butler majority, while the fifth (Brandeis) joined the Butler dissent.
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authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not
limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Con-
stitution, '129 Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, proceeded to
demonstrate that he simply did not understand what he-or Ham-
ilton-had said.
Applying what he called "another principle embedded in our
Constitution,""13 Roberts said, "The act invades the reserved
rights of the states. It is a statutory plan to regulate and control
agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers delegated to
the federal government.'' Powers not delegated to the United
States, he continued, "are reserved to the states or to the peo-
ple .... The same proposition, otherwise stated, is that powers
not granted are prohibited. None to regulate agricultural produc-
tion is given, and therefore legislation by Congress for that pur-
pose is forbidden. 1 32
Sic "transit gloria Hamiltoni! Having made a show of endorse-
ment, Roberts forthwith renounced him; Roberts's "principle" that
prohibits spending for matters "beyond the powers delegated to
the federal government" is not a different "principle embedded in
our Constitution," but rather the exact converse of Hamilton's
precept that spending is "not limited by the direct grants of legis-
lative power.' ' 133 Under Butler's simplistic dual federalism prem-
ise that "powers not granted are prohibited,"" every expendi-
ture other than to effectuate "the direct grants of legislative power
found in the constitution" ipso facto "invades the reserved rights
of the states."
The rule of decision in Butler, in other words, is precisely
Madison's view, applied notwithstanding the Court's simultaneous
nominal endorsement of Hamilton's view. The majority's seeming
obliviousness to this flagrant self-contradiction 135 makes its opin-
129. Butler, 297 U.S. at 66.
130. Id. at 68.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 66.
134. Contrast the more accurate understanding of "powers" discussed supra notes
21-28 and accompanying text.
135. This charge of obliviousness might not be equally fair as to all members of the
Butler majority. That majority consisted of six Justices, but their split into three camps
the next year in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), suggests that even
in 1936 they might not have been entirely of one mind.
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ion in Butler one of the few truly ridiculous opinions delivered in
two centuries of Supreme Court jurisprudence. 36
In Steward, Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts joined the Butler dissenters.
Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter all still retained dual
federalism's pie-slice error, but only Butler and McReynolds maintained it with undiluted
vigor. Justice Butler characterized unemployment compensation as a matter "from which
the United States is by the Constitution excluded." Id. at 618 (Butler, J., dissenting).
Justice McReynolds's opinion consisted for the most part of a nine-page quotation of
President Pierce's 1854 message (see supra note 114 and accompanying text) explaining in
dual federalist terms his veto of the program of land grants to states to fund indigent
assistance. Steward, 301 U.S. at 600-09 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). Significantly, Pierce
had invoked the spirits of Madison and Jefferson while conspicuously omitting any men-
tion of Hamilton at all. See id. at 606-07.
Sutherland and Van Devanter, on the other hand, compromised their dual feder-
alism a bit. They affirmed "the complete supremacy and independence of the state within
the field of its powers . . . . The federal government has no more authority to invade
that field than the state has to invade the exclusive field of national governmental pow-
ers. ... Id. at 611 (Sutherland and Van Devanter, JJ., dissenting) (citation omitted);
see also id. at 615. But they were willing for
the federal government and a state government to coiperate to a common end,
provided each of them is authorized to reach it. But such co6peration must be
effectuated by an exercise of the powers which they severally possess, and not
by an exercise, through invasion or surrender, by one of them of the govern-
mental power of the other.
Id. at 611-12.
Accordingly, Sutherland and Van Devanter dissented only in Steward, simultaneously
joining the majority in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937), in upholding the old-age
pension provisions of the same Social Security Act. The old-age provisions, the two Jus-
tices said, unlike the unemployment compensation provisions involved in Steward, repre-
sented cooperation to a common end through exercise of the powers that each respec-
tively possessed and entailed no surrender of power by the participating states, because
even though to qualify for support of its old-age assistance program a state must have
adopted a plan conforming to federal specifications,
[t]he state keeps its own funds and administers its own law in respect of them,
without let or hindrance of any kind on the part of the federal government; so
that we have simply the familiar case of federal aid upon conditions which the
state, without surrendering any of its powers, may accept or not as it chooses.
Steward, 301 U.S. at 612 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). At this point,
Sutherland cited the unanimous opinion of the Court in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923), which Sutherland himself had written. Steward, 301 U.S. at 592
(Sutherland, J., dissenting). In Mellon, Sutherland had observed that the Maternity Act
did not "require the States to do or to yield anything," Mellon, 262 U.S. at 482, but
went no further "than to propose to share with the State the field of state power," id. at
485. Even though federal aid was forthcoming under the Maternity Act only if the state's
own plan was deemed satisfactory, a state could alter its program with no consequence
other than ineligibility for the following year's grant. Id. at 479.
136. One recent but stunningly anachronistic article baldly reiterates the dual federal-
ism thesis, complete with assertions that legislative objectives not "expressly delegated" to
Congress are "retained exclusively to" the states. Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman,
Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 Sup. Cr. REV. 85, 102, 117. Pro-
fessors McCoy and Friedman elude the ridicule earned by the Butler majority only be-
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The Butler majority opinion recites the ill-considered "pretext"
dictum from M'Culloch'37 and repeatedly stresses that theme.138
It mistakenly applies the Necessary and Proper Clause as a restric-
tion of the (taxing and) spending power.1 39 It further manifests
the dual federalism error by equating "extraneous objects 1 40
with "prohibited ends.' 41 And its error is punctuated by irony,
for Hamilton had specifically advocated federal spending to influ-
ence agricultural production. 142
The Butler dissenters, however, understood Hamilton no bet-
ter. Penetrating and escaping the misconceptions ensconced by
dual federalism was tedious and difficult intellectual work, and no
Justice had yet finished it by this time. Writing for the Butler
dissenters, Justice Stone showed none of the clear understanding
of classic federalism principles he would display five years later
when writing for the unanimous Court in United States v.
Darby.143
Darby was not a spending power case, but as the Justices
recognized, the principles applied there to uphold the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) are generic. The relevant part of the 1941
Darby opinion upheld the portion of the FLSA prohibiting the
shipment in interstate commerce of goods produced under wage
and hour circumstances unsatisfactory to Congress.1" This part of
the Court's opinion in Darby constitutes the first deliberate and
clear-sighted affirmation by any modern Supreme Court majority
of the principle of extraneous ends.
cause they do not even claim to endorse Hamilton's view.
137. Butler, 297 U.S. at 68-69 (quoting M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat)
316, 342 (1819)); see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
138. E.g., Butler, 297 U.S. at 70, 77.
139. After quoting from M'Culloch the classic exposition of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 421 ("let the end be legitimate . . . "), the Butler majority
misapplied it to produce this absolutely anti-Hamiltonian proposition:
The power of taxation [and spending], which is expressly granted. may, of
course, be adopted as a means to carry into operation another power also ex-
pressly granted. But resort to the taxing [and spending] power to effectuate an
end which is not legitimate, not within the scope of the Constitution, is obvi-
ously inadmissible.
Butler, 297 U.S. at 69. Madison himself could not have better articulated the Madisonian
view.
140. Id. at 67.
141. Id. at 77.
142. See supra text accompanying note 71.
143. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
144. Id. at 115.
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Citing tax cases-thus illustrating the generic nature of the
principle involved-Stone wrote for the Darby Court,
The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce
are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of
which the Constitution places no restriction . . . . "The judicial
cannot prescribe to the legislative department of the government
limitations upon the exercise of its acknowledged power." What-
ever their motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do
not infringe some constitutiorial prohibition are within the plena-
ry power conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause.45
Accordingly, the Darby Court expressly overruled Hammer v.
Dagenhart'46 in favor of "the powerful and now classic dissent of
Mr. Justice Holmes setting forth the fundamental issues in-
volved . . . ."" After Darby, a federal measure "nominally" ex-
ercising some enumerated power would not again be thought vul-
nerable merely because "its motive or purpose' 148 "or its ef-
fect" '149 was "to control in some measure'?1-° a matter within
the reserved power of the states.
The Darby Justices were not misled by M'Culloch's old "pre-
text" dictum. Indeed, in discussing this extraneous ends principle,
the Darby Court made no reference at all to M'Culloch (or to the
Necessary and Proper Clause). The Darby Court cited M'Culloch
only with respect to the different portion of the FLSA that re-
quired employers to provide specified wage and hour circumstanc-
es for production employees;"' unlike the rule against shipment,
that rule governing production was a straightforward application of
the extraneous means principle of the Necessary and Proper
Clause." 2
145. Id. (citations omitted).
146. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
147. Darby, 312 U.S. at 115.
148. Id. at 113.
149. Id. at 116.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 117-24.
152. See supra note 62. To stress that this extraneous means principle was generic and
not peculiar to the commerce context, the Darby opinion explained,
Such legislation has often been sustained with respect to powers, other than the
commerce power granted to the national government, when the means chosen,
although not themselves within the granted power, were nevertheless deemed
appropriate aids to the accomplishment of some purpose within an admitted
power of the national government.
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Darby thus clearly distinguished the principle of extraneous
ends from the principle of extraneous means, discussing each in a
separate part of the opinion dealing with a different part of the
FLSA. But while this distinction is indispensable to understanding
and applying Hamilton's view of the spending power, it had not
thus been recognized and clarified before Darby was decided in
1941.
Justice Stone's understanding of federalism's analytical princi-
ples was not so well developed when Butler was at issue in 1936.
Being no more prepared than his brethren at that time to perceive
and affirm the principle of extraneous ends, Justice Stone in his
Butler dissent scrambled that principle with the principle of extra-
neous means.
In Butler, Stone said that reductions in agricultural production
agreed to by recipient farmers "are but incidents of the authorized
expenditure of government money"'53 and reasoned that if such
"incidents" could be regarded (as he said the Butler majority re-
garded them) as limiting the granted power, "the time-honored
principle of constitutional interpretation that the granted power in-
cludes all those which are incident to it is reversed.' 54 Stone
elaborated his reference to that "time-honored principle"'5 by
quoting Chief Justice Marshall's famous statement in M'Culloch v.
Maryland about means "plainly adapted" to ends "within the
scope of the constitution. '
That M'Culloch statement, of course, was a paraphrase of
Hamilton, but it was a paraphrase of Hamilton's view only of the
Necessary and Proper Clause.'57 The "time-honored principle" to
which Stone referred in Butler pertains only to ends that are enu-
merated, authorizing pursuit of them by means that are not; it says
Darby, 312 U.S. at 121.
The Darby Court also used a second Necessary and Proper Clause rationale to up-
hold the requirement regarding production wages and hours, independently of the ship-
ping prohibition elaborated supra note 62. Darby, 312 U.S. at 122-24. On this second,
"competition" rationale, Congress in the exercise of its plenary power over interstate
commerce had decided that the cost effects of lower wages and longer hours should not
be a factor in interstate commerce competition, and accordingly, as a means to eliminate
that competitive factor, it had prohibited such lower wages and longer hours. Id.
153. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 84 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155. Stone called this the "cardinal guide to constitutional interpretation." Id.
156. Id. (quoting M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
157. See supra note 43.
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nothing at all about using enumerated powers as means to pro-
mote extraneous ends-and that was the issue in Butler. In Butler,
Stone unwittingly jumbled these distinct issues with the undiscrimi-
nating phrases "incident to" and "incidents of."' 8 Hamilton had
understood, endorsed, and used both the principle of extraneous
means and the principle of extraneous ends, but he never had con-
fused the two, and he never had associated the latter with the
Necessary and Proper Clause.
Having so scrambled the'egg, Stone assumed that M'Culloch's
language about ends that are "legitimate, . . . within the scope of
the constitution,' 59 must be relevant to the point at issue in But-
ler. Indeed, wholly at odds with Hamilton, he assumed that the
end, or purpose, of a federal spending program must determine its
constitutionality. Thus Stone declared that "[t]he Constitution re-
quires that public funds shall be spent for a defined purpose," 6 '
concluding that spending could be "within the granted power" 16'
only if adapted to "the end which alone would justify the expendi-
ture." 162 "Expenditures would ... lose their constitutional sanc-
tion," he reasoned, were there not some assurance that "the per-
mitted end would be attained. 1 63
Hamilton had maintained that the end promoted by spending
is immaterial,"6 the consequence being that Congress may spend
even for extraneous ends. Stone, however, maintained that the end
promoted by spending is determinative, the consequence being that
Congress may spend only for the purposes constitutionally "de-
158. Butler, 297 U.S. at 83 (Stone, J., dissenting). With regard to the obfuscatory, am-
biguous word "incident," see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
159. M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 421.
160. Butler, 297 U.S. at 83 (Stone, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 85.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 83. Only a confused allusion to the irrelevant Necessary and Proper Clause
could have made it seem material to Justice Stone whether conditions accompanying
federal financial assistance are "reasonably adapted to the attainment of the end" at
which the spending is aimed. Id. at 85; see also id. at 83. Adaptation to a targeted end
is material when the end is within some enumerated power and one needs the Necessary
and Proper Clause to justify a means that otherwise there would be no power to use;
when the measure used as a means is itself an exercise of an enumerated power, howev-
er, it cannot possibly be less constitutional by virtue of being adapted poorly, if at all, to
some end. For further discussion of the "germaneness" notion, see infra Section III(A).
164. It is immaterial, that is, unless it is forbidden or restricted by some Bill of
Rights type of constitutional provision, of course. See supra note 51 and accompanying
text.
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fined." Thus, Stone's position was not Hamilton's at all. His dis-
agreement with the Butler majority was not as to whether Con-
gress may spend toward ends that are not "within the scope of the
constitution"; 6 ' rather, it was only as to what ends are "within
the scope of the constitution."
As Stone reasoned in his Butler dissent, the "defined purpose"
or the "permitted end', 66 of spending is the "general Wel-
fare"-that phrase from the clause that authorizes Congress to
"lay and collect Taxes"167 being treated as definitive of the
spending power. But at the same time, Stone took this "permitted
end"-the "general Welfare"- to include anything "nation wide in
its extent and effects." 168 What makes this interpretation irrecon-
cilable with Hamilton, of course, is not the vast range of ends it
countenances, 69 but rather the notion that all such ends-all
matters "nation wide in [their] extent and effects"-are within the
enumerated power to spend, and therefore not extraneous at all.
The implications of this confusion are enormous. To be sure,
the spending power itself enables Congress to use only the carrot
(subsidy, or conditional subsidy), as distinguished from the stick
(coercive sanctions), to promote federal policy on such "general
Welfare" matters. Conceiving those "general Welfare" matters as
themselves within rather than extraneous to the enumerated pow-
ers, however, makes it seem that both the Necessary and Proper
Clause and the Supremacy Clause must be applicable not just to
the spending function itself, but to the "general Welfare" ends
thus mistakenly conceived as enumerated. Under this mistaken
view, the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes even nonfiscal,
avowedly coercive measures to more fully effectuate any policy
about anything that Congress tries to influence somewhat through
spending-obliterating the principle of enumerated powers-and
the Supremacy Clause gives priority to every federal policy about
anything, producing comprehensive, supreme governing power in
the federal government.
165. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
166. Butler, 297 U.S. at 83 (Stone, J., dissenting).
167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
168. Butler, 297 U.S. at 79.
169. After all, no rule as to purpose could possibly give more latitude for spending
than Hamilton's view that the ends, or objectives, of federal spending are constitutionally
immaterial.
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These of course are precisely the consolidating, centralizing
results that the principle of enumerated powers was devised to
preclude."' 0 Thus, by misconceiving "general Welfare" ends as
enumerated rather than extraneous, Justice Stone unwittingly abro-
gated the principle of enumerated powers, surrendering unused the
whole rhetorical arsenal it provides against unbounded, general,
and supreme national legislative power.
That plainly was not what Stone meant to do; it was a conse-
quence of an intellectual mistake. In 1938 Stone would join in
vigorously reaffirming the principle of enumerated powers, t"' and
in 1941 in Darby he would distinguish and separate the issues he
had merged by mistake in Butler. Nonetheless, Stone's mis-
take-conceiving the phrase "general Welfare" in Article I, Section
8, Clause 1 as placing general welfare ends within the constitution-
al enumeration-still recurs constantly today, inexorably entailing
absurd results."72
In 1937 the Butler dissenters emerged as the core of a new
majority in the Social Security Act cases, Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis and Helvering v. Davis.17 3 While they had grown in num-
ber, however, their analysis had not yet improved. 74
As in Butler, in Steward and Helvering the challenges techni-
cally were to the taxes imposed. Helvering involved the old-age
benefits provisions of the Social Security Act and a tax on em-
ployers designed to help fund them; the challenger relied on But-
ler.75 Steward involved the Act's unemployment compensation
170. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
171. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
172. See infra Part III.
173. In both Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), and Helvering v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937), Butler dissenters Justices Stone, Brandeis, and Cardozo were
joined by Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts of the Butler majority. (Roberts, in
fact, had written the Butler majority opinion.) In Helvering, Justices Sutherland and Van
Devanter joined them as well.
174. In Helvering, Justices Cardozo, Brandeis, Stone, and Roberts urged dismissal be-
cause no sufficient cause of action had been either pleaded or proved, Helvering, 301
U.S. at 639, but the other five Justices found in the case "extraordinary features making
it fitting . . . to determine whether the benefits and the taxes are valid or invalid." Id. at
640.
175. Id. at 634. Only two Justices-Butler and McReynolds-were persuaded by the
attack on the old-age benefits provisions in Helvering. Although Justices Sutherland and
Van Devanter joined Butler and McReynolds in dissent regarding the unemployment
compensation provisions at issue in Steward, they joined the majority in Helvering be-
cause (for reasons I do not find self-evident, and which they did not explain) they con-
19941
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
provisions, t76 which were complex enough to require some expla-
nation. The Act authorized administration grants to help states de-
fray the overhead costs of their unemployment compensation pro-
grams.1 77 To qualify a state for such aid, its program had to sat-
isfy federally prescribed criteria aimed to ensure that the program
would provide sufficient and effective financial relief.178  The
same end of effective relief for the unemployed also was targeted
by a tax credit provided by the Act to employers in states whose
programs satisfied those criteria.179
The challenger in Steward considered unemployment relief an
"ulterior aim,"'' because it was not within the scope of any enu-
merated power. Indeed, because to the dual federalist mind any
matter not within some enumerated power is foreclosed from any
federal attention at all, the argument was that the "ulterior aim"
of these provisions was "not only ulterior, but essentially unlaw-
ful.t181
Hamilton would have responded simply that Congress may
spend even toward ends extraneous to any enumerated power. He
could have cited examples from his own day, including cod fishery
subsidies, funding of public improvements, and disaster relief. He
might also have pointed to his own calls for federal funding of
education, agriculture, industry, and trade." Between these on
the one hand and pensions for the elderly and compensation for
the unemployed on the other, there is no principled difference of
constitutional dimension. In Hamilton's view, the fact that all these
sidered old-age assistance (unlike unemployment assistance) to be an end as permissible
for the federal government as for the states, and because they concluded that the old-age
provisions involved no surrender of the participating states' own power. See Steward, 301
U.S. at 612 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
176. In Steward, the taxing provisions included a credit tailored for the same purpose
as the spending plan accompanying it, and the Court considered both in light of that
aim. Steward, 301 U.S. at 585-86.
177. Id. at 577.
178. Id. at 578.
179. The Act imposed a tax on employers and provided for crediting against that tax
most of the contributions an employer had made to a state unemployment compensation
system if the state program satisfied the criteria qualifying states for administration
grants. Social Security Act, ch. 531, §§ 901-902, 49 Stat. 620, 639-40 (1935) (repealed
1939).
180. Steward, 301 U.S. at 585.
181. Id. at 586.
182. See supra text accompanying note 71.
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ends are "extraneous" to any enumerated power could not warrant
calling any of them "ulterior," let alone "unlawful."
It was not Hamilton, however, but Justice Cardozo who wrote
for the Court in both Steward and Helvering. Cardozo professed
endorsement of the Hamiltonian position,183 but he utterly failed
to understand it or to respond as Hamilton would have. Instead,
just like Justice Stone in the Butler dissent a year earlier, Cardozo
unwittingly abrogated the principle of enumerated powers.
The problem of unemployment, Cardozo said, "had become
national in area and dimensions,"'" and the old-age indigence
problem "is plainly national in area and dimensions." ' These
statements, and the further observation that "laws of the separate
states cannot deal with it effectively,"' 186 recall the generality of
the Eighth Randolph Resolution, as referred to the Committee of
Detail in 1787, that the national legislature should be competent
"to legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union,
and also in those Cases to which the States are separately incom-
petent . ... ," Following the lead of the Committee of Detail,
the delegates at the Constitutional Convention deliberately aban-
doned this high level of generality in order to obtain the distinct
advantage offered by enumeration.'8s Cardozo and his fellow Jus-
tices in 1937, however, missed their whole point.89
183. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
184. Steivard, 301 U.S. at 586.
185. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 644. Cardozo then said, "Congress, at least, had a basis
for that belief." Id. If the issue in Helvering, Steward, and Butler had been under the
Necessary and Proper Clause, this comment would have been on point: the classic under-
standing of that Clause, according to which Congress may impose a regulation upon an
extraneous matter as a means to promote an enumerated end as long as it has a rational
basis to believe that the regulation will conduce to the enumerated end, had begun to
emerge again just six weeks earlier, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937). But the Necessary and Proper Clause states the principle of extraneous means,
and the issue in these cases concerned, instead, the principle of extraneous ends. This
statement by Cardozo, too, was therefore inapt. Hamilton had recognized that "[uit is . . .
of necessity left to the discretion of the National Legislature, to pronounce, upon the ob-
jects, which concern the general Welfare, and for which under that description, an appro-
priation of money is requisite and proper." HAMILTON, supra note 71, at 303. But
Hamilton's statement was addressing the "general Welfare" phrase as a possible superven-
ing restriction on the power to spend; he was not discussing the essence of that power
itself.
186. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 644.
187. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 12, at 131.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16.
189. Neglect of the reason for, and the significance of, the Convention delegates'
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Describing a situation as "national in area and dimensions"
certainly attributes sufficient incidence or impact to it to implicate
the general welfare as distinguished from the welfare of a few.
However, that is an entirely different issue from whether the situa-
tion having that impact is one within Congress's enumerated pow-
ers; to overlook this distinction is to miss the crucial issue separat-
ing Hamilton from Madison on the spending power-namely,
whether the situation even needs to be one within Congress's enu-
merated powers in order for Congress to spend regarding it.
Justice Cardozo pointed out that in a period of three and
one-half years more than $2.9 billion had been drawn from the
Federal Treasury for emergency relief (in addition to sums spent
on programs to put victims of the Great Depression back to
work).' 9 Hamilton would have upheld such expenditures regard-
less of whether the Constitution entrusted such concerns to the
federal government-indeed, even though it specifically did not.
Failing to understand Hamilton, however, Cardozo thought it nec-
essary to deny that economic relief of the unemployed and elderly
are "fields foreign to [Congress's] function";1 91 he thought it nec-
essary to claim instead that such welfare ends are "fairly within
the scope of national policy and power."' 92 But of course, they
are not. They simply are extraneous ends toward which (among
innumerable others) Congress may spend.
Perhaps it was true, as Cardozo eloquently wrote, that there
was "need of help from the nation if the people were not to
starve";193 if so, however, that was true exactly-and only-in the
same sense that Hamilton had believed there was need in 1791 for
federal subsidy of manufacturing if the young nation's scant
economy was not to fail. Federal funds may be spent to meet any
such need, but neither the generality and urgency of the need nor
any decision to meet it can place such a matter among those enu-
merated by the Constitution for the federal government's con-
cern. 94 The essence of Hamilton's spending power view is pre-
choice to enumerate was abetted by some prominent, politically driven scholarship of the
New Deal period. See, e.g., Robert L. Stem, That Commerce Which Concerns More States
Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1338-40 (1934).
190. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 587 (1937).
191. Id. at 590.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 586.
194. We might also agree with Cardozo that there is need for the national govern-
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cisely that Congress may spend for matters that the Constitution
does not designate for the federal government's concern-that
Congress may spend for matters that (in terms of enumerated
powers doctrine) are "foreign to [Congress's] function" and are not
"fairly within the scope of national policy and power."
Since Darby's affirmation of the principle of extraneous ends
in 1941, the Supreme Court has prominently acknowledged that
principle as the real reason that the holding in Butler was wrong
and the ones in Steward and Helvering correct. The Court has
upheld spending (and spending conditions) directed toward ends
that it frankly recognized as beyond Congress's constitutional pow-
ers, without feeling compelled to repeat the doubletalk about
"defined purpose,"'195  "permitted end,"'196  and "end[s] legiti-
mately national"'197 that clutters the Stone and Cardozo opinions
of 1936 and 1937 and obfuscates the point.
Its first occasion to do so arose in Oklahoma v. United States
Civil Service Commission,198 just six years after Darby. Congress
had conditioned its offer of certain federal funds on recipient
states' curtailment of partisan political activities by certain offi-
cials.' 99 The Justices upheld the condition even though "the Unit-
ed States ... has no power to ... regulate local political activities
as such of state officials ....
More recently, when Congress conditioned highway fund
grants to states so as to reduce the amount available to states that
allowed persons under twenty-one years of age to purchase or
possess alcoholic beverages, the Court in South Dakota v. Dole2°t
recognized that it was immaterial whether the object (diminishing
teenage drinking or drunk driving by teenagers) was within any of
ment "to safeguard its own treasury" against devastation by similar drains in the future.
See id. at 591. But such drains are wholly at Congress's discretion: the "threat" to be
safeguarded against is only the threat that Congress might be generous in responding to
situations for which the Constitution permits, hut no enumerated power commits, the
federal government to pay.
195. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 83 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
196. Id.
197. Steward, 301 U.S. at 591.
198. 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
199. Id. at 143.
200. Id. Contrast the thesis in Steward, that the matter sought to be influenced was
"legitimately national" and "fairly within the scope of national policy and power." 301
U.S. at 590-91.
201. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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Congress's powers. On behalf of the seven-Justice majority, Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote, "[O]bjectives not thought to be within
Article I's 'enumerated legislative fields' . . may nevertheless be
attained through the use of the spending power and the condition-
al grant of federal funds." ' That stated the Hamiltonian view
well enough that only a purist academician might quibble." 3
Four years later Chief Justice Rehnquist made the same point
again, writing for the Court that "[t]he Government can, without
violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage
certain activities it believes to be in the public interest,''204 not-
withstanding those activities are not within the federal
government's power to control.
Nonetheless, the anti-Hamiltonian errors of conception mani-
fested in Stone's Butler dissent and repeated the next year in
Cardozo's Steward and Helvering majority opinions still confound
spending power analysis today. Indeed, the consequences go be-
yond spending issues: the eloquence of expression employed in the
Steward and Helvering opinions, and the prestige of their author,
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, have helped to accredit a "sophisticat-
ed" modern impression that the principle of enumerated powers is
an anachronism, really just a quaint old "fiction, 2 5 and that
every problem even arguably "national in area and, dimen-
sions ' 20 6 is, ipso facto, "within the scope of national policy and
power., 207 It is true that this sophisticated but consolidating and
centralized notion of governing power under the Constitution is
precisely the import of what Stone and Cardozo confusedly
said;.. it is a mistaken view, however, to which neither Stone
202. Id. at 207 (citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)).
203. The metaphor of "fields" is a dangerous one; powers other than "legislative"
ones are enumerated, and even some legislative powers are enumerated elsewhere than in
Article I (e.g., U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3, cl. 2; id. art. IV, § 1; id. amend. XIV, § 5);
such extraneous objectives might be "attained," but they also might be frustrated by
states or by private recipients and thus not actually be "attained" at all.
204. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991). The activities funded in that instance
were family-planning services specifically excluding abortion counseling. See also Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977), in which the Court said that the federal government may
"make a value judgment . . . and . . . implement that judgment by the allocation of
public funds."
205. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 307
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
206. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586 (1937).
207. Id. at 590.
208. See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
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nor Cardozo wittingly subscribed209-a product merely of intellec-
tual mistake, not even of any policy choice.
C. The Foundational Fault: Text Matters
Stone, Cardozo, and the other Butler dissenters and the Stew-
ard and Helvering majority members were primed for the analyti-
cal mistake they made. They were primed for it by the long-stand-
ing habit of attributing Congress's spending power to the clause of
the Constitution that authorizes taxes "to pay the Debts and pro-
vide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States. ,210
The Taxing Clause, however, does not actually authorize
spending at all. The long-standing assumption that it does relies on
a course of inference like the one spelled out by Justice Roberts
in United States v. Butler:
The Congress is expressly empowered to lay taxes to provide for
the general welfare. Funds in the Treasury as a result of taxa-
tion ... can never accomplish the objects for which they were
collected unless the power to appropriate is as broad as the pow-
er to tax. [Therefore t]he necessary implication from the terms of
the grant is that the public funds may be appropriated "to pro-
vide for the general welfare of the United States..21'
Since it is only out of respect for the principle of enumerated
powers that one seeks a textual basis for the spending power in
the first place, it seems anomalous to stake so significant a power
on nothing more than a chain of inferences. Moreover, there is
even greater reason for dubiety than this: even if it might be tak-
en to imply authority to spend tax revenues, the Taxing Clause
cannot be twisted enough to authorize the spending of Treasury
assets derived from gifts, user fees, sales of surplus federal proper-
ty, or other nontax sources. For generations, public debts were
paid and a large part of the federal budget was supported by
proceeds from the sale of public domain lands; but nothing in the
Taxing Clause even implicitly contemplates spending such funds.
209. The very next year the Court, with Stone (but not Cardozo) participating,
forcefully reaffirmed constant adherence to the principle of enumerated powers, applying
it rigorously in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
210. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
211. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936).
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Most significant in light of the modern fact of routine deficit
spending, the text of the Taxing Clause is utterly inadequate to
authorize spending on the national credit.
The gravest difficulty in associating the spending power with
the Taxing Clause, however, is not that the Clause is inadequate
(which it is), but that it misleads. When one attributes the spend-
ing power to this Clause, as Stone and Cardozo and the 1937
majority did, one can be very easily seduced into thinking that any
"general Welfare" objective is an enumerated one-even though
were it not being targeted by spending, it readily would be rec-
ognized as an objective extraneous to any enumerated power."'
Once one yields to this seduction, it follows that supremacy atta-
ches to Congress's general welfare objective and even that
nonfiscal federal measures to achieve it are warranted. With that,
of course, one's alienation from the Constitution's allocation of
governing power is complete.
Other language in the Constitution is better adapted than the
Taxing Clause to authorize spending. Financial assets are property,
no matter whence they derive, and the Constitution without re-
striction empowers Congress to "dispose of... the ... Property
belonging to the United States., 213 Moreover, the aptness of this
212. Although the confusion thus induced between extraneous and enumerated ends is
predominantly detrimental, the confusion has not been wholly without good effect. Proba-
bly it is precisely because of this confusion that Justice Roberts and Chief Justice Hughes
slipped into alignment with the Butler dissenters to comprise the new majority in Stew-
ard.
The same confusion likely made it possible for even Justices Sutherland and Van
Devanter to join in Helvering: the old-age pension provisions litigated there contemplated
what obviously was "welfare" spending, whereas the ends of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1933 litigated in Butler were less in the traditional pattern of welfare measures
and thus could more readily be characterized as extraneous. The unemployment compen-
sation provisions at issue in Steward also fit the traditional welfare pattern, but Justices
Sutherland and Van Devanter objected to them on a different ground, as involving a
surrender of some self-governance by states (which they concluded the pension provisions
did not). See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 612 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dis-
senting). Justice Sutherland's dissent is discussed at greated length supra note 135.
The same confusion between extraneous and enumerated ends might also explain
why even Justice Brandeis, having concurred in Holmes's dissent in Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), see supra note 49 and accompanying text, joined quietly
both in Stone's Butler dissent and in Cardozo's two 1937 majority opinions without call-
ing attention to the principle of extraneous ends that Holmes's Dagenhart opinion so
bluntly expressed: if Brandeis, like Stone and Cardozo, misconceived the general welfare
as an enumerated end, he might not have realized that the principle that should dispose
of Steward and Helvering was actually the same principle espoused in that Dagenhart
dissent.
213. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Most of the litigation under this clause has in-
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language to authorize spending is no accident: a careful parsing of
the records of the Constitutional Convention indicates that this
Article IV Property Clause was specifically designed for the pur-
pose, among several others, of authorizing Congress to spend-
even for objects that would not be within any enumerated power.
Indeed, several examples of such spending were specifically dis-
cussed, and none was disapproved. To detail and document the
evidence here would distract from the more important aspects of
spending power analysis being elaborated in this Article; that task
is undertaken in a separate article.1 4
This Property Clause basis for spending toward extraneous
ends215 is sufficient not only as to tax revenues, but also as to
nontax receipts like sale proceeds, gifts, and user fees, and even as
to borrowed funds: the borrowing power216 imports no restriction
on the use of any borrowed funds, and borrowed assets and credit
both are alienable, or disposable, "property" of the United
States. 217
The language of the Property Clause places no limit whatever
on the objectives toward which dispositions of federal property
may be aimed. It does not even restrict spending to objectives
comprehensible within so latitudinous a phrase as "general Wel-
volved realty, but it is recognized as equally applicable to personalty. See, e.g., Nixon v.
Richey, 513 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (White House tapes); Nuclear Data, Inc. v. Atomic
Energy Comm'n, 364 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. II1. 1973) (patent rights).
Because of their common source in this single Clause, Congress's powers regarding
federal money and regarding nonmonetary federal property parallel one another. Conse-
quently, for example, United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940) (involving condi-
tions attached to congressional grant of hydroelectric rights), is as enlightening concerning
Congress's spending power as concerning its power regarding nonmonetary federal proper-
ty.
214. See David E. Engdahl, The Basis of the Spending Power, 18 SEAT'rLE U. L.
REV. (forthcoming Fall 1994).
215. For spending toward enumerated ends-i.e., to carry into execution the enumer-
ated powers-the Property Clause is superfluous because the Necessary and Proper
Clause applies. Because funds may be drawn from the Treasury "in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7, that Clause authorizing "all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for" effectuating the enumerated powers, id. §
8, cl. 18, is ample authority to spend for government operations and all other ends with-
in the enumerated powers.
216. Id. cl. 2.
217. Even funds held in trust by the United States might be regarded as within the
Article IV Property Clause. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2426
(1992), in which the Court rejected the argument that funds held by the United States in
an escrow account are not federal funds-albeit with a remarkably bumbling and inade-
quate rationale.
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fare." Misplaced anxiety about unlimited federal power might
therefore mislead one to think that the Taxing Clause is the safer
and more conservative, because more guarded, referent for the
spending power. But it manifestly is not. In the first place, the
nominal limitation to "general" rather than "particular" welfare
has negligible justiciable significance."1 8 In the second place, and
more significantly, the Supreme Court declared in a 1976 per cu-
riam opinion that it is a mistake to think of the "general Welfare"
phrase as a limitation: "Appellant's 'general welfare' contention
erroneously treats the General Welfare Clause as a limitation upon
congressional power. It is rather a grant of power, the scope of
which is quite expansive, particularly in view of the enlargement of
power by the Necessary and Proper Clause." ' 9 Indeed, as the
last phrase of this pronouncement demonstrates, it really is the
reference of the spending power to the language of the Taxing
Clause that portends the more sweeping federal competence: the
only way the Justices in 1976 could have concluded that the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause would "enlarge" federal power in the
spending context was by mistakenly assuming that it could support
nonfiscal measures aimed at effectuating extraneous objectives of
spending. Reference instead to the scantier language of the Prop-
erty Clause would not likely have induced that mistake.
Hamilton's view implements the principle of enumerated pow-
ers (and the important values of federalism it is designed to pre-
serve) precisely by distinguishing between the act of spending and
the objectives at which various acts of spending might be aimed,
holding that Congress may spend regardless how extraneous its
objective. By emphasizing this distinction, Hamilton's thesis refutes
the mistaken claim of federal supremacy for /extraneous policy
ends and exposes misapplications of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. Because the Property Clause contains no language about
purpose even at a high level of generality, attributing the spending
power to it helps avoid confusing extraneous ends with enumerat-
ed ones. It thus actually serves more effectively to ensure govern-
218. As the Court wrote in 1937,
The line must still be drawn between one welfare and another, between particu-
lar and general . . . . The discretion, however, is not confided to the courts.
The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display
of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment. This is now familiar law.
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
219. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976) (per curiam).
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ment tempered by a federal distribution of power. In contrast,
attributing the spending power to the Taxing Clause with its illuso-
ry limits strongly induces confusion between extraneous and enu-
merated ends, tending to subvert the Constitution's allocation of
governing power.
It is true that even Hamilton attributed the spending power to
the Taxing Clause."2 That he did so demonstrates that such
misattribution need not necessarily lead one to confuse extraneous
with enumerated ends and thereby inadvertently abrogate the
principle of enumerated powers in favor of a general federal gov-
erning power. It is possible to resolve spending power issues cor-
rectly even if the long-standing error as to the source of the
spending power remains uncorrected. Propositions that are inher-
ently misleading are unsatisfactory, however, even if they do not
always deceive. The misattribution of the spending power to the
Taxing Clause helps to perpetuate very great mischief, and there-
fore it would be beneficial to recognize and correct the mistake
now. Recognizing that Congress's power to spend toward extrane-
ous ends derives from the Property Clause can do much to facili-
tate and encourage clearer analysis of the issues.
Even if this long habit of misattribution proves too deeply in-
grained to be purged, however, the commonly made errors of
spending power analysis are not unavoidable. The next Part of this
Article examines some of those errors and their consequences and
elaborates how to avoid them.
220. HAMILTON, supra note 71, at 230, 302-03. Hamilton wrote, "The terms 'general
welfare' were doubtless intended to signify more than was expressed or imported in those
which Preceded [i.e., the other clauses in Article I, § 8]; otherwise numerous exigencies
incident to the affairs of a Nation would have been left without a provision." Id. at 303.
This statement by itself may be criticized as belittling the scope of the enumerated
powers, ignoring those conferred on one or another branch by other Articles and Sec-
tions and failing to acknowledge the reach of the Necessary and Proper Clause. However,
even if most "affairs of a nation" could be found to be provided for by these, at least
some affairs arguably worth national attention could not, and it is these that Hamilton's
argument addresses. The phrase "general Welfare," he continued,
is as comprehensive as any that could have been used; because it was not fit
that the constitutional authority of the Union, to appropriate its revenues shou'd
have been restricted within narrower limits than the "General Welfare" and be-
cause this necessarily embraces a vast variety of particulars, which are suscep-
tible neither of specification nor of definition.
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III. CORRECTING CRITICAL MISTAKES
Lawyers under a regime of precedent characteristically fashion
rhetorical structures even with crooked stones, not troubling (or
not daring) to ascertain whether the masons have cut them askew.
But stare decisis is a treacherous rule in constitutional law. Much
"constitutional" doctrine finds little to work with in the Constitu-
tion's own text. Where that is true, the risk of poor policy might
be substantial, but the risk of intellectual error is less, and there-
fore more deference to precedent might be desirable to help mod-
erate zealous policy crusades. The state-federal allocation of gov-
erning power, however, is one realm where the text is extensive,
and coherent enough if only it be thoughtfully analyzed. Prece-
dents reflecting less adept analysis can gravely, albeit unwittingly,
distort, damage, and destroy. Flawed stones make unstable, some-
times dangerously inadequate walls. The obligation of each of us is
to the Constitution, not to some judicial oracle living or dead;2 '
this obligation is not discharged by reiterating and continuing to
fumble with intellectual mistakes just because the Supreme Court
has made them before.
Constant recitation of the familiar phrases of the 1937 Social
Security Act opinions, 22 without recognizing that those phrases
reflect only a transient stage in the long struggle to maintain and
apply sound intellectual principles of the Constitution, has kept
Hamilton's vision of the spending power out of the Justices' grasp,
notwithstanding their repeated affirmations that he was correct.
The result is a nonsensical jumble of decisions irreconcilable with
anything that Hamilton maintained. We turn now to consider what
it should mean if Hamilton's view of the spending power is given
more than lip service and is understood and applied.
A. The Inaneness of "Germaneness"
Chief Justice Rehnquist declared in his opinion for the Court
in South Dakota v. Dole' that "our cases have suggested (with-
out significant elaboration) that conditions on federal grants might
221. The prominent Supreme Court assertions to the contrary are pretentious hog-
wash. See generally David E. Engdahl, John Marshall's "Jeffersonian" Concept of Judicial
Review, 42 DUKE L.J. 279 (1992) (contrasting the "Jeffersonian" concept with the "judi-
cial supremacy" view).
222. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 619; Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
223. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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be illegitimate if they are unrelated 'to the federal interest in par-
ticular national projects or programs.' 224 Rehnquist did not
elaborate, and the lack of elaboration is significant: Rehnquist's
own words were mere dicta,225 as had been the few statements in
earlier cases to which he referred.226
Justice O'Connor, however, advanced "germaneness" as a rule
of decision. Dissenting in Dole, she exaggerated the prior dicta
and asserted, "We have repeatedly said that Congress may condi-
224. Id. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)).
The Dole majority also rejected an argument similar to dual federalism's erroneous equa-
tion of extraneous ends with forbidden ones. South Dakota urged that the Twenty-First
Amendment's confirmation and enhancement of state authority to regulate liquor made it
the states' exclusive domain and asserted this supposed foreclosure of federal regulation
as an "independent constitutional bar" to the spending condition. Id. at 209.
That was a weird reading of the Twenty-First Amendment, of course: the Eigh-
teenth Amendment had given power to both Congress and the states to enforce Prohibi-
tion, but the language of the Twenty-First Amendment is inapt to give any power at all.
Moreover, its second section refers to both state and federal laws, prohibiting the viola-
tion of either notwithstanding other constitutional considerations that otherwise might
inhibit their enforcement, but giving no lawmaking power beyond what already, and inde-
pendently, was in place. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. As to states, what was already in
place was the "police power," and the Amendment seems tailored to lift whatever inhibi-
tion thereon the "dormant commerce clause" otherwise might impose. But there also
were already in place all of the federal government's enumerated powers, and the Twen-
ty-First Amendment says nothing to cut back Congress's commerce power (for example),
or its power to regulate even extraneous matters-even local production, sale, and con-
sumption-insofar as that might be "necessary and proper" to effectuate its policy for in-
terstate commerce. It therefore is impossible to read candidly the Twenty-First Amend-
ment as reserving liquor regulation exclusively to the states.
Instead of refuting the state's premise, however, the Dole majority simply rebuked
the dual federalist inference the state had drawn from it. In doing so, the Court in sub-
stance reiterated the principle of extraneous ends, that Congress is not prohibited from
influencing a matter just because it is not placed within its governing control, and ex-
plained that references to an "independent constitutional bar" can mean only that the
spending power "may not be used to induce the states to engage in activities that would
themselves be unconstitutional." Dole, 483 U.S. at 210.
225. The state had not pressed the "germaneness" point in Dole or seriously urged
that the spending condition at issue there was invalid on that ground. Amici curiae, how-
ever, had argued the point at length, id. at 208-09 n.3, and perhaps for that reason
Rehnquist added with reference to the condition under consideration that "the condition
imposed by Congress is directly related to one of the main purposes for which highway
funds are expended-safe interstate travel . . . . Congress conditioned the receipt of
federal funds in a way reasonably calculated to address [a] particular impediment to a
purpose for which the funds are expended." Id. at 208-09.
226. The phrase Rehnquist quoted from Massachusetts v. United States was dicta, gen-
eralizing cases on different and differing points. Rehnquist also quoted from Ivanhoe Irri-
gation District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958), in which the suggestion of a re-
striction to "conditions relevant to federal interest in the project and to the over-all ob-
jectives thereof" likewise was dicta. Id.
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tion grants under the spending power only in ways reasonably
related to the purpose of the federal program. '227 Then in 1992,
this time on behalf of a six-Justice majority, O'Connor wrote in
New York v. United States that while Congress may attach condi-
tions to federal funds, "[s]uch conditions must ... bear some
relationship to the purpose of the federal spending .... The
occasion for this latest dictum was her gratuitous approval of an
aspect of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act of 1985229 that O'Connor specifically acknowledged had not
even been challenged in the case.
2 0
This purported "germaneness" requirement appeals to those
resentful over decades of fiscal bullying by Congress. Some
remediation of Congress's overbearingness, at least, is appropriate,
but the apothecaries of "germaneness" have too little science to
devise a medicine that could work. The germaneness "cure" they
peddle amounts to no more than cheap whiskey and snake oil.
It comes in three varieties, but none can do any good. The
harshest is a brew concocted by counsel on behalf of the National
Conference of State Legislatures and other amici in South Dakota
v. Dole and approved by Justice O'Connor, who quoted it straight
from their brief:
Congress has no power under the Spending Clause to impose
requirements on a grant that go beyond specifying how the mon-
ey should be spent. A requirement that is not such a specifica-
tion is not a condition, but a regulation, which is valid only if it
falls within one of Congress' delegated regulatory powers.231
227. Dole, 483 U.S. at 213 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Addressing the specific condition
at issue in that case, she continued, "In my view, establishment of a minimum drinking
age of 21 is not sufficiently related to interstate highway construction to justify so con-
ditioning funds appropriated for that purpose." Id. at 213-14.
228. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2423 (1992).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b)-(d) (1988).
230. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2426. She said of the uncontested conditions, "The
[funding] conditions imposed are reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure:
both the conditions and the payments embody Congress' efforts to address the pressing
problem of radioactive waste disposal." Id. (citation omitted).
231. Dole, 483 U.S. at 216 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for the National
Conference of State Legislatures at 19-20). Tracking the amicus brief, which set forth the
thesis propounded by Professors McCoy and Friedman, supra note 136, at 102, O'Connor
claimed that the Hatch Act condition litigated in Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission,
330 U.S. 127, 128-29 (1941) (challenging Hatch Act, ch. 314, 24 Stat. 440 (1887) (current
version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 362, 365, 368, 377-379 (1988))), is "appropriately viewed as a
condition relating to how federal moneys were to be expended." Dole, 483 U.S. at 217
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This medicine would kill the patient to cure the ill. If one
were really to disallow any conditions except those directing "how
the money should be spent,"' 2 scarcely any conditions could be
imposed except those designating authorized uses or specifying ac-
counting methods. A condition that particular funds be used for
schools rather than roads would be acceptable, but a condition, for
example, that recipients undertake not to discriminate on the basis
of age or handicap-or some other boorish but not unconstitution-
al ground-probably would not. Indeed, even conditions foreclos-
ing race and sex discrimination would be void as to most spending
programs-except insofar as they could be upheld, independently
of the spending power, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment233 as means to combat state action discriminating on such
constitutionally forbidden grounds.
The second nostrum is less deadly, but still needlessly astrin-
gent. It requires that any funding condition be reasonably related
to "the purpose of the expenditure," ' "the purpose of the fed-
eral program, ' s or "the federal interest in [the] particular na-
tional project[] or program[].,, 236 This is the variation articulated
by Justice O'Connor in her own words, as quoted above from her
Dole dissent z7 and also as stated in New York v. United States
and alluded to in the Dole majority's dictum.3s
This proposition shows little reflection. In the first place, this
kind of "germaneness" requirement assumes the anti-Hamiltonian
premise that spending is permissible only for certain specified
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). The only relationship she could point to, however, was that
the official whose political activities were material in Oklahoma '"was employed in con-
nection with an activity financed in part by loans and grants from a federal agency." Id.
If that is all that "specifying how the money should be spent means," id. at 216, a con-
dition that persons administering Aid to Families with Dependent Children grants recycle
paper, or refrain from smoking, or bathe daily, would be equally "germane."
232. Id.
233. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
234. Dole, 483 U.S. at 213 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 212 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)).
237. See supra text accompanying note 227.
238. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. It also is prescribed by Professors McCoy and Friedman,
who say, "[I]f Congress wishes to spend to achieve 'broad policy objectives,' it may use
the power to attach conditions to achieve those objectives. But this does not mean that
Congress may attach conditions to achieve policy objectives that are independent of the
expenditure." McCoy & Friedman, supra note 136, at 103.
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ends. An analogy will illustrate the point: if one were authorized
to buy nothing but groceries and flowers, one's purchase of a
houseware item even at the same store might raise an issue of ger-
maneness. It might matter, for example, whether the houseware
item were a pan for soup (germane to groceries), a vase (germane
to flowers), or a wrench to fix the car (germane to nothing autho-
rized at all). But the issue of germaneness could arise only be-
cause the authority was restricted in terms of purpose: if instead
one were authorized to buy anything, even if one made a particu-
lar shopping trip specifically for food it would not exceed one's
authority to pick up film, or motor oil, or shirts, at the same time.
In the second place, even if spending were permissible only
for certain objectives, nothing could prevent promoting one such
objective by means of conditions attached to funds promoting
another. For example, even if the generalities "common Defense"
and "general Welfare" were conceived as comprehending all per-
missible purposes of federal spending, the Constitution would not
prohibit tailoring defense spending to promote welfare ends, nor
would it prohibit grants for one general welfare purpose from
being conditioned also to promote another.
The false notion that conditions must be germane to the pur-
pose of the particular grant had its origin in this passage of Justice
Stone's United States v. Butler dissent:
Congress may not command that the science of agriculture be
taught in state universities. But if it would aid the teaching of
that science by grants to state institutions, it is appropriate, if not
necessary, that the grant be on the condition, incorporated in the
Morrill Act, that it be used for the intended purpose."'
239. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1. 83 (1936) (Stone, Cardozo, and Brandeis, JJ..
dissenting) (citation omitted). Similarly, addressing the qualification requisites for state
plans of unemployment compensation under the Social Security Act, Justice Cardozo said
in Steward,
A credit to taxpayers for payments made to a state under a state unemploy-
ment law will be manifestly futile in the absence of some assurance that the
law leading to the credit is in truth what it professes to be . . . . What is basic
and essential may be assured by suitable conditions . . . . In determining essen-
tials Congress must have the benefit of a fair margin of discretion.
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 593-94 (1937). However, "manifestly futile"
does not necessarily mean unconstitutional, and there is no reason why being "basic and
essential" to the attainment of some end that itself has no constitutional relevance should
be a requisite to a condition's constitutionality.
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Standing by itself, however, this statement is a non sequitur. To
complete the logical schema one must include another premise,
which Stone had articulated earlier in the same paragraph. That
premise was that federal expenditures would "lose their constitu-
tional sanction" if they should "fail of their purpose," because
"[tihe Constitution requires that public funds shall be spent for a
defined purpose.""24
In other words, at its origin the idea that conditions must be
germane to the purpose of the particular grant was integral to, and
dependent upon, the anti-Hamiltonian notion that the constitution-
ality of the spending itself depends on the objective at which the
spending is aimed.
The third variety of the "germaneness" nostrum is not a cure
at all, but the essence of the disease. (The second variety, indeed,
is just a tincture of this virulent strain.) This third and most ele-
mental form is the proposition of the Butler dissenters that federal
expenditures would "lose their constitutional sanction" if they were
not "for a defined purpose" within Congress's constitutional pow-
er."4 But this is precisely the anti-Hamiltonian, Madisonian
premise, mistaken for Hamilton's by Justice Stone and the others
who became the majority in Steward because-in 1936 and
1937-they did not yet recognize the principle of extraneous ends.
Actually, Hamilton had candidly maintained that Congress
may spend even toward objects that the Constitution nowhere
authorizes the federal government to pursue. Because he under-
stood the corollaries of the principle of extraneous ends, Hamilton
knew perfectly well that this principle leaves the principle of enu-
merated powers in full vigor and the policy objectives of federal-
ism secure: the power to spend, even toward extraneous objectives,
justifies no other steps whatsoever to achieve such extraneous
aims, and Congress's will for extraneous matters simply is not
supreme.
In Hamilton's view, Cardozo's suggestion in Steward that
spending conditions might be invalid unless germane to an object
within the federal government's regulatory powers is incongruous
240. Butler, 297 U.S. at 83 (Stone, Cardozo, and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting), see also id.
at 85 ("[Rlesults become lawful when they are incidents of those [enumerated] powers
but unlawful when incident to the similarly granted power to tax and spend.").
241. Id. at 83; see also supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
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nonsense.242 Cardozo did indeed say (his statement as to taxing
applying to spending as well) that
[i]n ruling as we do, we leave many questions open. We do not
say that a tax is valid, when imposed by act of Congress, if it is
laid upon the condition that a state may escape its operation
through the adoption of a statute unrelated in subject matter to
activities fairly within the scope of national policy and power. No
such question is before us. In the tender of this credit Congress
does not intrude upon fields foreign to its function .... [This is
not a case] where the conduct to be stimulated or discouraged is
unrelated to ... any ... end legitimately national. 43
But the questions Cardozo said were left open were precisely the
questions that actually were at issue in Steward and Helvering, and
those holdings-notwithstanding the inapt opinions-put those very
questions decisively to rest. The holdings in those cases were faith-
ful to Hamilton; only the opinions (despite nominally endorsing
him) were not.2'
In New York v. United States, Justice O'Connor argued that
were it not for a germaneness requirement, "the spending power
could render academic the Constitution's other grants and limits of
federal authority." '245 She could not have reasoned so, however,
had she understood (as Hamilton did) the corollaries to the princi-
ple of extraneous ends.246 Earlier, in her Dole dissent, she had
written,
If the spending power is to be limited only by Congress' notion
of the general welfare, the reality, given the vast financial re-
sources of the Federal Government, is that the Spending Clause
gives "power to the Congress to tear down the barriers, to in-
vade the states' jurisdiction, and to become a parliament of the
whole people, subject to no restrictions save such as are self-
imposed." This, of course, as Butler held, was not the Framers'
plan and it is not the meaning of the Spending Clause.247
242. Professors McCoy and Friedman reiterate this nonsense, insisting that "if achieve-
ment of an end is beyond Congress's means regulatorily, it also is invalid as part of a
benefit scheme." McCoy & Friedman, supra note 136, at 104.
243. Steivard, 301 U.S. at 590-91.
244. See supra notes 143-52 and accompanying text.
245. 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2423 (1992).
246. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
247. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 217 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936)).
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O'Connor thus was quick to acknowledge that her "approach
harks back to" Butler,248 but she failed to notice the error that
makes Butler's majority opinion ridiculous.24 9 She thought its
only error was its "crabbed view of the extent of Congress' regula-
tory power under the Commerce Clause. The Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act ... was regulation that today would likely be consid-
ered within Congress' commerce power."" ° But while it mis-
judged the scope of the commerce power, she thought, the Butler
majority was correct in restricting the permissible purposes of
spending to the effectuation of enumerated powers."
But this is the Madisonian view. Sic transit gloria Hamil-
toni-iterare! O'Connor reiterated exactly the Butler majority's
monumental error, parading Madison in masquerade of Hamilton
once more.
Concluding her dissent from the Dole majority's approval of
conditioning highway funds on recipient states' elevating their
minimum drinking ages, O'Connor declared, "Because [the condi-
tion] cannot be justified as an exercise of any power delegated to
the Congress, it is not authorized by the Constitution.""2 2 Al-
though Justice O'Connor seems to have believed that she was
following Hamilton,' 3 this concluding proposition could not have
248. Id. at 216.
249. See supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
250. Dole, 483 U.S. at 216. It is revealing to notice that the rationale thus conjured
by O'Connor was not even advanced by the government in Butler, 297 U.S. at 64.
251. Dole, 483 U.S. at 217.
252. Id. at 218. Justice Brennan wrote a short, separate dissent in Dole. Noting that
age requisites for purchasing liquor are "squarely within the ambit of those powers re-
served to the States[,] . . . " id. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting), he wrote, "Since States
possess this constitutional power, Congress cannot condition a federal grant in a manner
that abridges this right." Id. Not even the Butler majority itself could have better stated
the dual federalist thesis as applied to spending.
253. She wrote, "I also subscribe to the established proposition that the reach of the
spending power 'is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Con-
stitution.' " Id. at 212-13 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 66 (1936)). The use of the quoted phrase from Butler manifests that Justice
O'Connor understood no better than the 1936 majority what Hamilton really maintained.
It seems significant that Professors McCoy and Friedman, on the other hand, in
their article advocating germaneness requirements and criticizing the majority holding in
Dole, nowhere mention Hamilton and do not pretend to endorse his view. See McCoy &
Friedman, supra note 136, at 85, 104.
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been made more Madisonian even by specific citations to
Madison's own equivalent statements. 4
In Dole, it was unclear whether anyone except Justice
O'Connor herself had been fooled; her getmaneness dicta in New
York v. United States, however, appear in a majority opinion.255
Nonetheless, the talk about germaneness still is dicta: it remains
true (so far) that the Supreme Court never actually has held any
spending condition unconstitutional for lack of germane-
ness-whether to the process of spending, or to the purpose of a
particular funding program, or to any enumerated end. Neverthe-
less, any time the notion of a germaneness requirement is even
taken seriously it puts Hamilton and his view of the spending
power out of reach.
B. The "Supremacy" Fallacy and the Contractual Character of
Spending Conditions
Justice Cardozo wrote for the Court in Helvering v. Davis,
"When money is spent to promote the general welfare, the con-
cept of welfare or the opposite is shaped by Congress, not the
states .... [T]he locality must yield.",1 6 Had Cardozo meant on-
ly that Congress alone must judge what spending might do the
public good, his point would be well taken. But that is not what
he said. Rather, he cited the Supremacy Clause as if it could mean
that states and localities must yield not merely to Congress's deci-
sion whether and on what conditions federal funds should be of-
fered, but also to whatever policy choices-even about matters
254. See, e.g., supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
255. 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2431 (1992).
256. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937) (citing the Supremacy Clause, U.S.
CON ST. art. VI, cl. 2). Cardozo made this statement in response to a wholly conjectural
supposition:
Counsel for respondent has recalled to us the virtues of self-reliance and frugal-
ity. There is a possibility, he says, that aid from a paternal government may
sap those sturdy virtues and breed a race of weaklings. If Massachusetts so be-
lieves and shapes her laws in that conviction, must her breed of sons be
changed, he asks, because some other philosophy of government finds favor in
the halls of Congress?
Helvering, 301 U.S. at 644-45.
Moreover, the analogies to which Cardozo appealed for support, see id. at 645,
were extravagantly inapt. The reason states cannot countermand a protective tariff is that
they cannot negate federal taxes. Furthermore, the protective purpose is an exercise of
the power over foreign commerce. Also the nullification fiasco had nothing to do with
using enumerated powers toward extraneous ends.
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extraneous to any enumerated power-Congress might try to pro-
mote through funding or funding conditions.
I call this logic the "supremacy fallacy." It consists of disre-
garding what I characterized earlier as the second corollary of the
principle of extraneous ends.5 7
Ironically, this same flaw in logic made by Cardozo and the
1937 majority had been manifested by the opposite, 1936 majority
in a famous paragraph of its Butler opinion. The Agricultural
Adjustment Act had been defended in that case by a suggestion
that objecting states could "prevent those under the state's juris-
diction from complying with" 8 the production limits that condi-
tioned the subsidy payments, but the Butler majority had replied,
The argument is plainly fallacious. The United States can make
the contract [specifying production limits in exchange for federal
payments] only if the federal power to tax and to appropriate
reaches the subject matter of the contract. If this does reach the
subject matter, its exertion cannot be displaced by state action.
To say otherwise is to deny the supremacy of the laws of the
United States; to make them subordinate to those of a State.
This would reverse the cardinal principle embodied in the Consti-
tution and substitute one which declares that Congress may only
effectively legislate as to matters within federal competence when
the States do not dissent."5
In this passage, the logical flaw manifested itself as
equivocation in the use of the word "reach." Through the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act, Congress had reached agricultural produc-
tion only in the sense that it had reached lotteries when it forbade
interstate shipment of lottery tickets; it reached lotteries, however,
in a very different sense than it reached interstate commerce (or
shipping in interstate commerce). The Supremacy Clause precluded
any state from countermanding the shipping prohibition, but any
state that so wished remained free to permit (or to conduct) lot-
teries nonetheless (albeit with locally printed tickets, of course).
That would have frustrated Congress's manifest anti-lottery policy,
but it would not have violated the Supremacy Clause, because
Congress had power only over interstate commerce (including
interstate shipping), not over lotteries per se. Similarly, any state
257. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
258. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 74 (1936).
259. Id.
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could have enforced its own law against curtailing agricultural
production, even if that would have frustrated the federal aim. By
doing so, a state might disable its farmers from qualifying for the
subsidy, but it would not affront any federal authority conferred
by the Constitution.26
The supremacy fallacy attributes supremacy not to the act of
spending itself, but rather to Congress's will for any matter it
might try to influence by financial inducements. Because it fell
prey to this fallacy, the Butler majority concluded that a federal
policy incapable of supremacy must be void.26' The Steward ma-
jority employed the same fallacy, concluding conversely that if
extraneous federal policies can validly be promoted by spending
then they must be supreme.2 62
James Madison fell prey to this supremacy fallacy, too. That is
why he thought Hamilton's approval of spending for ends beyond
the scope of enumerated powers
would have the effect of giving to Congress a general power of
legislation instead of the defined and limited one hitherto under-
stood to belong to them .... It would have the effect of sub-
jecting both the Constitution and laws of the several States in all
cases not specifically exempted to be superseded by laws of Con-
gress ....2
But the supremacy fallacy is a mistake Hamilton never made.
His point was precisely that Congress can "reach" matters through
spending that its enumerated governance powers do not enable it
to reach in ways that could invoke the Supremacy Clause. The
spending power enables Congress to reach them, but only "as far
as regards an application of Money., 264
That any state may frustrate a policy that Congress promotes
only through spending (i.e., without also using some other enumer-
260. It would be different, of course, if the production restriction were conceived as a
means to effectuate Congress's policy of stabilizing interstate commodities markets, in-
voking the Necessary and Proper Clause. That. of course, is what distinguished the sec-
ond Agricultural Adjustment Act from the first. The second Act (including its "class
basis" feature) was upheld in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942), using the
same Necessary and Proper Clause principle of extraneous means that had been used
(and distinguished from the principle of extraneous ends) in United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 113-15 (1941).
261. See Butler, 297 U.S. at 74.
262. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590-91 (1937).
263. MADISON, supra note 93, at 585.
264. HAMILTON, supra note 71, at 303.
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ated power) is exactly the reason Hamilton recognized that inter-
state canal projects could not be accomplished through federal
spending alone. It is precisely the reason President Monroe called
the spending power "deficient as a power in the great characteris-
tics on which its execution depends. 2 65 Had Hamilton or Mon-
roe conceived that the Supremacy Clause could apply to a policy
objective simply because it was being promoted by federal spend-
ing, neither could have considered a constitutional amendment
requisite to the successful implementation of federal plans for in-
ternal improvements. 66
Whenever any enumerated power is used toward an extrane-
ous end, there obviously is a federal policy with regard to that
extraneous end. It might even be a very important policy, over
which nationwide controversies rage and elections are won and
lost. But federal policies as to extraneous ends have none of the
constitutional significance that attaches to federal policies concern-
ing the "objects of government ' 267 committed to the federal gov-
ernment's care by enumeration. Regardless of their social, political,
or cosmic importance, federal policies as to merely extraneous
ends are immaterial for purposes of federalism analysis under the
Constitution. The reason the likes of Justices Stone and Cardozo
in 1936 and 1937 succumbed to the supremacy fallacy is that they
did not then recognize that Hamilton's view of the spending power
is simply an application of the principle of extraneous ends-a
principle that was not even frankly affirmed until 1941, in the
Darby case.2 68
The first opportunity for the Justices to dispel the supremacy
fallacy from spending power doctrine arose six years after Darby,
in Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission.2 69 In
Oklahoma, the Court countenanced state frustration of Congress's
policy against partisan political activity of appointed state officials.
Congress had made compliance with that Hatch Act policy a con-
dition to certain funding, even though the matter "reached" by the
condition-state officials' partisan activity-was one that (as the
265. MONROE, supra note 98, at 173.
266. As to Monroe, see id. As to Hamilton, see Hamilton, supra note 73, at 603.
267. See Wilson, supra note 16, at 764.
268. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).
269. 330 U.S. 127 (1947). The Oklahoma case is discussed supra text accompanying
notes 198-200. Darby is discussed supra note 62.
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Court acknowledged) "the United States ... has no power to
regulate ...."' Because the federal funds were so conditioned,
the state had to forgo the funds, of course; the significant point,
however, is that the will of Congress as to partisan activities of
state officials was frustrated in Oklahoma-quite contrary to the
supremacy proposition stated in both Butler and Steward.
That holding should have been enough to dispel the suprema-
cy fallacy. Unfortunately, however, Justice Stone had died the
previous year, and not every Justice had so firm a grasp of the
applicable principles as Stone had shown in Darby. The opinion of
the erstwhile Solicitor, Justice Reed, for the Oklahoma plurality
typifies the confusion that ensued.
Justice Reed quoted a passage from United States v. Darby,
but the passage he quoted27 was not relevant to the Oklahoma
case at all. In Darby, Justice Stone did use the extraneous ends
principle (for which Oklahoma rightly stands): Stone used it to
overrule Dagenhart272 and uphold section 15(a)(1) of the Fair La-
bor Standards Act.273 The passage from Darby quoted by Justice
Reed, however, appears seven pages later, in a separate part of
the Darby opinion, discussing section 15(a)(2) of that Act and
upholding it under the extraneous means principle of the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause. The Oklahoma case and the Darby pas-
sage Justice Reed quoted involved completely different issues.
It therefore is hardly surprising that the syllogism Justice
Reed set forth is a colossal non sequitur. First, quoting from
Darby's discussion of the principle of extraneous means, he stated
as his major premise that "the Tenth Amendment has been consis-
tently construed 'as not depriving the national government of au-
thority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power
which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted
end.' 274 Then, as his minor premise, he said, "The end sought
by Congress through the Hatch Act is better public service by
requiring those [state officials] who administer funds for national
needs to abstain from active political partisanship. ',275 While the
270. Oklahoma, 330 U.S. at 143.
271. Oklahoma, 330 U.S. at 143 (quoting Darby, 312 U.S. at 124).
272. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
273. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C §§ 201-219 (1940) (current version at 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
274. Oklahoma, 330 U.S. at 143 (quoting Darby, 312 U.S. at 124).
275. Id.
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major premise contemplated extraneous means but enumerated ob-
jectives or ends, the phrase "national needs" in this minor premise
is equivocal: particularly when used with reference to activities of
state officials, it can include congressionally selected extraneous
objectives, not just enumerated ones. Indeed, preventing "active
political partisanship" by state officials is an end over which Jus-
tice Reed in the same opinion declared that Congress "has no
power ... as such.""2 6
This equivocation exacted its toll in the conclusion of Justice
Reed's syllogism, where he said, "So even though the action taken
by Congress does have effect upon certain activities within the
state, it has never been thought that such effect made the federal
act invalid."277 The citations Justice Reed affixed to this state-
ment were to cases illustrating the principle of extraneous ends.
That principle-and thus the holding in Oklahoma-is perfectly
sound, but it has nothing to do with the major premise Justice
Reed articulated.
Justice Reed's opinion obscured'the principle that sustains the
Oklahoma holding in other respects too. For example, Justice
Reed reasoned that the Hatch Act provision was valid because
"[t]he end sought by Congress ... is better public service" from
those state officials "who administer funds for national needs,"278
but if such "better public service" were an end within Congress's
enumerated powers, surely it would offend the Supremacy Clause
for Oklahoma not to comply. On the other hand, if it were an
extraneous end there would be no point in distinguishing between
state officials who administered funds "for national needs" and
those who administered (federally granted) funds for state or local
needs. Again, if by specifying "for national needs" Justice Reed
meant to include only officials administering grants that were
aimed at effectuating enumerated powers, he was not actually
applying Hamilton's view of the spending power; if (consistently
with Hamilton's view) he intended it to include concerns that were
extraneous although common to the whole nation, however, the
phrase "for national needs" was superfluous.
In spite of the confusion manifest in Justice Reed's Oklahoma
opinion and in some other cases from the following decade,279
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. In United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 730 (1950), govern-
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mistakes were avoided at first when the modern Supreme Court
began to consider conditions accompanying federal grants for so-
cial welfare purposes. In cases with opinions by Chief Justice War-
ren,"'0 Justice Harlan,28 ' and Chief Justice Burger, 282  the
Court enforced conditions states had agreed to as consideration for
the grants, making no reference whatever to the Supremacy
Clause. The supremacy fallacy thus was avoided until an otherwise
equivalent case in 1971, when Justice Brennan wrote for the
Court. Instead of simply holding the state to its bargain, Brennan
wrote that a state rule in conflict with conditions accepted by the
state to secure financial assistance offered under the Social Secu-
rity Act for its program of Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren (AFDC) "violates the Social Security Act and is therefore
invalid under the Supremacy Clause. 2
81
ment counsel tried to justify the Central Valley Project in California under the Com-
merce Clause as a measure controlling navigation. The Supreme Court, however, said,
"[T]he power of Congress to promote the general welfare through large-scale projects for
reclamation, irrigation, or other internal improvement, is now as clear and ample as its
power to accomplish the same results indirectly through resort to strained interpretation
of the power over navigation." Id. at 738. The fallacy in this statement is that Congress's
power as to those reclamation and improvement ends by virtue of the "general Welfare"
clause is not really "as ...ample" as its "power over navigation" unless it enjoys su-
premacy over adverse state laws. The Court in Gerlach either failed to recognize this or
erroneously assumed that any end pursued by spending is ipso facto an enumerated end.
Eight years later, in Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-96
(1958), Justice Clark wrote an account of federal reclamation projects utterly devoid of
careful legal analysis, but exuding awe of such feats and evincing determination that
nothing should stand in their way. He levelled a barrage of constitutional propositions to
drive attackers away, some correct and appropriate but others either unfounded or misap-
plied. Among the shells that were duds are his statement that "the promotion of agricul-
ture" is "a valid public and national purpose," id. at 294; his proposition that spending
conditions must be "relevant to federal interest in the project and to the over-all objec-
tives thereof," id. at 295; and his assertion that the federal government may regulate
whatever it subsidizes, id. at 296. For the latter assertion, no rationale was attempted at
all, and no authority was cited other than a prior judicial statement that had been made
to repel a due process attack and intimated nothing at all about bases of federal power.
See infra note 303.
280. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 310 (1968) (striking Alabama "substitute father"
regulation as inconsistent with grant for AFDC).
281. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420 (1970) (invalidating New York statute as
inconsistent with grant for AFDC).
282. California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 124 (1971)
(enjoining California Unemployment Insurance Code as inconsistent with federal grant for
unemployment compensation).
283. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 (1971).
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Brennan's misstatement prompted Chief Justice Burger to
write a separate concurrence solely to emphasize this single point.
The Chief Justice explained that
[while Congress had used its] power of the purse to force the
States to adhere to its wishes to a certain extent .... adherence
to the provisions of Title IV [of the Social Security Act] is in no
way mandatory upon the States under the Supremacy Clause.
The appropriate inquiry in any case should be, simply, whether
the State has indeed adhered to the provisions and is accordingly
entitled to utilize federal funds in support of its program."
It is true that the process of judging whether state rules or actions
conform to conditions the state has accepted in order to receive
federal funds is virtually identical to the process of deciding "pre-
emption" questions, and preemption, of course, is a function of the
Supremacy Clause. The similarity of the inquiry, however, does not
make the questions the same, any more than the frequent similari-
ty of preemption and "dormant commerce clause" inquiries makes
those questions the same. In both instances, profound differences
persist despite the frequent similarities.
Despite Chief Justice Burger's attempted clarification, howev-
er, Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, articulated the suprema-
cy fallacy again in another AFDC case six months later.285 A
year after that, in yet another case about AFDC conditions, while
the Justices split 7-2 as to whether the state practice at issue com-
plied, both the majority286 and the dissenting287 opinions es-
poused the supremacy fallacy, treating the issue as one of preemp-
tion under the Supremacy Clause.
In 1981, however, a majority of the Justices moved far toward
not only recovering, but reinforcing the point Chief Justice Burger
had tried to make a decade before. Pennhurst State School & Hos-
pital v. Halderman288 involved a federal statute authorizing feder-
al grants to assist states with programs for the mentally retard-
ed.289 A section of the statute declared that "[p]ersons with de-
284. Id. at 292 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
285. Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 600 (1972) (citing Townsend, 404 U.S. at
286).
286. New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 406-23 (1973).
287. Id. at 423-32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
288. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
289. Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-103,
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velopmental disabilities have a right to appropriate treatment,
services, and habilitation"; that such services "should be designed
to maximize . . . developmental potential . . . and should be pro-
vided in the setting that is least restrictive of ... personal liberty";
and that "the States ... have an obligation to assure that public
funds" are not provided to institutions that are not consistent with
these terms.29 If providing or governing care for the handi-
capped had been within some enumerated power, certainly the
Constitution would have supported enforcement of these terms,
even though the precise steps to be taken and the possible costs of
compliance were not ascertainable in advance.
However, care for the handicapped is not within any enumer-
ated power. It is, instead, merely an extraneous end that Congress
has determined to promote by means of its spending power. Ac-
cordingly, the Court said in Pennhurst,
Congress may fix the terms on which it shall disburse federal
money to the States .... [H]owever, legislation enacted pursu-
ant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in
return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federal-
ly imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress' power to
legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the
State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the "con-
tract." There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State
is'unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is
expected of it.
... The crucial inquiry ... is ... whether Congress spoke
so clearly that we can fairly say that the State could make an
informed choice."9'
Because of the "knowing acceptance" requisite to contract enforce-
ability, the Court reasoned that "if Congress intends to impose a
condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambigu-
ously ... with a clear voice .... "2
Persons might disagree (and the Justices did) as to whether
the conditions at issue in Pennhurst were clear and unambiguous
enough to have been knowingly and voluntarily assumed. But that
89 Stat. 486 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6083 (1988 & Supp. III
1991)).
290. Id. § 111(1)-(3), 89 Stat. at 502.
291. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17, 25 (citations omitted).
292. Id. at 17 (citations omitted).
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question (which is different as to every purported spending condi-
tion) was quite beside the Court's major point that federal funding
conditions in their essence are creatures of contract. What makes
such conditions obligatory is that essence as contract, wholly apart
from the circumstance that they happen to be spelled out in a
statute or an agency rule. Although articulated in a statute or rule,
they have no force as "law"; their only force is contractual. Conse-
quently, they are not among the "Laws of the United States...
made in Pursuance"293 of the Constitution, to which the Su-
premacy Clause applies.294
The inapplicability of the Supremacy Clause to federal policies
for extraneous ends promoted through spending does not mean
one is free to take federal money and then flout the terms on
which it is given. The obligation to do as one has undertaken to
do as consideration for money offered on specified terms, howev-
er, is an obligation in the nature of contract: it is no more attrib-
utable to any "legislative," "regulatory," or "governing" power
than are the obligations between private persons arising from
agreements between them.
Pennhurst's contractual characterization of spending conditions
has been repeatedly reaffirmed. The Court in 1984 reiterated that
Congress may attach "unambiguous conditions to federal financial
assistance that [recipients] are not obligated to accept," '295 adding
that compliance with conditions is required "as a quid pro quo for
the receipt of federal funds."296 In 1986, the Court said, "Con-
gress enters into an arrangement in the nature of a contract with
the recipients of the funds: the recipient's acceptance of the funds
293. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
294. Every new regulation pursuant to a "legislative" or "regulatory" power, a power
to govern, changes the rules under which going concerns have operated theretofore. It is
thus "retroactive," not in the sense that it punishes past behavior, but in the sense that
it alters consequences that could have been anticipated when the commitment to a given
course of action was made. The Supremacy Clause makes such regulations binding re-
gardless of how they upset contrary expectations.
But spending conditions are different: the Court said in Pennhurst that "Congress'
power to legislate under the spending power . . . does not include surprising participating
States with postacceptance or 'retroactive' conditions." Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 25. A leg-
islature may unilaterally change the rules in mid-game; one party to a contract, however,
may not, and since the essence of spending conditions is contract, for this purpose Con-
gress is to be considered not as a legislature but as a contracting party.
295. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575 (1984).
296. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 633 n.13 (1984).
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triggers coverage under the nondiscrimination provision." '297 The
Court applied the same Pennhurst rationale again in 1992.298
Nevertheless, while it cannot be reconciled with the proposi-
tion that the obligation of spending conditions is contractual, the
supremacy fallacy still persists by default of any effort in any liti-
gated case to make the point. Only a year after Pennhurst, for
example, Justice Marshall for the Court again attributed the force
of AFDC conditions to the Supremacy Clause,99 with neither
counsel nor any other Justice identifying the error.
Accepted conditions are equally enforceable against a recipi-
ent, of course, whether their binding force is attributed correctly to
contract or mistakenly to the Supremacy Clause. In cases brought
against a recipient, therefore, insisting upon accuracy of statement
might seem an inconsequential quibble. But there are other cases,
and in some the supremacy fallacy has induced conclusions that
could not have been reached without it.
An example is Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board,00 in
which the Court unanimously held that funds derived from Social
Security disability benefits are immune from state debt-collection
processes even though they are in private hands. A section of the
Social Security Act does purport to exempt from "execution, levy,
attachment, garnishment, or other legal process" all "moneys paid
or payable" under the Act,30 1 and as to moneys "payable" but
not yet paid, there is no doubt this provision is valid.3' But once
they have been transferred to beneficiaries, the sums paid as such
disability benefits no longer belong to the United States. What
power can Congress claim over funds no longer its own? It is ri-
diculous to posit a germ of federal power infecting Social Security
benefits like a virus incubated in the Federal Treasury. 303 Advan-
297. United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 605
(1986).
298. In Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360, 1366 (1992), the Court denied an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by affected individuals because the federal measure funding state
child-welfare programs failed to indicate "unambiguously," id, at 1370, that acceptance
would entail obligations with respect to staff sufficiency and workload efficiency judicially
enforceable at the instance of third parties.
299. Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 138, 146 (1982).
300. 409 U.S. 413, 415 (1973).
301. 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (1988).
302. As long as they remain in the hands of the federal government, moneys payable
still belong to the United States, and moneys belonging to the United States (it may be
conceded) are immune or at least immunizable from all state attempts at control, even
by garnishment.
303. The "moneys" involved are not even physical currency or coin, but mere ac-
[Vol. 44:1
THE SPENDING POWER
taging disabled persons (or other Social Security beneficiaries) vis-
A-vis creditors is not within any enumerated federal power--except
perhaps the bankruptcy power, which is not even implicated here.
Protecting this asset of recipients might serve the aims of a benefi-
cent spending program, but those aims, while permissible constitu-
tionally and imperative politically, certainly are extraneous to
Congress's enumerated powers.
How could this federal policy regarding an extraneous matter
override state collection actions or state collection laws? The ex-
emption could not find support in the Necessary and Proper
Clause, because that Clause avails nothing for extraneous ends.
The exemption could not be supported on contract grounds, not
only because the beneficiaries of such Social Security benefits do
not contract for them, but also because the rights of creditors
could not be reduced by an agreement made only between oth-
ers.
3 04
But the briefs, and the Court's very short opinion in Philpott,
totally overlooked all these issues. By sheer ipse dixit, with no
attempt to reason, the Court simply declared that collection pro-
ceedings against private funds derived from payments under the
Social Security Act are precluded "[b]y reason of the Supremacy
Clause.9M5
Eight years after Philpott, the Court construed federal statutes
as precluding state courts from treating military retirement pay as
community property.3 6 Had the constitutionality of those statutes
counting entries or electronic transfers, or instruments representing financial obligation
that precipitate electronic transfers or accounting entries when they are deposited for
collection.
The Supreme Court said in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 131 (1942), that "[i]t
is hardly lack of due process for the Government to regulate that which it subsidizes."
That might be true, but the statement addresses only the due process issue and says
nothing to supply a deficiency of federal power. The regulations in Wickard were sup-
ported by the Necessary and Proper Clause in conjunction with the commerce power. Id.
at 119, 124-25.
304. In Philpott itself the creditor happened to be a state that did participate (con-
tractually) in the Social Security program involved. Philpott, 409 U.S. at 415. As to that
particular creditor, therefore, it might be possible to rationalize the result by saying that
the state accepted the restraint on collection as a contracted condition of its own partici-
pation. But 42 U.S.C. § 407 certainly is not phrased as a condition, and the Court made
no gesture toward such a rationale anyway.
305. Philpott, 409 U.S. at 417.
306. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 233-35 (1981). All but two Justices agreed in
1989 that subsequent legislation had only modified, not abrogated, that preemption.
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been challenged (it was not), they could have been easily sus-
tained; Congress has enumerated power to maintain and provide
for armed forces,0 7 and "the military retirement system is de-
signed to serve as an inducement for enlistment and re-enlistment,
to create an orderly career path, and to ensure 'youthful and
vigorous' military forces."30 8 Community property laws are ca-
pable of affecting retirement incentives in ways interfering with the
utility of military retirement programs toward these enumerated
ends; statutes precluding application of community property laws
could be upheld, therefore, under the Necessary and Proper
Clause. The possibility of contriving any comparable telic link to
some enumerated power in the case of Social Security benefits,
however, seems extremely remote.°9
A decision equivalent to Philpott, applying the same Social
Security Act provision, was announced by per curiam opinion in
1988.310 This time the supremacy fallacy barred a state from at-
taching funds a prisoner had received as Social Security benefits,
under a state statute authorizing recouping from prisoners the
costs of their incarceration."' Congress presumably intended that
Social Security benefits should improve the conditions of
recipients' lives, not defray states' incarceration costs, 312 but the
same could be said of a prisoner's mother who left him a bequest.
How can one justify any difference in result? The import of the
principle of enumerated powers is precisely that except insofar as
some enumerated power is served, the intent or will of Congress
has no more legal force than the intent or will of one's mother.
Either certainly could make a gift on conditions that would cause
it to fail rather than fall into strangers' hands, but neither may
insulate the assets from relevant and otherwise applicable state law
Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 593-94 (1989) (7-2 decision).
307. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. cls. 12-13.
308. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 234.
309. In any event, more than a conceivable chain of telic links to some enumerated
power end is required in order to invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause. See
ENGDAHL, supra note 39, at 39-43; see also id. at 33-39.
310. Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395, 396 (1988) (per curiam). The Court reasoned
that the Social Security Act provision "unambiguously rules out any attempt to attach So-
cial Security benefits. The Arkansas statute just as unambiguously allows the State to
attach those benefits. As we see it, this amounts to a 'conflict' under the Supremacy
Clause-a conflict that the State cannot win." Id. at 397.
311. Id.
312. See id. at 398.
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after the transfer is complete."' It cannot matter to whom cer-
tain assets belonged before they became a part of the prisoner's
personal estate. But again, as in Philpott, no search for any enu-
merated end was made. Again, as in Philpott, the supremacy falla-
cy was unchallenged by counsel and prevailed by default. 4
An even more bizarre case is Lawrence County v. Lead-Dead-
wood School District No. 40-1.' Lawrence County-a political
subdivision of South Dakota whose very existence and every func-
tion depends on the will of that state-received federal funds
under the Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act. 16 That Act entails no
contractual obligations for recipients; they are merely donees. A
South Dakota statute required all subdivisions of the state to dis-
tribute any funds the federal government paid in lieu of taxes in
the same way they distributed general tax revenues." 7 Lawrence
County, however, chose to distribute the funds it received differ-
ently, claiming that the federal law said it could do so.31
The federal statute simply said that recipient units of "general
local government" where relevant tax-exempt federal lands were
located "may use the [in-lieu-of-tax] payment for any governmen-
tal purpose,"' 3 9 and it took some freewheeling contrivance of leg-
islative history for the majority to inflate this provision into an
authorization by Congress for state subdivisions to flout the laws
of their own existence.32 What is most remarkable about Law-
rence County, however, is not the alchemy of statutory construc-
tion but that not even the dissenters (Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Stevens) questioned whether the Supremacy Clause could
apply even if such a congressional authorization of defiance were
found. They dissented only on statutory construction grounds.32'
313. Unless by virtue of Congress's bankruptcy power. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
314. The attached benefits of a second petitioner in Bennett -had been paid as
Veterans' Administration disability pension benefits, under a different statute having an
exemption provision comparable to that of the Social Security Act. Bennett, 485 U.S. at
396. As to veterans' disability benefits-unlike Social Security benefits-an argument like
that sketched above for military retirement benefits might conceivably be ventured.
315. 469 U.S. 256 (1985).
316. 31 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6907 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
317. Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 259.
318. Id.
319. 31 U.S.C. § 6902(a).
320. Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 262-68.
321. Id. at 273 (Rehnquist and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
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Even if it is true, as the majority found, that Congress be-
lieves local discretion might cause in lieu receipts to be expended
in ways preferable to the federal government (e.g., providing bet-
ter law enforcement, road maintenance, and public health services
for vacationers traveling to national parks, monuments, and for-
ests), 322 that surely can have no constitutional significance, for
expenditures by local governments are not within any enumerated
power. (Even the private use of federally owned lands is an extra-
neous end.) Whether to give federal money to local government
units that have less discretion over its expenditure than Congress
might desire certainly is up to Congress; enabling a local govern-
ment to do something that the laws of its creator state forbid, or
excusing it from doing something that the laws of its creator state
require, however, assumes premises contradictory to the most
elementary principles of American government heretofore main-
tained.323
The majority in Lawrence County did not articulate such revo-
lutionary premises, much less try to defend them. Instead, once
again the constitutional issue was decided by default. The holding
in Lawrence County is naked fiat, supported only by the confusion
occasioned by intellectual default.324
322. Id. at 265-66.
323. In a thoughtful recent essay, Professor William Van Alstyne has reasoned that
state constitutional provisions should disable states and state agencies from accepting fed-
eral funds offered on conditions that conflict with state law, or at least with state consti-
tutional law. William Van Alstyne, "Thirty Pieces of Silver" for the Rights of Your Peo-
ple: Irresistible Offers Reconsidered as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 16 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POL'Y 303, 307 (1993). But for the fact that it utterly lacks both rationale
and reason, the Lawrence County decision would repel Van Alstyne's sensible suggestion.
324. In addition, neither the majority nor the dissenting opinion in Lawrence County
reckoned adequately with the practical aspects of budgeting and finance.
Federal in-lieu-of-tax payments typically constitute as relatively fixed and stable a
sum as property tax revenues. Consequently it is possible to include them in a unified
budget that allocates revenues regardless of source. Would a state law requiring such uni-
fied budgeting be valid? If so, what material difference would there be from what the
South Dakota statute in Lawrence County required? Is it credible to read either the
federal statute or its legislative history as precluding unified budgeting and requiring
separate budgeting for disbursements from in-lieu-of-tax funds instead?
In many states, limited-function local government entities like school districts are
not funded by the counties, but are fiscally autonomous, and the counties merely serve,
in effect, as collection agents for the property tax levies independently assessed by those
other entities. Where that is true, could such entities drive their levies high enough to
approach the limits of taxpayer tolerance (or limits set by law), so that counties as a
practical matter would be left to fund their general services less out of property tax rev-
enues and more out of any in-lieu-of-tax payments they might receive? If so, the practi-
[Vol. 44:1
THE SPENDING POWER
If Congress offered money to help midwives establish practices
even in states whose medical practice laws forbid midwifery, could
one's acceptance of such a grant entitle her to practice midwifery
in a prohibiting state? Could she claim in defense to a state prose-
cution that she was acting in compliance with the terms of her
grant? Would she not instead be obliged simply to forgo the grant
(or to suffer the consequences of failing to fulfill its conditions)?
To imagine supremacy for the federal policy regarding midwifery
in such a case would be to resurrect the discredited Butler denial
that states could forbid farmers to reduce acreage in production, as
the farmers had to do in order to qualify for aid under the first
Agricultural Adjustment Act.3" If case authority against such a
mistaken supremacy pretension could be thought necessary, Okla-
homa v. Civil Service Commission326 should suffice.327
The point can also be made with humbler analogies. Suppose
a family has household rules under which the young daughter is to
be home by ten, but her uncle, Sam, tells her she may stay out
until twelve when she is spending the money he gives her. What
time had she better be home? Suppose the uncle strikes a deal
with his teenage nephew, under which the nephew will be relieved
of his household chores if he drives the uncle to the store? What
should be the parent's response when the son refuses to help carry
the trash because he' chauffeured the uncle, as agreed? Can it
make no difference that the parent was not party to the deal?
There are obvious differences among Philpott, Lawrence County,
the midwifery hypothetical, and these family examples, but the
material point in them all is the same.
Compare the following two statements:
Statement A: "I'll give you my money if, but only if, you do X;
so if you will not or cannot do X, you cannot have my money."
Statement B: "I'll give you my money to do X, and once you
accept my money you will be entitled to do X no matter who
might wish to prevent you."
cal result would hardly differ from what the majority in the Lawrence County case es-
chewed; could any legal difference credibly be pretended?
325. See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
326. 330 U.S. 127 (1947); see supra notes 269-70 and accompanying text.
327. It is immaterial to the supremacy question whether the state rule or policy in-
volved pertains to its own employees-or its own counties, such as in Lawrence Colin-
ty-or instead pertains to private citizens within the state's governmental jurisdiction.
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Statement A is a spending "condition," but Statement B is not. To
make Statement B stick would require more than merely an unre-
stricted power to spend; it would require governance power over
the doing or not doing of X-an enumerated federal power, to
which Supremacy Clause consequences could attach. Statement A is
compatible with the Hamiltonian view of the spending power;
Statement B illustrates the supremacy fallacy that easily creeps in
unawares.
C. Choice, Acceptance, "Coercion," and Public Policy
Certain implications of the contractual character of spending
conditions already are well recognized. The Pennhurst requirement
that conditions be stated clearly enough that the recipient "could
make an informed choice 3 8 is one of these. It means that suffi-
cient clarity is required not only as to the fact that an obligation is
being assumed, but also as to the scope or scale of that obligation.
For example, in Grove City College v. Bell,329 a condition requir-
ing assurances of nondiscrimination as to any "program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance" was held to require assur-
ances only as to the particular activities or programs being as-
sisted, not as to the entire enterprise of a recipient.330 Construing
the condition to have greater scope might better promote the
political or social goals involved, but that could not matter because
unlike statutes, contracts must be construed with respect for the
reasonable expectations of both parties, not merely for such credi-
ble interpretations as government agencies unilaterally might pre-
fer.331
Another recognized implication is that something fairly
amounting to "acceptance" must be shown before spending con-
328. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981); see supra
notes 288-94 and accompanying text.
329. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
330. Id. at 573-74.
331. If a tougher condition is desired than the original language fairly imports, the
terms can be changed for future grants, agitated political sentiments might even make it
easier to muster congressional support for broader language the second time around.
After Grove City College, for example, proponents of a more onerous condition could
play pettifogger by berating the judges for "narrowing" the original condition, and by
calling the revisory legislation they proposed a "restoration" act. Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988); see Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1036 (1992).
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ditions can be enforced. Conditions are enforceable only "upon
those who are in a position to accept or reject those obligations as
a part of the decision whether or not to 'receive' federal
funds. ,332
Even in Grove City College, while the private college to which
the "assurance of compliance" requirement was applied was not it-
self the payee of federal funds and had no written contract with
the United States, it did elect to cooperate by certifying to the
funding agency information that was requisite to the students'
eligibility.333 It did so knowing that any funds granted an appli-
cant would be restricted to use for the applicant's expenses related
to attending that college, and knowing that federal law treated
such flow-through grants to students as no less "assistance to insti-
tutions of higher education '' 31 than grants made to institutions
themselves on students' behalf. Although the Grove City College
opinions did not go beyond statutory construction to the constitu-
tional question in the background, knowing participation even to
no greater extent than as elaborated above seems sufficient to give
rise to contractual obligations.335
The contractual character of spending conditions also has
other implications. Other spending power issues might best be
analyzed in contract terms. One of these is the problem usually
discussed in terms of "coercion."
A "coercion" objection was raised against the Maternity Act
considered in Massachusetts v. Mellon.336 Justice Sutherland, writ-
ing for the unanimous Court, however, thought it sufficient to an-
swer that the Act "imposes no obligation but simply extends an
option which the State is free to accept or reject. '37 It did not,
he continued, "require the States to do or to yield anything. If
332. United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 606
(1986).
333. Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 559.
334. See id. at 566 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1070(a)(5) (1988)).
335. Numerous Grove City College students received federal "Basic Educational Op-
portunity Grants." Id. at 559. Most institutions whose students receive such aid participate
by determining applicant eligibility themselves, calculating the awards, and serving as
conduits for the federal funds. Id. at 559-60 n.5. Grove City College and some others
chose instead to participate no further than to "make appropriate certifications." See id.
at 559 n.5. It was possible, however, to have declined participating at all, and Grove City
College did not so decline.
336. 262 U.S. 447, 461-68 (1923).
337. Id. at 480.
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Congress enacted it with the ulterior purpose of tempting them to
yield, that purpose may be effectively frustrated by the simple
expedient of not yielding. 3 38 The Maternity Act simply offered
matching funds to states willing to undertake maternal and child
health programs satisfying federal standards. 39 States were free
to decline, sparing even their own matching shares by having no
program at all, or to operate nonconforming programs at their
own expense; the costs were modest enough, and the program
constituencies had sufficiently little political power, that both of
these alternatives were realistic. There was nothing in the Mater-
nity Act comparable to the conditional 90% tax credit for employ-
ers used later in the unemployment title of the Social Security
Act" to create political pressure against states' going their own
ways. Under these circumstances, the "coercion" claim in Mellon
was, indeed, very weak.
A majority of the Justices in Butler, on the other hand, found
the Agricultural Adjustment Act coercive.341 The restriction on
farmers' production that was a condition of qualifying for federal
financial assistance, they said,
is not in fact voluntary. The farmer, of course, may refuse to
comply, but the price of such refusal is the loss of benefits. The
amount offered is intended to be sufficient to exert pressure on
him to agree to the proposed regulation .... If the cotton grow-
er elects not to accept the benefits, he will receive less for his
crops; those who receive payments will be able to undersell him.
The result may well be financial ruin 2 .... This is coercion by
economic pressure.343
338. Id. at 482.
339. Id. at 479.
340. Social Security Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, § 902(c), 49 Stat. 620, 640.
341. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 70-71 (1936).
342. Perhaps it might have been ruin, but in fact it was not. The dissent pointed out
not only that the coercive impact claimed by the majority was not supported by the re-
cords, id. at 81 (Stone J., dissenting), but also that a special tax later had to be enacted
to offset the profits reaped by nonparticipants in the Agricultural Adjustment Act from
the market price improvements attributed to others' production reductions, id. at 82-83.
The majority replied, "The coercive purpose and intent of the statute is not obscured by
the fact that it has not been perfectly successful. . . . [That afterwards the special offset-
ting tax was enacted] only serves more fully to expose the coercive purpose of the [Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act]." Id. at 71.
343. Id. at 70-71 (citations omitted).
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No spending program or condition since Butler has been held
invalid on coercion grounds. Even though pressure techniques even
more powerful than those of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
have become commonplace,344 and although a dependency on
federal funds akin to addiction may have developed,34 the stan-
dard response to claims of spending power "coercion" still is the
Mellon reply: complaints of coercion should not be heard because
the recipient could have employed "the simple expedient of not
yielding. 3 46
Nonetheless, there remains enough concern about coercion
that the issue continues to be given lip service, at least. For exam-
ple, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court in 1987, "Our
decisions have recognized that in some circumstances the financial
inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass
the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion.' ,147
The idiom of coercion dates to the regime of dual federalism.
To dual federalists, the issue of ultimate moment was whether,
under the pretext of spending, Congress was really "regulating" a
matter reserved exclusively to the states or interfering with states'
independence of action in their reserved domain. The operative
premise was that federal measures nibbling at the states' plate
were void; coercion was only an identifying earmark of such for-
bidden regulation or interference.348
344. For some examples of onerous modern conditions, see, e.g., Kaden, supra note
20, at 871-83; Rosenthal, supra note 121, at 1137-39.
345. In the mid-1980s. federal grants to states and state subdivisions amounted to
about 20% of state and local expenditures. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552-53 (1985).
346. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923); see, e.g., Oklahoma v. United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947); see also Grove City College v.
Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 565 n.13 (1984) (noting that if the College found the condition objec-
tionable, it was free to cease participating in the funding program and thus escape the
condition).
347. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). Since refusing the condition challenged by South Dako-
ta in that case would disqualify it for only 5% of the federal funds otherwise available
under specified highway grant programs, Rehnquist was able to say that the state's "argu-
ment as to coercion is . . . more rhetoric than fact." Id.
348. Coercion, however, was not the only earmark, and its absence was not sufficient
to absolve the condition imposed. Therefore the majority's extended discussion in Steward
about "draw[ing] the line intelligently between duress and inducement," Steward, 301 U.S.
at 586-90, was quite beside the points that troubled the dissenters.
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Now that dual federalism has been repudiated, and the princi-
ple of extraneous ends has been candidly affirmed, the significance
of coercion must be somewhat different. If it is to have any signifi-
cance at all, "coercion" must be not merely an earmark or an
indication of some other fact that in turn has legal consequences,
but rather a fact that has legal consequences by itself.
Coercion does have significant consequences in contract law:
duress and undue influence have long been regarded as making
contracts voidable. For several reasons, however, this branch of
contract law is not very useful for dealing with spending power
''coercion."
First, as to public-entity grantees there is reason to doubt that
the concepts of coercion and undue influence "can ever be applied
Two of them, Justices Sutherland and Van Devanter, agreed specifically that the
Social Security Act's powerful combination of tax credits and administration grants condi-
tioned on a state's adopting a conforming unemployment compensation plan "is not coer-
cion. If the act stopped here, I should accept the conclusion of the Court that the legis-
lation is not unconstitutional." Id. at 610 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). Their concern was
that acceptance of the conditions would constitute a pro tanto surrender of essential
powers by a state. To get its unemployment compensation plan approved, a state had to
agree to transfer the proceeds of its own unemployment tax to the Federal Treasury;
although the state might alter its law at any time even to break conformity, it was at
least uncertain whether if it did, it could get its funds back-or whether if it stayed, it
could withdraw or pay out any of its own funds so transferred except as permitted by
the federal law. Id. at 612-13. Sutherland, joined by Van Devanter, maintained, "[A]
state cannot, by contract or statute, surrender the execution, or a share in the execution,
of any of its governmental powers. ... 1d. at 610. Sutherland quoted from Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 295 (1936), as follows: "State powers can neither be ap-
propriated on the one hand nor abdicated on the other." Steward, 301 U.S. at 615
(Sutherland, J., dissenting). Thus, Sutherland wrote, "The force of what has been said is
not broken by an acceptance of the view that the state is not coerced by the federal
law." Id.
To Justice McReynolds, what mattered was not just preventing coercion, but insu-
lating states' policy choices from federal influence, coercive or otherwise. If such influence
were allowed, he reasoned, whether it took the form of "threats of punitive measures or
offers of seductive favors," id. at 599 (McReynolds, J., dissenting), "it can hardly be
expected that the States will retain genuine independence of action. And without inde-
pendent States a Federal Union as contemplated by the Constitution becomes impossi-
ble." Id. at 609.
For Justice Butler, too, the problem inhered in any federal inducement regardless
whether it reached the point of coercion:
The provisions in question, if not amounting to coercion in a legal sense, are
manifestly designed and intended directly to affect state action in the respects
specified. And, if valid as so employed, this "tax and credit" device may be
made effective to enable federal authorities to induce, if not indeed to compel,
state enactments for any purpose within the realm of state power, and generally
to control state administration of state laws.
Id. at 616-17 (Butler, J., dissenting).
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with fitness to the relations between state and nation" ;349 even if
"coercion by economic pressure" is a credible concept as to pri-
vate grantees, proof seems difficult and unlikely, and such specula-
tion.. as the Butler majority employed to find it seems unlikely
to recur.
Second, duress and undue influence have been regarded as
rendering a contract voidable at the instance of the victim party,
but not void. Consequently, while an unhappy grant recipient
might find relief, profound dislocations of governing structure
might be accomplished to the extent that the recipients of largesse
did not themselves object, despite the protests of affected nonre-
cipients. The majority in Steward alluded to this possibility when it
answered the company's claim that states were coerced by pointing
out that the state
does not offer a suggestion that in passing the unemployment law
[qualifying her for assistance under the Social Security Act] she
was affected by duress .... For all that appears she is satisfied
with her choice, and would be sorely disappointed if it were now
to be annulled."
Third, and probably even more important, while duress or
undue influence makes a contract voidable, the victim seeking such
relief must tender restitution. Despite their complaints about atten-
dant conditions, recipients of federal funds typically are loath to
give them back. Indeed, the threat not even of recoupment but
just of future denial of additional funds is what typically induces
recipients to endure conditions to which they vigorously object. A
"remedy" for coercive spending that obliges restitution of funds to
the United States therefore is effectively no remedy at all.
Nevertheless, recognizing that spending conditions are contrac-
tual in character can make possible effective and practical solu-
tions for objectionable spending conditions, if the idiom of coer-
349. Id. at 590. "Undue influence" generally has been considered to require a special
relationship such as confidence, trust, or subservience and circumstances sufficient to in-
dicate something less than a competent and independent exercise of judgment.
350. The dissenters described it as "groundless speculation." Uniied States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1, 83 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
351. Steward, 301 U.S. at 589 (citations omitted). The only reason the Butler majority
a year earlier was able to invalidate the Agricultural Adjustment Act even though no
participating farmer complained was that the holding was based not on any concept of
contract law, but on the concept of dual federalism, which operated as a constitutional
restriction whether the contracting farmers liked it or not.
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cion is displaced by idioms more congenial to modern contract law
usage and not reminiscent of dual federalism.352 Specifically, it is
useful to think in terms of "unconscionability" and "public policy"
constraints.
Since the advent of the Uniform Commercial Code,353 Amer-
ican contract law generally has developed a vigorous disposition
against unconscionability.35 4 There is no firm or rigorous defini-
tion of "unconscionability," but in modern private law practice the
concept is commonly applied when an absence of meaningful
choice is shown. Inequality of bargaining power is not enough by
itself to convert undesirable terms into unconscionable ones, but
far less interference with independent will and free choice need be
shown to invoke the unconscionability concept than to satisfy the
traditional requirements of coercion by duress or undue influence.
Moreover, the "rule" against unconscionability need not result
in contract avoidance; restitution therefore need not be requisite to
relief. And unconscionability can result simply in nonenforcement
or limitation of the unconscionable terms; therefore, particular
conditions could be avoided while others-and the arrangement as
a whole-remain in force.
352. The possibility of applying familiar contract law principles poses a minor theoret-
ical problem. First, no state's own law is competent to govern when, how, to what ex-
tent, or with what consequences rights in federal property (including federal money) are
acquired. See authorities collected in Engdahl. supra note 70, at 297 n.49, 362. Second,
"[t]here is no federal general common law." Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78
(1938). And third, there is no comprehensive federal statutory law of contracts. The
resulting theoretical problem is, to what "law of contracts" might one resort in connec-
tion with the spending power?
But this theoretical problem is not a difficult one in fact: federal judges have had
no difficulty developing appropriate "federal common law" as needed in cognate areas.
See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943) (fashioning
federal common law to govern rights and duties of United States on commercial paper
issued by it).
353. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1990) provides:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without
the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscio-
nable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
354. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) provides:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made
a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of
any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.
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"Unconscionability" overlaps the concept of "public policy" as
a reason for denying the effect of bargains, or of particular con-
tractual terms. Where either or both of the parties are govern-
ments, most of the traditional public policy limitations applicable
to private contracts3 55 might not hold. On the other hand, there
are public policy limitations attributable to constitutional prohibi-
tions that apply specifically and only because it is the federal or
state government that is acting.
As to the latter, the public policy of the Constitution is by no
means exhausted by its protections of individual liberty. In addi-
tion, the policy of federalism pervades it.356 Contrary to the dual
federalists' thesis, this policy does not reserve any realms of be-
havior for governance exclusively by the several states; it does
demand, however, preservation of the integrity of the several
states as discrete "political communities" comprised of persons
who simultaneously are members of the larger whole.357 The Con-
stitution contemplates that each of these discrete communities is
entitled to maintain and effectively use, without undue interfer-
ence, subnational governments largely of its own design to serve
its members' needs and desires however that changing membership
from time to time might independently choose.
This constitutional policy is the basis for a viable principle of
"state immunity" untainted by dual federalism and dissociated
from the much-abused Tenth Amendment. I have elaborated its
sources and some of its applications elsewhere.3 8 It is a policy
that affords great respect, but not blind capitulation, to determina-
tions of the political branches. It involves neither talismanic labels
nor wooden rules, but practical judgment. There is some room
(and even a textual basis359) for applying it even as to Congress's
regulatory powers, but one need not await the eventual correction
of the mistake made by the (former) majority in Garcia36" before
355. See generally 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 2-66
(1990) (discussing public policies developed by courts or derived from legislation used as
grounds for not enforcing a contract).
356. Even in Steward, while finding them not to be contravened in that case, the
Court recognized not only that there are "restrictions implicit in our federal form of
government," but also that so-called coercion might contravene them. Steward Mach. Co.
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937).
357. See supra note 20.
358. David E. Engdahl, Sense and Nonsense About State Immunity, 2 CONST. COM-
MENTARY 93 (1985); see also ENODAHL, supra note 39, at 383-90.
359. See Engdahl, supra note 358, at 93.
360. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Garcia, id.
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applying this state immunity principle in the context of spending
conditions, for spending conditions are contractual in character,
and the Constitution's policy of federalism should be considered
among the public policy constraints enforceable on contract law
grounds regardless of whether it might constrain exercises of
Congress's regulatory powers.
D. Third-Party Obligations
Contract obligations depend upon the manifestation not only
of one's intent to bind another, but also of that other's assent to
be bound. This duality distinguishes contracted obligations from
legislated ones.
For this reason, contracting parties cannot impose obligations
upon someone else solely by agreement between themselves. It can
make no difference that one or both of the contracting parties
want very much to obligate that third person, or that obligating
that third person is crucial to achieving the purpose of the con-
tract, or even that the contract is of benefit to that third person.
To obligate another person solely by virtue of contract requires
some sufficient manifestation of voluntary assent by that person.
What this means with respect to federal spending conditions
can be illustrated with United States Department of Transportation
v. Paralyzed Veterans of America.36' Section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973 (which conditions federal grants made after its
enactment) prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap under
"any program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
at 557, a bare majority of the Court (including several Justices who no longer sit) over-
ruled National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Garcia is commonly
viewed as relegating the preservation of federalism to politics. See, e.g., Martha A. Field,
Garcia v. Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV.
L. REv. 84 (1985). But see ENGDAHL, supra note 39, at 388-89 (noting that even in
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554, the Court reserves without elaboration a judicial role "tailored
to compensate for possible failings in the national political process . . .").
Garcia has been undercut and seems likely to be increasingly marginalized and
disregarded if not actually overruled. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
2408, 2423 (1992) (stating that Congress is not authorized to "regulate state governments'
regulation of interstate commerce"); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (construing
statute to avoid arguable state immunity impediment). Once Garcia is gone, what should
replace it is not an exact revival of the National League of Cities rationale, but rather a
rule of reasoned judgment. See Engdahl, supra note 358, at 106-07.
361. 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
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tance. 362 Since section 504 was enacted, airport operators have
received substantial federal financial assistance, and much of this
assistance has been for the construction and development of termi-
nals, runways, and other airport facilities that are of particular
benefit to air carriers.3 63 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held
that section 504 does not bind those air carriers who are not par-
ties to the grant agreements.
The majority opinion in Paralyzed Veterans treated the issue
merely as one of statutory construction, concluding that Congress
limited the scope of § 504 to those who actually "receive" federal
financial assistance because it sought to impose § 504 coverage as
a form of contractual cost of the recipient's agreement to accept
the federal funds .... By limiting coverage to recipients, Con-
gress imposes the obligations of § 504 upon those who are in a
position to accept or reject those obligations as a part of the
decision whether or not to "receive" federal funds. In this case
the only parties in that position are the airport operators. 64
It seems likely, however, that the majority's construction of the
statute was influenced by the underlying constitutional point; if
one ignores that point, the less crabbed construction advanced by
Justice Marshall (joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun) in
dissent makes a great deal more sense.365 That constitutional
point is that the handicap antidiscrimination requirement was not
one Congress had any enumerated power to impose but was mere-
ly a funding condition; its obligation therefore was merely contrac-
tual,366 and no merely contractual term could bind non-parties to
the funding contract even if they benefitted from the airport im-
provements so funded.367
362. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
363. See Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. at 604-05.
364. Id. at 605-06.
365. Id. at 613 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
366. Discrimination on the basis of handicap has not been held to be constitutionally
prohibited even when supported by state action, and no statutory prohibition applies
independently of § 504.
367. Of course, wholly apart from the spending power and attendant conditions, air
carriers (and even handicap discrimination by air carriers) might be regulable by Con-
gress not only insofar as the carriers do interstate commerce, but also in other respects
insofar as might be "necessary and proper" to effectuate Congress's will with respect to
interstate commerce. Those possibilities, however, are separate from the questions of
whether and how Congress may control the carriers by virtue of the spending condition
involved in Paralyzed Veterans.
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Certainly one contracting party may insist, as a condition to
its assent, that another contracting party undertake to require
specified behavior of others with whom the latter has some deal-
ings. So for example (assuming a sufficient delegation of authori-
ty), the responsible federal agency could have conditioned grants
to airport operators on those operators" agreement to include
language precluding handicap discrimination by air carriers in all
leases of airport facilities to such carriers.36 Even if that had
been done, however, the carriers' obligations would have resulted
from their own lease agreements with the operators; the funding
agreement between the federal government and the airport opera-
tors still would not, because it could not, have obligated the air
carriers.
This point has other applications as well. For example, a fed-
eral funds recipient cannot alter or abrogate the contract rights of
its employees by a funding agreement to which the employees do
not accede. If a recipient agreed in a funding agreement to dis-
charge employees acting contrary to conditions the recipient ac-
cepted, any such discharge nonetheless would be unlawful unless it
were consistent with the employee's employment contract as well.
This would be true even if the employee's action were attributable
to the recipient employer under applicable principles of agency or
employment law so as to constitute a breach of the recipient's
obligation under the funding agreement,36 9 for-except insofar as
368. See the suggestion made by Justice Marshall in Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. at
617-18 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
369. There is a comment in the Court's opinion in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173
(1991), that might be taken to suggest that employees are bound personally by funding
agreement terms accepted by their recipient employers. The Court wrote,
Individuals who are voluntarily employed for a Title X project must perform
their duties in accordance with the regulation's restrictions on abortion counsel-
ing and referral . . . . [T]his limitation is a consequence of their decision to
accept employment in a project, the scope of which is permissibly restricted by
the funding authority.
Id. at 198.
But Rust was only a facial challenge to regulations elaborating eligibility conditions
for federal assistance. The relevant statute provided: "None of the funds appropriated un-
der this subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family plan-
ning." 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1988). Employees who counseled inconsistently with the regu-
lation of course would imperil their employers' continued funding; in that sense-i.e., if
they wished not to cause a loss of funding (and thus, perhaps, of their jobs)-they were
indeed "required" to observe the counseling and referral restriction. But the Court in
Rust was not even considering whether such abortion counseling could be the basis for
consequences personal to the employee. The quoted statement therefore should not be
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respects matters that are themselves within the scope of the enu-
merated powers-not even the federal government may affect a
person's legal rights without the affected person's own assent.
For the same reason, no term agreed to solely between a
recipient and the federal funds provider could subject any third
person to any liability or penalty. Governing power can impose
obligations and attach penalties regardless of a purported obligor's
consent, but power merely to contract cannot; furthermore, the
governing power of the federal government is circumscribed by the
principle of enumerated powers. These implications of the contrac-
tual character of spending conditions, however, seem not to have
occurred yet to counsel in any case; consequently, they have not
been examined by any court.
FDIC v. Mallen,"7 a recent case involving federal insurance
of bank deposits, is illustrative. The Federal Deposit Insurance Act
(FDIA)37t provides as a condition to be accepted by institutions
receiving such federal financial backing that the FDIC under cer-
tain circumstances may suspend any officer of an insured deposi-
tary institution from office or prohibit that officer from participat-
ing further in the institution's affairs.372 FDIC's insuring agree-
ments, including this condition, of course are contracts with the
insured institutions as corporate bodies, not with any such officer
personally.
In Mallen, the Supreme Court held that a bank president sus-
pended by the FDIC under this provision has a personal property
right in his position sufficient to invoke due process protection.373
But neither Mallen's own legal counsel nor the Court acting sua
sponte thought to question whether or how the bank's agreement
with the FDIC could have given the FDIC any power at all over
that personal right of Mallen. A funding condition obligating the
bank to suspend an officer at FDIC's request might have been
taken to mean that an individual's "decision to accept employment in a project, the scope
of which is permissibly restricted by the funding authority," Rust, 500 U.S. at 198, could
be sufficient to subject that individual personally to any liability, civil or criminal, for
acting contrary to the funding conditions that had been accepted not by that individual,
but only by the 'organization receiving the conditioned federal funds.
370. 486 U.S. 230 (1988).
371. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (Supp. IV 1992), amended by Riegle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338.
372. Id. § 1818(g).
373. Mallen, 486 U.S. at 240. The Court went on to find that due process had been
satisfied in Mallen's case. Id. at 248.
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valid and effective; officers typically serve at a corporate board's
pleasure, and Mallen therefore probably would have had no em-
ployment contract rights against the bank. But that was not the
case. The' FDIC had not insisted that the bank suspend Mallen;
rather, the FDIC itself had removed Mallen (as the statute de-
clared it could do) and simply notified the bank that it had done
so."' The crucial litigable issue in Mallen, therefore, was not
whether postsuspension FDIC procedures without any presuspen-
sion hearing were adequate to satisfy due process, but rather
whether the Constitution conferred any power at all upon the
federal government itself to suspend Mallen from his job at the
bank.
Had that question been perceived, evidence might have been
mustered to show that Mallen somehow had manifested his per-
sonal assent, or conceivably, some rationale might have been de-
vised for holding executives (or chief executives) of federally in-
sured banks personally accountable on conditions accepted on
behalf of the corporations they serve.375 No such evidence or ra-
tionale was even attempted in Mallen, however, because no one
even thought to question the FDIC's dubious assertion of the
constitutionality of this power.
There is another recent case even more remarkable than
Mallen. In 1986, Congress enacted the Emergency Medical Treat-
ment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) as an amendment to the
Medicare provisions of the Social Security Act.376 EMTALA
adds conditions to the provider agreements hospitals must execute
in order to qualify for Medicare payments. The hospitals them-
selves are the contracting parties and the recipients of the relevant
funds. The EMTALA conditions require recipient hospitals to
treat all persons entering their emergency departments according
to terms prescribed in the Act. In particular, by accepting funds to
which EMTALA applies, a hospital agrees not to withhold emer-
gency-room services from anyone who is medically unstable, re-
gardless of ability to pay.377
374. Id. at 238.
375. Or perhaps some constitutional basis might be found for the FDIA other than
the spending power alone.
376. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (Supp. 1991) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988)).
377. Id. § 1395dd(b)(1).
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Penalties are specified for participating hospitals that violate
these conditions. In addition, EMTALA provides that the "respon-
sible physician" is "subject to a civil money penalty of not more
than $50,000 for each such violation," whether that physician is
"employed by or under contract with the participating hospi-
tal." '378 These physicians, however, are not parties to the Medi-
care provider agreements between the hospitals and the govern-
ment. They are not the recipients of funds under those provider
agreements, and typically they have not even remotely agreed
personally to be bound by EMTALA.
Nonetheless, although the EMTALA physician penalty was
earnestly litigated the first time it was applied, with even some
rather farfetched, so-called constitutional arguments being ad-
vanced, neither counsel nor the courts ever thought to inquire
what constitutional basis might conceivably exist for it.379 Neither
counsel nor the court realized that there exists no constitutional
basis at all for federal imposition of such a personal penalty upon
persons who have not personally agreed to such a condition and
are not themselves recipients of the federal assistance involved.
There also are other provisions, equally insupportable, for
which no support ever has been asked or offered. For example, a
section of the federal penal code added in 1984 makes it a felony
for any employee of a recipient state or local agency or recipient
private organization to steal, embezzle, or misapply property of
such organization or agency. 80 Another statute purports to make
378. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B). The current statute applies to "any physician who is re-
sponsible for the examination, treatment, or transfer of an individual in a participating
hospital." Id. EMTALA also creates a civil action against the hospital, but not against
the physician. Id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A).
379. See Burditt v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 934 F.2d 1362
(5th Cir. 1991). Dr. Burditt argued that he was not "under contract" with the hospital.
However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held whether the physician was
under contract with the hospital to be irrelevant as a matter of state law, declaring that
"a physician is 'under contract' with a hospital [for purposes of EMTALA] when, pursu-
ant to their mutual agreement, the physician examines and treats or transfers people who
are covered by EMTALA, regardless of whether the agreement refers to EMTALA." Id.
at 1374. This dispute over whether Dr. Burditt was under contract with the hospital di-
verted attention from the more important facts that he was not contractually bound by
EMTALA and that Congress did not have any power to so bind him other than contrac-
tually.
380. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A) (1988). Under this statute, it is not even material
whether the property stolen, embezzled, or misapplied had been acquired with federal fi-
nancial assistance. Of course, even limiting the statute to property so acquired could not
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it a felony to "knowingly make[] any false statement ... for the
purpose of influencing in any way ... any institution the accounts
of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion ... upon any application .... or loan, or any change or
extension of any of the same . ,,38t These penal code provi-
sions lack any basis in the Constitution. It cannot be sufficient to
give constitutional competence to Congress that the deed sought to
be punished is done against one to whom Congress has extended
financial aid. Funds recipients are not protectorates of the federal
government: Congress has no more power to punish theft from the
beneficiaries of its largesse than it has to punish theft from anyone
else. Federal dominion over federal property is irrelevant, because
once any particular funds have been given to a recipient, those
funds are not federal property anymore. The Constitution does not
contemplate that federal regulatory power should tag along after
federal money like a hungry dog. Money cannot infect the recipi-
ent with the germ of generalized federal governing control, or an
infectious virus capable of spreading that disease to anyone who
touches the recipient or its property.
It seems as though if any thought at all has been given to
possible constitutional bases for imposing obligations upon non-
parties to funding agreements, the question has been pressed no
have made it constitutional; the defect described in the text would remain.
381. 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (Supp. IV 1992); see also United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct.
1735 (1992) (indicting defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 for supplying banks with over-
valued assessments of his assets in loan requests). If it were permissible to invoke the
Necessary and Proper Clause of the U.S. Constitution by sheer conjecture, this statute
might possibly find support under that Clause in conjunction with the Article IV Property
Clause, as follows: having power to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the . . . Property belonging to the United States," U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, Con-
gress may "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execu-
tion" that power, id. art. I, § 7, cl. 18. If one conceived a policy of conserving funds as
being within the Property Clause, diminishing the probability of claims against the federal
government as a deposit guarantor could serve that policy of conservation. One way to
diminish the probability of claims under deposit insurance is to increase the likelihood
that the depositary institution will remain solvent. One way to help ensure its solvency is
to diminish its risk of uncollectible loans, and one way to do that is to prompt candid
disclosure from persons seeking such loans by providing for punishment of fraud.
Such telic chains are permitted under the Necessary and Proper Clause, but there
are requisites. For example, the means-to-ends connections must seem both rational and
"substantial." More to the present point, however, it must appear not merely that the
telic connections are conceivable by conjecture, but that they actually were the basis of
Congress's action. See generally ENGDAHL, supra note 39, at 20-24, 33-43 (summarizing
the limits on Congress's power under the Necessary and Proper Clause).
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further than to determine whether imposing the third-party obliga-
tion would help effectuate the end at which the particular spend-
ing program is aimed. If that end were within the scope of some
enumerated federal power, of course-such as military pre-
paredness or interstate commerce policy-this extent of inquiry
would be sufficient. With the vast majority of federal spending
programs, however, the end is not an enumerated one, but merely
an extraneous one, and the fact that some third-party obligation
might help effectuate some extraneous end is utterly insufficient
constitutionally to support the imposition of that obligation by
Congress. Hamilton's spending power view does not posit Congress
as competent to do anything toward extraneous (i.e., nonenumer-
ated) ends, except spend.
E. Third-Party Enforcement of Conditions
The federal government has many ways to enforce conditions
that accompany federal financial aid. If a prospective recipient fails
or refuses to satisfy the conditions, obviously its application for
funds may be denied. If a condition is breached after a grant has
been made, requests for renewal or extension may be denied, and
furthermore, by principles of ordinary contract law, any increments
remaining to be paid during the current grant term may be with-
held. There should even be a claim for restitution of sums already
paid. Alternatively, the United States might obtain a judicial order
compelling the recipient to comply with conditions it has accepted,
even though the principle of enumerated powers would preclude
enforcement of identical requirements if the recipient were not
contractually bound. In addition, statutes establishing federal
spending programs may assign responsibility to a federal adminis-
trative agency for continuing oversight to ensure that contracted
funding conditions are fulfilled.
Sometimes, however, enforceability at the instance of the
government itself might be deemed insufficient. Today, every fed-
eral funding agreement includes conditions designed for the benefit
of persons who are not themselves parties to that agreement. As
long as they are sufficiently clear to satisfy the Pennhurst stan-
dard,3" such third-party beneficiary conditions certainly are valid.
Whether third-party beneficiaries themselves may sue to enforce
382. See supra notes 288-91 and accompanying text.
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compliance with those conditions, however, is a question of consid-
erable legal complexity.
Federal statutes prescribing conditions to accompany federal
funds seldom address the question of third-party enforcement at
all. The general rule is-or was, at least, until 1980-that enforce-
ability at the instance of third parties is a question of state law,
even though the obligation sought to be enforced arises from a
contract with the United States. The 1980 decision in Maine v.
Thiboutot" made a profound change in this general rule, but
that change already has been countermanded somewhat and if
intelligently considered is unlikely to endure. It seems appropriate,
therefore, to examine the pre-1980 situation first.
The Supreme Court confirmed the basic state law character of
the question in Miree v. DeKalb County." Claimants' Lear jet
had crashed after its engines were fouled by birds swarming from
a garbage dump maintained by the County adjacent to the
County's airport.38 As a condition to federal grants for airport
improvement, the County had agreed to restrict the adjacent land
to uses compatible with takeoff and landing.38 6 Claimants argued
that federal rather than state law should determine whether they
could sue as third-party beneficiaries, but all the Supreme Court
Justices thought otherwise.387
Two years later, the American Law Institute, cognizant of
Miree, .amended section 313 of its Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts by adding a subsection saying that the principles evolved
through common law judicial processes for application to private
third-party beneficiary contracts also apply to contracts with "a
government. ''3' This general proposition is broad enough to in-
clude contracts regarding federal financial assistance. Of course,
the law generally applicable to private third-party beneficiary con-
tracts is state law, because "[t]here is no federal general common
law.
389
383. 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).
384. 433 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1977).
385. Id. at 27.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 32-33. There was no dissent in Miree: Chief Justice Burger wrote separate-
ly, concurring in the judgment. Id. at 34-35 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
388. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313(1) (1981); see also id. ch. 14 in-
troductory note.
389. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see discussion infra note 391.
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Relevant law varies from state to state. It therefore follows
from Miree that third-party beneficiaries of a particular funding
condition might be able to sue if one state's law applies but not if
another's does. This variability of result from state to state and
from claimant to claimant is acceptable, the Justices reasoned in
Miree, because a third party's claim against a federal funds recipi-
ent "raises no question regarding the liability of the United States
or the responsibilities of the United States under the con-
tracts"39 and therefore does not implicate such federal interests
as might warrant the application of so-called federal common law.39
390. Miree, 433 U.S. at 28-29. The Court stated,
The operations of the United States in connection with FAA grants such as
these are undoubtedly of considerable magnitude. However, we see no reason
for concluding that these operations would be burdened or subjected to uncer-
tainty by variant state-law interpretations regarding whether those with whom
the United States contracts might be sued by third-party beneficiaries to the
contracts.
Id. at 30.
391. Cf Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) (holding that
the rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper it issues are governed by
"federal common law"). The proposition in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
78 (1938), that "[t]here is no federal general common law" does not mean that nonstatu-
tory law in general, or the "general law," necessarily is state law. To 18th-century, hence
prepositivist, legal minds, the general law derived from England's classic common law and
applied (with few variations) in the several states was not "state" law at all; it simply
was the general law, which all Americans shared in common. Our earliest generations
assumed that the activities of their governments (both state and federal) would be gov-
erned by the principles and concepts of that general law, which was neither federal law
nor any particular state's own law, but they never conceived that activities of the federal
government should be governed by state law. (For an example of the mistaken assump-
tion to the contrary, see PETER W. Low & JOHN G. JEFFRIES, FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 317 (3d ed. 1994)).
For generations after state processes of judicial law elaboration had begun to prolif-
erate variations, federal courts in diversity cases continued to work under the outmoded
premise that the same "general law" was shared nationwide. Not until Erie did the feder-
al judiciary reckon with the new reality that gradually had emerged, at last acknowledg-
ing that federal courts are no more competent than Congress to supervene the
disseverance of America's "general law." See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. Erie did not so much
overrule the diversity case practice as acknowledge that its conceptual premise had long
since ceased to be true.
Five years after reckoning in Erie with its import for diversity cases, the Justices
considered in Clearfield Trust what the displacement of the prior nationwide "general
law" by the variant general laws of the respective states must mean with respect to inter-
ests and obligations of the United States. See Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367. To regard
the peculiar laws of any state as the matrix and measure of federal rights and obligations
would render the exercise of enumerated federal powers contingent and dependent upon
the laws of a state, and such a result had been recognized since the time of John Mar-
shall as irreconcilable with the Supremacy Clause. See, e.g., M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 329-30 (1819) (arguing that instrument employed to effectuate fed-
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While third-party enforceability of spending conditions is gen-
erally a question controlled by state law, however, state law can
be overridden as to spending conditions that promote ends within
the scope of an "enumerated" power. Two separate ramifications
of the principle of enumerated powers were adumbrated in Miree,
although the circumstances of that case made it unnecessary for
the Court to elaborate them as fully as the circumstances of other
cases might require.
The first of these ramifications involves the equivocal charac-
ter of references to federal "policy." It was argued in Miree that
even though the third-party claim alleged no federal liability or
obligation, the relevant spending condition did articulate federal
"policy," and that effectuation of that policy was of sufficient
"federal interest" that it must not be left to depend upon state
law.39 The Justices simply deflected this suggestion, saying that
"4even assuming the correctness of this notion .... the issue of
whether to displace state law on an issue such as this is primarily
a decision for Congress. Congress has not chosen to do so in this
case.
,393
While this deflection sufficed for Miree, however, for other
circumstances the point requires analysis in light of the principle of
eral powers cannot be left subject to debilitation by states). In Clearfield Trust, the Jus-
tices therefore concluded that "[tihe rights and duties of the United States on commercial
paper which it issues are governed by federal rather than local law." Clearfield Trust, 318
U.S. at 366. There being no federal statutes on point, that law was to be fashioned judi-
cially in the manner which, by the 20th century, had come to be regarded as the "com-
mon law" process. See id. at 367.
The Clearfield Trust rule cannot be confined to commercial paper; it extends to
contracts in general, and beyond. See id. It contemplates "federal common law" displacing
the law that otherwise would govern matters within the scope of any enumerated federal
power. Two centuries ago, the law that otherwise would govern was the commonly
shared American general law; today, it is the variety of bodies of law evolved from that
bygone American general law through state-by-state "common law" processes of judicial
development.
On the other hand, because "federal supremacy" is the necessity that justifies this
rule and the Constitution countenances federal supremacy only within the scope of the
enumerated federal powers, Clearfield Trust cannot justify displacing the law otherwise
governing matters outside the enumerated powers (not even those matters being reached
as a means to an enumerated end by virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause).
Clearfield Trust does not support displacement of state law merely because a federally
contrived uniform rule might better serve some extraneous end toward which the federal
government is employing an enumerated power.
392. Miree, 433 U.S. at 28-29.
393. Id. at 32.
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enumerated powers. Federal policy for air travel safety (the rele-
vant federal policy in Miree) is policy within the scope of
Congress's plenary commerce power, and any measure to pro-
mote-through spending conditions or otherwise-federal policy
for matters within an enumerated power is supported by the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause. Consequently, whether to displace state
law impacting that federal policy certainly was within Congress's
power.
However, the only federal policies that many spending condi-
tions promote are policies extraneous to the enumerated powers.
Such conditions illustrate the principle of extraneous ends, and for
reasons fully elaborated earlier,3 94 as to such federal policies the
appropriate answer to the suggestion of the Miree claimants is very
different. Congress-and, a fortiori, federal courts395-cannot dis-
place state law in order to effectuate federal policy for matters
extraneous to the enumerated powers. As to funding conditions
that promote federal policy only for such extraneous matters,
therefore, not even express statutory language can control the
third-party enforcement question. Instead, state law governs, be-
cause constitutionally, there can be no federal law.3 96
Miree also adumbrated a second ramification of the principle
of enumerated powers, one that affects subject-matter jurisdiction.
If the federal statute prescribing the funding condition could be
held to "imply" a cause of action for beneficiaries of that condi-
tion, their claim would raise a federal question. In Miree, jurisdic-
tion premised on diversity of citizenship was ample and the possi-
bility of federal-question jurisdiction on this "implied cause of
action" theory was raised only at the Supreme Court level, and
only as an afterthought, without pleading, briefing, or argument
below. The Supreme Court therefore merely noted the possibility
and refused to elaborate upon it.397 Just as with the first ramifi-
cation, however, what warranted no elaboration in Miree itself
merits careful examination for the sake of other cases.
Before Miree, the Supreme Court had considered whether
private causes of action could be found by implication from feder-
394. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
395. See the a fortiori rationale in Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
396. Cf. id. at 78-80 (stating that Congress does not have power to declare common
law applicable to states).
397. Miree, 433 U.S. at 33-34.
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al statutes articulating policy with respect to certain matters within
Congress's enumerated powers, such as the use of interstate com-
merce or the mails to solicit shareholder proxies398 and activities
in connection with the election of Presidents, senators, and mem-
bers of Congress.399 Before Miree, however, the Court had not
considered whether causes of action could be implied by provisions
aimed only at extraneous ends.
The distinction is of crucial importance. When Congress cre-
ates private rights and obligations within the scope of its enumer-
ated powers, inferring a private cause of action to enforce them
does not require positing federal competence beyond the enumer-
ated powers. Insofar as such private suits would tend to effectuate
Congress's policy for an enumerated matter, authorizing them is
plainly within Congress's power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause,4" regardless of whether the intent to authorize them is
explicit. Many spending conditions, however, pertain to matters
outside the scope of any enumerated power. As to such extrane-
ous matters, Congress constitutionally has no competence to legis-
late. It can generate rights and liabilities as to them, but only by
contract, and "cause of action" is a conception of law, not of con-
tract.
The particular spending condition relied upon in Miree could
easily have been linked through the Necessary and Proper Clause
to the enumerated Commerce Clause policy end of air-traffic safe-
ty. Finding a third-party cause of action implicit in that particular
spending condition, therefore, would not have surpassed federal
power, because the enumerated policy of interstate commerce
safety would have been served. But creating causes of action to
enforce extraneous conditions is not within the power given to
Congress by the Necessary and Proper Clause. To find an "im-
plied" cause of action to enforce any extraneous spending condi-
tion, therefore, would require positing legislative competence for
Congress beyond the scope of the enumerated powers.
It is conceivable that recipients might be required as a condi-
tion of funding to agree to respond on the merits to claims of
398. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
399. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Congress's power to regulate federal
elections had been considered and broadly upheld in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
118-33 (1970).
400. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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third parties under extraneous conditions. The Pennhurst rule
discussed earlier,0 1 however, would require that this condition
and its impact be made unmistakably clear" 2 and if they were
made so clear, no occasion for discussing "implied" causes of ac-
tion should arise. Moreover, even then the impediment to federal
court jurisdiction would remain insofar as the third-party claims
arose from provisions binding only by force of contract and not by
virtue of the funding statute as law in itself.
Because it declined in Miree to discuss the federal-question
issue at all, the Court had no occasion even to mention the dis-
tinction between enumerated and extraneous ends.
In 1979, the Supreme Court returned to this second issue
adumbrated in Miree. In Cannon v. University of Chicago,0 3 the
Court held that the statute conditioning federal aid to educational
institutions on their abstinence from sex discrimination" implies
a federal cause of action for beneficiaries of that condition.05 In
Cannon once again, there was no mention of the distinction be-
tween conditions promoting enumerated ends and those promoting
only extraneous ones. Even as to private institutions, such as the
University of Chicago, however, the particular condition considered
in Cannon is supported by the "enforcement power" enumerated
in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although private
discrimination on the basis of sex, unlike state action discriminat-
ing on that ground, 4' does not implicate the Equal Protection
Clause, if the restriction against private discrimination serves as a
means to discourage or prevent forbidden discrimination by the
state, then, by analogy, the prophylactic statutory prohibition of
such private discrimination is within the power enumerated for
Congress in the Fourteenth Amendment's Enforcement Clause.0 7
401. See supra notes 288-92 and accompanying text.
402. By contrast, where, as in Miree, an enumerated rather than merely extraneous
end was served, consent or even knowledge on the part of a grant recipient should not
be a prerequisite to third-party enforceability, for not only giving those particular rights
but also giving the cause of action to enforce them would be assertions of Congress's
legislative power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
403. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
404. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1988).
405. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688-89.
406. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982); Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
407. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-53 (1966) (holding that the enforce-
ment power under the Fourteenth Amendment supports statute against English literacy
19941
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As to conditions aimed only at extraneous ends, therefore, Cannon
in no way disputes the proposition that third-party enforceability
is, as Miree held, a question of state, not federal law.
Indeed, Cannon does not support a federal cause of action for
every spending condition that promotes an enumerated end. In
Cannon, the Justices elaborated, and applied in the spending con-
text, a strategy of statutory construction they had employed in a
nonspending context four years earlier in Cort v. Ash."' In any
context, this strategy requires examination of the specific terms
and circumstances of each particular statutory provision under
which the question of a federal cause of action is put."9 Under
this approach, therefore, even among spending conditions promot-
ing objects within the scope of enumerated powers, the third-party
beneficiaries of some conditions might have a federal cause of
action 41 while the beneficiaries of many others might not. As to
requirement as means to prevent unconstitutional disenfranchisement of citizens unable to
read and write English, even though English literacy requirement itself does not violate
Constitution). In the Fifteenth Amendment context, see Rome v. United States, 446 U.S.
156, 177 (1980) (holding that the enforcement power under the Fifteenth Amendment
supports statute against electoral changes discriminatory in effect, even though the
Amendment itself forbids only intentional discrimination in voting).
408. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
409.
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly
providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff "one of the
class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted"--that is, does the stat-
ute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indica-
tion of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or
to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legisla-
tive scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause
of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the con-
cern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely on federal law?
Id. (citations omitted).
410. Where the recipient of federal funds is a state entity (as in Cannon), rather than
a private one or a municipality or county, enforceability of conditions at the instance of
third-party beneficiaries is complicated further by considerations of state immunity from
suit by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment, and the rule of Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1, 20 (1890). There is no Eleventh Amendment immunity for counties, cities, or school
boards. See Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274. 280-81 (1977) (school
boards); Workman v. New York, 179 U.S. 552, 565 (1900) (cities); Lincoln County v.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890) (counties).
Under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 125 (1908), officials could sometimes be sued
personally in federal courts even if their state was immune. However, Young contemplat-
ed only claims for prospective relief from alleged constitutional violations. Id. Young
therefore was irrelevant to claimed violations of spending conditions, except where some
constitutional violation also was claimed and the claims were so intertwined that the
spending condition claim could be deemed "pendent" for purposes of jurisdiction.
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the latter, state law would continue to determine whether third-
party beneficiary claims could be heard, for while Congress could
have addressed such claims, it has not. And similarly-although for
the different reason that by virtue of the principle of enumerated
powers, Congress could not have governed the point even if it had
tried-third-party enforceability of conditions promoting only ex-
traneous objectives also would remain a question of state law.
In 1980, the majority ruling in Maine v. Thiboutot n worked
a profound change, exponentially increasing the prospect of third-
party beneficiary suits to enforce spending conditions. The
Thiboutot majority found a federal cause of action for spending
condition beneficiaries under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute coun-
tenancing private claims for state action depriving persons of rights
"secured by the Constitution and laws., 412
Before Thiboutot, whether a third-party beneficiary of a vio-
lated funding condition could sue the recipient to enforce it was a
question of state law, unless the particular condition promoted
some enumerated end and a federal cause of action could be in-
ferred under the rule of Cort v. Ash413 and Cannon.4t4 Ash and
Cannon required separate analysis of the statutory provisions re-
garding each particular funding condition as to which a question of
For this jurisdictional reason, the earlier third-party spending condition cases pur-
sued in federal courts always had advanced some purported constitutional claim to which
the spending condition claim was made pendent. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397.
399 (1970); see also, e.g., New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S.
405, 411 (1973); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 600 (1972); Townsend v. Swank,
404 U.S. 282, 283 (1971); California Dep't of Human Resources v. Java, 402 U.S. 121,
124 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,
311 (1968).
There was a rush of such cases in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but it quickly
abated once the Court began to curtail extravagant applications of the Equal Protection
Clause. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-23 (1973),
and extended the Hans v. Louisiana bar to suits for monetary relief (even if prospective
in form) against officials when it seemed the money "must be paid from public funds in
the state treasury." See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).
411. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
412. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . ..
413. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
414. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979).
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third-party enforcement was raised.415 Under Thiboutot, by con-
trast, state law is superfluous, and no analysis of any particular
condition is necessary because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is taken to cover
them all.416
Thus, Thiboutot alters everything heretofore said about third-
party enforcement. For that and other more important reasons, the
Thiboutot rule merits critical scrutiny. The Thiboutot majority now
is gone from the Court, and its rationale was gravely flawed. Sub-
sequent decisions have significantly, and (it seems) deliberately,
diminished the impact of its rule. Indeed, I venture to predict that
the Thiboutot rule will not long endure once its fundamental falla-
cy is perceived.
The Thiboutots had suffered a reduction of benefits under
Maine's program of AFDC, funded largely by federal grants under
the Social Security Act.417 As a condition to that federal assis-
tance, Maine had undertaken to conform its AFDC program to
provisions of the Social Security Act and implementing federal
regulations.418 The Thiboutots sued in state court for judicial re-
view of the administrative action reducing their benefits and joined
a claim under section 1983.419 For purposes of administrative re-
view, it would have been sufficient for them to show that the
reduction resulted from a benefits-calculation method different
from the one the state had contracted to use by accepting the
conditioned funds. The premise of the section 1983 claim, however,
was that AFDC recipients have a right secured by the Social Secu-
rity Act to have the state agency administering AFDC use a con-
forming method of calculating benefits.42 °
This premise made Thiboutot fundamentally different from
every prior case in which a spending condition claim had been
heard. In those, the principal claims had been constitutional and
the spending condition claims merely pendent.41 They were not
even federal law claims at all, much less claims under section
1983-although with jurisdiction otherwise established and no
other issue in those cases affected by whether the spending condi-
415. Id. at 689-709; Ash, 422 U.S. at 80-85.
416. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).
417. Id. at 2-3.
418. See id. at 3.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 4-5.
421. See supra note 410.
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tion claim arose under state or federal law, there had been no
occasion in those cases to focus on that point.4z2 The state law
character of such claims never had been material until Miree in
1977,4  in which jurisdiction rested on diversity but the state law
character of the claims determined the outcome. Miree was the
only case before Thiboutot in which that point had been materi-
al.424
Yet the unanimous and recent holding in Miree was complete-
ly overlooked in Thiboutot. Maine's highest court agreed that the
calculation method used by the state agency did violate the fund-
ing conditions prescribed by the Act, and moreover, that section
1983 applied.4' Reaching only the latter point,426 the U.S. Su-
preme Court affirmed by a 6-3 vote.
The construction given in Thiboutot to section 1983 is applica-
ble to a wide spectrum of federal statutes, not merely those that
prescribe funding conditions, and some of its faults are equally
evident in any application. For example, in rejecting the long-set-
tled view that the phrase "and laws" contemplates only laws pro-
tecting civil rights and equal protection, Justice Brennan's majority
opinion purported to rely on the "plain language" of section
1983.427 A more candid application of the "plain meaning" rule,
however, would instead have taken the word "and" to import the
422. Justice Brennan argumentatively asserted for the Thiboutot majority that § 1983
had been "the exclusive statutory cause of action" in several of those cases.' See
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 5-6. There is nothing in those cases themselves, however, to sup-
port Brennan's retrospective mischaracterization. It would not have served Brennan's
purpose to acknowledge that they might have been considered state law claims (as the
Justices in Miree unanimously had held).
423. See supra note 384.
424. In Thiboutot, which arose in a state court, the state or federal law character of
such claims was made relevant by a request for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1988), which could apply only if the Thiboutots' spending condition claim were indeed
based on § 1983. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 8-10.
425. Thiboutot v. State, 405 A.2d 230, 236 (Me. 1979), affd, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
426. The state court also held that an attorney's fees award under § 1988 might be
appropriate and had remanded the case. Id. at 240. Proceedings on remand were stayed
when certiorari was granted by the U.S. Supreme Court, 444 U.S. 1042 (1980), but in the
interim, the state agency complied with the state court's ruling both by changing the
method of calculating benefits and also by paying the additional AFDC benefits to the
Thiboutots retrospectively. Thiboutot, 405 A.2d at 232. When the case actually reached
the Supreme Court, therefore, the only relief at issue was the request for attorney's fees.
That depended on whether § 1988 applied, which in turn depended on whether § 1983
applied. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 3.
427. Id. at 4.
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conjunctive rather than disjunctive, so that the rights, privileges, or
immunities referred to would be only those secured both by the
Constitution and by federal laws and not any secured by either the
Constitution or a statute alone. On this ground (as well as on
several other grounds elaborated by dissenting Justices)428
Thiboutot's view of section 1983 remains vulnerable to attack.
Whether or not it convinces the credulous in other contexts,
however, the Thiboutot rationale is utterly fallacious when applied
(as it was in Thiboutot itself) to statutory provisions that do, and
constitutionally can do, no more than establish conditions to feder-
al funding.429 Section 1983 contemplates rights "secured by" fed-
eral "laws"; the lawmaking or "legislative" competence of Con-
gress, however, extends no further than the enumerated powers.
Certainly Congress may condition federal assistance on a prospec-
tive recipient's agreement to terms that will benefit third persons
(just as any donor or testator may), and if that condition is not
lawfully countermanded, it might as a practical matter "secure"
certain gains to those third persons. But unless the terms thus
prescribed as conditions are also independently valid by virtue of
some enumerated power, they are obligatory only by virtue of
such agreement and not by force of law. They may freely be coun-
termanded by state law (except insofar as the state itself is con-
strained by its own contracted obligations). Beyond the scope of
its enumerated powers, Congress has no more competence to
make "law" than any private donor or testator has.
True, it is a statute that prescribes the funding condition and
requires denial of federal assistance if the funding condition is not
agreed to; however, only the agreement-and not the stat-
ute-makes the terms obligatory on the funds recipient and thus
"secures" the contemplated third-party rights. Thus, third-party
rights like those of the Thiboutots are "secured" (if at all) not by
any "law," but only by the contract between the recipient and the
United States, and section 1983 does not even remotely contem-
plate causes of action for contract violations. No feasible contor-
428. See id. at 11-34 (Powell, J., dissenting).
429. Justice Powell's appendix to his dissent in Thiboutot also listed numerous
nonspending measures for which Thiboutot's construction of § 1983 would be significant.
Id. at 34-37 (Powell, J., dissenting) (Appendix). Our particular concern here, however, is
with conditional spending.
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tion of its terms can bring rights "secured" only by contract within
its ambit.
Because prior to Thiboutot, few had seriously imagined that
section 1983 might comprehend such claims, Thiboutot and its
portent came as a great shock. Thus it is fair to say that in
Thiboutot the Supreme Court itself "surpris[ed] participating States
with postacceptance or 'retroactive' conditions, 4 3' exactly what
the Court the next year in Pennhurst State School v. Halder-
man431 would declare that Congress may not do.
Thiboutot precipitated a surge of section 1983 claims in the
lower courts. Some of those claims were asserted under regulatory
statutes within the scope of various enumerated powers, but many
were third-party claims asserted under federal funding condi-
tions.432 The particular concern in this Article is only with the
latter, but judicial reaction to the deluge came in both varieties
and therefore both must be noted.
The litigation flood was diked the year after Thiboutot by two
decisions. One of these was Pennhurst.433 In Pennhurst, a differ-
ent majority (including the three Thiboutot dissenters) held that
certain language in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act is merely precatory.43 4 That holding was con-
troversial, because the statutory language seemed adequate on its
face to create beneficiary rights and that probably was Congress's
intent. However, this very fact makes Pennhurst more forceful in
emphasizing that third-party claims cannot succeed without persua-
sive demonstration that the statutory language relied on actually
gives the complaining third parties legal rights.
If the language relied on does not actually create "rights," and
unless the right claimed is derivable from some independent
source, the beneficiaries of the funding to which the condition
applies have no "right" upon which 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could oper-
ate. Consequently, the Court's refusal to find that the statutory
language involved in Pennhurst actually created rights, its insis-
430. Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981).
431. Id. ("Though Congress' power to legislate under the spending power is broad, it
does not include surprising States with postacceptance or 'retroactive' conditions.")
432. See George D. Brown, Whither Thiboutot? Section 1983, Private Enforcement, and
the Damages Dilemma, 33 DEPAUL L. REV. 31 (1983) and cases cited therein.
433. See supra notes 288-92.
434. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 19 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976), amended by Pub.
L. No. 98-527, 98 Stat. 2662 (1994)).
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tence that the language was merely precatory, is best explained as
expressing the new majority's opposition to Thiboutot's section
1983 thesis itself.
The other 1981 decision was Middlesex County Sewerage Au-
thority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n.435 Seizing the occasion to
address this point even though no party had raised it, the Sea
Clammers majority said that even where actual third-party rights
are established, section 1983 cannot avail if the legislation creating
those rights provides other remedial devices "sufficiently compre-
hensive ... to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the
remedy of suits under § 1983.436 Whether or not Sea Clammers,
like Pennhurst, bespeaks dissatisfaction with Thiboutot's section
1983 thesis itself, it does diminish Thiboutot's significance for
spending condition claims in particular, because spending condi-
tions always are enforceable through a variety of remedial devices
at the federal government's instance (and discretion), and where
no basis for private claims other than section 1983 can be shown,
an inference that Congress considered this remedial array sufficient
is likely to be persuasive.
In 1989, a sharply divided Supreme Court repudiated the tacit
premise of numerous prior decisions by holding that section 1983
gives no cause of action either against "a state [or] its officials
acting in their official capacities."437 It might be that this holding,
too, is explicable as a reaction against Thiboutot's forced expansion
of section 1983, since it is difficult to rationalize persuasively oth-
erwise.
Pennhurst and Sea Clammers were sandbags hastily thrown
against the flood of section 1983 cases precipitated by Thiboutot.
Those sandbags still hold. For example, in 1992, a seven-Justice
majority applying Pennhurst concluded that the Adoption Assis-
tance and Child Welfare Act of 1980438 (a conditioned spending
measure) does not actually create third-party beneficiary rights.439
435. 453 U.S. 1 (1981). Sea Clammers was not a spending condition case; the claims
for which § 1983 was invoked were asserted under regulatory statutes resting on
Congress's commerce power and foreign affairs powers coupled with its Necessary and
Proper Clause power. See id. at 19.
436. Id. at 20. Cf. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1011-12 (1984) (holding that relief
granted under the Education of the Handicapped Act does not include attorney's fees).
This case made into a limitation on § 1983's reach the flip side of a factor that, before
Thiboutot, had been used to identify causes of action "implied" by federal statutes.
437. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
438. 42 U.S.C. § 671 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
439. Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360, 1370 (1992). A month earlier, all the Justices
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On the other hand, the sandbags have not proved impregnable:
5-4 majorities not only construed spending conditions to confer
third-party rights, but also applied section 1983 to them, in 1987
under the National Housing Act"4 and in 1990 under the Boren
Amendment to the Medicaid Act."1
The majorities in those 1987 and 1990 cases, however, includ-
ed Justices Brennan, Marshall, White, and Blackmun, all of whom
have since retired. All four of those Justices had been among the'
majority in Thiboutot itself and had resisted when Pennhurst
fought to dike the resulting flood." In contrast, the 1992 majori-
ty included Chief Justice Rehnquist (who had dissented in
Thiboutot); all three of the 1980s appointees-Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, and Kennedy (who likewise appear determined to contain
Thiboutot, if not overrule it); and the 1990s appointees to that
date-Justices Souter and Thomas.
This simplistic head count should be enough to induce doubt
that Thiboutot's novel construction of section 1983 can long sur-
vive. But to argue from head counts alone would be to deprecate
the role of the intellectual element in constitutional law. Thiboutot
has produced confusion in the lower courts," 3 and while com-
mentators have offered varied advice"' they have not succeeded
had either joined or concurred in holding that the third-party beneficiary right and third-
party cause of action inferred from Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments in Can-
non v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979), made damages available as a
remedy. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1038 (1992).
440. Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 424-32 (1987) (conclud-
ing, based on the legislative history and the remedies provided by the Brooke Amend-
ment, 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a) (1988), that Congress did not intend to foreclose a § 1983
cause of action). But cf. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1011-12 (1984) (rejecting §
1983 claim under the Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988
& Supp. 11 1990)).
441. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990) (applying 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1988)). Larger majorities have applied § 1983 to claims not based on spending conditions
violations. See, e.g., Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991) (Commerce Clause claims);
Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989) (certain claims resting
on preemption); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989) (claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
442. Justice White, with whom Justices Brennan and Marshall joined, dissented in
Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 33-55 (1981) (White, J., dissenting), and
Justice Blackmun concurred only in part, id. at 32-33 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
443. See Brown, supra 433, at 33.
444. See, e.g., id. at 31; Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of
Federal Law, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 394 (1982); Paul Wartelle & Jeffrey H. Louden, Private
Enforcement of Federal Statutes: The Role of the Section 1983 Remedy, 9 HASTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. 487 (1982); see also Henry P. Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under
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in dispelling the confusion and doubt. The reason, I think, is that
notwithstanding the roles of politics, predilection, and pragmatic
considerations, constitutional law fundamentally is an intellectual
enterprise, and shortfalls of logic, consistency, and coherence inevi-
tably produce confusion and disagreement in the short run and, in
the longer run, powerfully impel rethinking and change. Cogency,
on the other hand, breeds constancy.
Once exposed as unsoundly reasoned, faulty propositions tend
not to endure. Sometimes individuals become attached beyond
reason to favored but flawed propositions and adhere stubbornly
to them until overcome by the inexorable march of time. Whenev-
er good minds consider a point anew, however, there is opportuni-
ty again for reason to subjugate will, and for intellect's intolerance
of inconsistency, incongruity, and illogic to prevail. Thiboutot sim-
ply is nonsense, no matter how well it serves anyone's social or
political objectives. One can be confident, therefore, that the pros-
pect for its survival in the face of a candid reassessment is very
poor.
CONCLUSION
Even if one agrees that theoretical purity should not be ex-
pected (and may not even be desirable) in a discipline so relent-
lessly practical as law, there surely is a surfeit of contradictions
and anomalies in modern constitutional thought about federal
spending. The more one studies recent cases, the more it becomes
evident that often neither the Justices nor those who have argued
before them have quite understood what they were doing. Say
what one may about law thriving on experience rather than logic,
there is vast room for greater conceptual coherence and systematic
analysis in this realm of jurisprudence before any risk of doctri-
naire theory need be feared. Alexander Hamilton's was a pragmat-
ic and practical mind, and it was precisely for that reason that he
valued and strove to maintain consistency and coherence in his
constitutional thought.
Years ago it fell out of fashion among law teachers, scholars,
practitioners, and judges to invest any serious analytical effort
toward understanding the principle of enumerated powers and
Section 1983 and the APA, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 233 (1991); Steven H. Steinglass, The
Emerging State Court § 1983 Action: A Procedural Review, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 381
(1984).
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other rudimentary, if now sorely misunderstood, fundaments of the
constitutional law of American federalism. The anomalies and
contradictions now prevalent regarding the spending power are
among the sad results. It now is long past the due time to recon-
sider.
The one constant with regard to federal spending, from the
First Congress in the time of George Washington through both
historic practice and judicial theory right down to the latest cases,
is the conviction that Hamilton had it right. The shortfall has been
as to diligence in understanding what Hamilton said. This Article
is intended to help its readers in that important, illuminating, and
quite reorienting task.
